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Karadeniz'in Türkiye için Kıyasal Jeopolitik Açından Önemi

Coastal Geopolitic Importance of Black Sea for Turkey

Konur Alp DEMİR*

Öz

Kıyasal jeopolitik, okyanus, deniz, göl, boğaz, delta ve nehir gibi su kütlelerinin bir ülkenin jeopolitiğine stratejik açıdan katkı yapmasını açıklayan bir kavramdır. Bu kavram çerçevesinde ve aynı eksen etrafında değerlendirildiği takdirde bir iç deniz olarak nitelendirilebilecek Karadeniz'in coğrafi konumu ile Türkiye'nin Avrupa ile Asya'yı birbirine bağlayan bir noktada konumlanması Karadeniz'i hem Türkiye hem de Avrupa ve Asya için önemli bir konuma yükseltmektedir. Bu bağlamda Karadeniz'in Türkiye için coğrafya, ekonomi, siyaset ve güvenlik unsurları açısından incelenmesi gereken bir değeri ortaya çıkmaktadır. Karadeniz'in uluslararası ilişkiler bağlamında siyaset, ekonomi ve güvenlik üçlemesinin kilit noktasında durması bu bölgeye olan ilgiyi arttırmaktadır. Bu çalışmada Türkiye'nin Karadeniz'de en uzun kıyı şeridinde sahip olması bağlamında küresel siyaset ve uluslararası güvenlik konularındaki üstünlüğüne vurgu yapılacak, Karadeniz'in küresel siyasetteki önemi ve yeri değerlendirmeye alınacak, uluslararası güvenlik konularında Türkiye'nin yeterliliğini güçlendiren Karadeniz'in jeopolitik konumu incelenecektir. Bununla birlikte, çalışmada farklı unsurların Karadeniz üzerindeki hâkimiyet kurma çabaları incelenecektir. İlgili çabalar küresel yapılanmalar ve anlaşmazlıklar üzerinden gerçekleştirilmeye çalışılacaktır.

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Çalışmanın nihai amacı Karadeniz'in Türkiye için önemini kıyasal jeopolitik konumu açısından değerlendirilmesidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Karadeniz, Kıyasal Jeopolitik, Küresel Siyaset, Ekonomi, Yönetim.

Abstract

Coastal geopolitics is a concept explaining the strategic contribution of water bodies such as ocean, sea, lake, strait, delta and river to the geopolitics of a country. An inland sea as the geographical location of Turkey and the Black Sea can be considered to be located at a point linking Asia with Europe and the Black Sea to Turkey it raises an important position in both Europe and Asia. In this study, in terms of having the longest coastline on the Black Sea in Turkey will be held in global politics and emphasis on the rule of international security issues, the Black Sea to be taken and location assessment importance in global politics, geopolitics of the Black Sea to strengthen Turkey's competence in international security issues will be examined. However, the study will attempt to examine the different elements' efforts to dominate the Black Sea. Relevant efforts will be made through global structures and disagreements. The importance for Turkey's ultimate objective of the study is to evaluate in terms of the Black Sea coastal geopolitical position.

Keywords: Black Sea, Coastal Geopolitics, Global Politics, Economy, Administration.

Giriş

Jeopolitik kavramı 19. yüzyılın sonlarından itibaren bilim adamlarının inceleme nesnesi haline gelmiştir. Bu bağlamda bilim adamları jeopolitik kavramını uluslararası ilişkiler ve sınır hatlarının güvenliğinden yönetimine kadar geniş bir çerçevede olmak üzere devlet çalışmaları ile ilişkilendirmişlerdir. Çünkü ulus devletlerin kendi sınırlarını belirlemek suretiyle yer altı madenlerine ve su gibi hayati

önemi olan kaynaklara erişimlerini garanti altına almaya çalışmaları, coğrafi unsurlar açısından mutlak bir biçimde sınır çizme ve bu sınırlar içerisinde konumlanma konusunu gündeme getirmektedir.¹

Jeopolitik kavramını ilk defa bilim dünyası ile tanıştıran ve formülize eden kişi anayasa avukatı (veya anayasa hukukçusu) Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922)'dir. Karl Haushofer (1869–1946) ise ilgili kavramı sistematik açıdan geliştiren, uluslararası ilişkiler öğretilerine işleyen ve coğrafyacı kimliği ile de tanınan bir Alman subayıdır.²

Karl Haushofer jeopolitiği, “Doğal şartların ve tarihi gelişmelerin etkisi altında değişen siyasi hayat şeklinin (devletin) üzerinde yaşadığı yer ile ilişkisidir.” biçiminde anlamlandırmıştır. Kenar Kuşak Teorisi'nin sahibi Amerikalı jeopolitikçi Nicholas John Spykman ise jeopolitiği, “Bir ülkenin güvenlik politikasının coğrafi unsurlara ve olaylara göre planlanmasıdır.” şeklinde tanımlamıştır. İngiliz jeopolitikçi Geoffrey Sloan konuya farklı bir bakış ile yaklaşmış ve jeopolitik kavramını “Siyasi tarih içinde, belirli coğrafi modellerin önemine dikkat çekme girişimidir.” şeklinde yorumlamıştır. Amerikalı Colin S. Gray jeopolitik kavramı hakkında “Uluslararası ilişkilerin uzamsal incelemesi ve uygulamasıdır.” derken, konuyu devletlerarası ilişkilere yöneltmiştir.³

Eleştirel Jeopolitik Yaklaşımı'na göre jeopolitik kavramının eleştirel yönden değerlendirmesini yapan Gearóid Ó Tuathail ise jeopolitiği “Devlet yönetiminin kavramlaştırılmasına ve devletin idare edilmesine yönelik bir problem çözme kuramı” şeklinde açıklamıştır. Bu açıklamanın ulaşmak istediği hedef jeopolitiğin bir güç politikası olduğunun vurgulanmasıdır.⁴

¹ Klaus Dodds, *Global Geopolitics A Critical Introduction*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, USA, 2013, p. 1.

² Benno Teschke, “Geopolitics”, *Historical Materialism*, 2006, Volume: 14:1, pp. 327–335, p. 327.

³ Bülent Ulaş, *Jeopolitik: Türkiye'nin Milli Güvenliği ve Avrupa Birliği Üyelik Süreci*, Başlık Yayın Grubu, İstanbul, 2011, s. 97-98.

⁴ Bülent Ulaş, *a.g.e.*, s. 98.

Jeopolitik, devlet kavramı açısından değerlendirme yapıldığı takdirde, yapı, kurum ve güç arasındaki ilişkileri coğrafi konum üzerinden değerlendiren bir anlamlandırmaya sahiptir. Bu bağlamda yer (mekân), uzay (boşluk), ölçek, bölge, iletişim ağı ve ülke (toprak) kavramları jeopolitik açıdan önem taşıyan ve jeopolitiğin anlamlandırılması aşamasında kullanılan ana unsurları meydana getirmektedirler.⁵

Kıyı jeopolitiği ise dünya üzerindeki su kütlelerinin kara parçasına oranla daha fazla yer kaplaması ile doğrudan ilişkilendirilebilecek bir kavramdır. Çünkü dünya yüzeyinin yaklaşık % 70'i su ile kaplıdır. Bu sebepten dolayı dünya nüfusunun yaklaşık dörtte üçü herhangi bir su külesinin kıyısında yaşamaktadır. Bununla birlikte, yüz elliden fazla devlet konumlandığı coğrafya açısından kıyı devleti olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bu sebepten dolayı kıyı jeopolitiği üzerinde önemle durulması gereken bir kavramı meydana getirmektedir.⁶

Bu kavrama “Deniz Hâkimiyet Teorisi” ile önemli ölçüde katkı yapan Amerikalı Amiral Alfred T. Mahan (1840-1914) deniz ve kıyı jeopolitiği açısından önde gelen bir isimdir. Mahan “Denizlere hâkim olan dünyaya hâkim olur.” derken kıyasal jeopolitiğin önemine vurgu yapmaktadır. Buna göre ifade edilmesi gereken en önemli sonuç bir kıyı devletinin siyasi ve ekonomik yönden güçlü olması ve kendi güvenliğini garanti altına alabilmesi için hem açık denizlerde hem de kendi kıyılarında otoriter güç olmayı başarabilmesi gerekmektedir.⁷

Bu anlamlandırma çerçevesinde Karadeniz’in Türk devlet yönetimi açısından kıyasal jeopolitik öneminin incelendiği bu çalışmanın alt benliğinde, bir ülkenin üzerinde konumlandığı coğrafyanın devlet yönetimine sağladığı üstünlüklerin coğrafya ve yönetim birlikteliğinde değerlendirilmesi amacının yer almasından

⁵ Colin Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, Second Edition, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, USA, 2012, p. 19.

⁶ Emine Akçadağ, *Denizlerin Önemi ve Türk Deniz Kuvvetleri*, BİLGESAM Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, Rapor No: 68, İstanbul, 2015, s. 2.

⁷ Bülent Ulaş, *a.g.e.*, s. 27-29.

dolayı, coğrafya kavramının bilim olma niteliği üzerinden tanımlanması ihtiyacı hissedilmektedir.

Bu bağlamda coğrafya, insan ve doğal ortamın birlikteliğini inceleyen bir bilim dalı niteliğiyle anlamlandırılabilir. ⁸ Türk Dil Kurumu Büyük Türkçe Sözlüğü'nde ise coğrafya, “Yeryüzünü fiziksel, ekonomik, beşerî, siyasal yönlerden inceleyen bilim” ve “Bir yeryüzü parçasını, bir bölgeyi, bir ülkeyi belirleyen, niteleyen, fiziksel, ekonomik, beşerî, siyasal gerçekliklerin tümü”⁹ şeklinde tanımlanmıştır.

Yukarıdaki tanımlardan yola çıkılarak, insan ve doğal ortam arasında mutlak bir ilişkinin ve iletişimin var olduğu ifade edilebilmektedir.¹⁰ Devlet yönetiminin özünde de insan olduğu için devlet yönetimi ile coğrafya ilişkisini göz ardı etmek etkin devlet yönetiminin ana kurgusundan uzaklaşmak anlamına gelmektedir.¹¹

Coğrafi özellikler bir ülkenin kaderini belirleyen ve gücünün orantısız boyutunu ifade eden önemli etkenler arasında sayılmaktadır. Bir ülkenin coğrafi konumu, sahip olduğu topraklarının genişliği, arazi şartları, yüksek dağlara ve sık ormanlı bir toprak yapısına sahip olup olmadığı, bir ada üzerinde konumlanıyor olması ve önemli bir su kütlesinin yanında yer alması gibi unsurlar ilgili ülkeye kazanım olarak geri dönebilmektedir.¹²

Yaşadığımız yüzyılda teknolojinin gelişmesi, haberleşme kaynaklarının fazlalığı ve kolay biçimde sahip olunabilmeleri, ulaşım

⁸ Ali Özçağlar, *Yönetimsel Coğrafya*, 1. Baskı, Nika Yayınevi, Ankara, 2015, s. 15.

⁹ Türk Dil Kurumu Büyük Türkçe Sözlüğü, Coğrafya, http://www.tdk.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_bts&arama=kelime&guid=TDK.GTS.5b952eb73b5c22.35010999, (Erişim Tarihi: 09.09.2018).

¹⁰ Ali Özçağlar, *a.g.e.*, s. 15.

¹¹ Hasan Hüseyin Çevik, *Kamu Yönetimi Kavramlar – Sorunlar – Tartışma*, 2. Baskı, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2012, s. 25; Konur Alp Demir ve Hikmet Yavaş, “Yönetim Algısındaki Değişim: Yönetimde Özerk İnsan Unsuru”, *Mehmet Akif Ersoy Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 2014, Yıl: 6 Sayı:11, ss. 121-132, s. 121.

¹² Tayyar Arı, *Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Dış Politika*, 8. Baskı, MKM Yayıncılık, Bursa, 2009, s. 141.

imkânlarının fazlalaşması ve savaş teknolojilerinin kıtalar arası boyuta evrimleşmesi coğrafyanın önemini ortadan kaldırdıkları düşünülebilmektedir. Ancak dünya üzerinde güç dengelerinin sağlanmasında iki güç veya güce meydan okumak isteyen başka bir güç arasında binlerce kilometrelik büyük bir okyanusun girmesi veya ana kıtadan çok fazla uzak olmasa da bir su kütlesi hattı ile ayrılması ilgili devletlere mevcut durumda önemli bir kazanım sağlamaktadır.¹³

Bu çalışmada coğrafyanın stratejik gücünden faydalanılması gerekliliği üzerine odaklanılmıştır. Dolayısıyla bu çalışma kapsamında ve çalışmanın özü ile doğrudan ilişkili olan konu için soru haline getirilmesi gereken husus kıyı ile devlet birlikteliğinin stratejik önemidir. Konuya bu açıdan yaklaşıldığı takdirde sorulması gereken sorular şunlardır: Bir içdeniz olan Karadeniz'in Türkiye için kıyısız jeopolitik önemi nedir? Karadeniz'in Türkiye'nin bölgesel ve uluslararası alandaki ekonomisi, güvenliği ve siyaseti açısından önemi nedir? Karadeniz'de otoriter güç olmayı başarabilen bir kıyı devleti bölgesel ve küresel alanda nasıl bir üstünlük sağlayabilecektir? Bu çalışma kapsamında bu sorulara cevap aranmaktadır.

Bu bağlamda ilk önce Türkiye'nin üzerinde konumlandığı coğrafyanın jeopolitik analizi yapılacaktır. Çalışmanın ana kurgusuna ulaşabilmek için Karadeniz'in jeopolitik değerlendirmesi üzerinden Türkiye'nin bir kıyı devleti olarak üstünlükleri tartışılacak ve bu bağlamda kıyısız jeopolitik kavramına giriş yapılacaktır. Türkiye'nin sahip olduğu coğrafya üstünlüğünü kullanarak ürettiği veya üretmeye çalıştığı Karadeniz ile ilgili politikalarının incelenmesinin ardından Karadeniz'in ekonomik, güvenlik ve siyaset üçlemesindeki konumu tartışılarak konu tamamlanmaya çalışılacaktır.

¹³ Tayyar Arı, *a.g.e.*, 141-142.

1. Karadeniz'in Jeopolitik Konumu, Önemi ve Temel Kavramlar

Türk Dil Kurumu Büyük Türkçe Sözlüğü'nde jeopolitik kavramı “Coğrafya, ekonomi, nüfus vb.nin bir devletin politikası üzerindeki etkisi”; “Bir devlette bir bölgede uygulanan politikayla o yerin coğrafyası arasındaki ilişki” ve “Bir devletin saldırgan nitelikteki genişlemesini, ekonomik ve siyasi coğrafya açısından haklı kılmaya yönelik siyasi öğretisi”¹⁴ olmak üzere üç farklı şekilde tanımlanmıştır. Dolayısıyla jeopolitik kavramı bir devletin uluslararası politikalarını belirlerken sahip olduğu “coğrafya”, “ekonomi”, ve “nüfus” gibi değerlerinden yardım alması gerekliliğini vurgulayan bir anlamlandırmaya sahiptir.¹⁵ Benzer biçimde, jeopolitik üzerinde konumlanılan coğrafyanın özelliklerine göre devlet yönetme sanatıdır.¹⁶

Jeopolitik, dünyaya bakılan bir görüş açısidir. Bu görüş açısından devletler birbirleri ile etkileşim içerisine girmektedirler.¹⁷ Jeopolitik kavramı devlet ilişkilerini yorumlayıcı bir rol üstlenmektedir. Bu rol uluslararası ilişkilerde ve küresel siyasette su kütlesi ve kara parçasının üstlenmiş olduğu görevleri açıklamaya çalışan tarihsel bir strateji üzerinden şekillenmektedir. Bu strateji küresel siyaset üretme ve güvenlik sorunlarını açıklamak üzerine kurgulanmıştır. Bu bağlamda değerlendirildiği takdirde kuramsal bir gerçeklik üzerinden

¹⁴ Türk Dil Kurumu Büyük Türkçe Sözlüğü, Jeopolitik, http://www.tdk.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_bts&arama=kelime&guid=TDK.GTS.5b953639bf4d28.04268177, (Erişim Tarihi: 09.09.2018).

¹⁵ Hamza Akengin, *Siyasi Coğrafya İnsan ve Mekân Yönetimi*, 3. Baskı, Pegem Akademi Yayınları, Ankara, 2013, s. 8; Hakkı Çiftçi ve Murat Koç, “Türkiye'nin Yeni Jeopolitiğinin Çevresi”, *International Conference on Eurasian Economies 2013*, (Editörler: Selahattin Sarı; Alp H. Gencer ve İlyas Sözen), St. Petersburg – Russia, 17-18 Eylül 2013, Beykent Üniversitesi, 2013, ss. 854-861, s. 855; Ali Hasanov, *Jeopolitik Teorileri Metodolojisi Aktörleri Tarihi Karakteristiği Kavramları*, Babiali Kültür Yayıncılığı, İstanbul, 2012, s. 15.

¹⁶ İbrahim Atalay, *Türkiye Coğrafyası ve Jeopolitiği*, 9. Baskı, Meta Basım Matbaacılık Hizmetleri, İzmir, 2016, s. 375.

¹⁷ Francis P. Sempa, *Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*, Transaction Publisher, Canada, 2002, p. 4-5.

hareket ederek jeopolitik kavramının uluslararası güvenlik konusunda açıklayıcı bir niteliğe sahip olduğu öne sürülebilmektedir.¹⁸

Jeopolitik dinamik bir siyasetin aracı unsuru olduğu için küresel güç dengelerinin dağıtılması ve tekrardan toplanması aşamasında önemli görevler üstlenmektedir.¹⁹ Çünkü jeopolitik küresel siyasetin anahtar kavramıdır. Farklı bir anlatım ile bir devlet sahip olduğu jeopolitik gücünü dış ilişkilerde doğru yerde ve zamanda kullanırsa iletişim ve gerektiği durumda pazarlık üstünlüğüne sahip olabilmektedir.²⁰ Çünkü bir devlet jeopolitik yeterliliğini ve jeostratejik yeteneğini kullanarak dış politikada üstün bir konuma gelebilme olasılığına sahiptir.²¹ Dolayısıyla bir devletin dünya üzerindeki konumu devletlerarası ilişkilerde önemli bir etken olarak kendisini göstermektedir. Bu bağlamda değerlendirildiği takdirde bir devletin doğal veya yapay boğazlara, göllere, denizlere, akarsulara, okyanuslara, çöllere, enerji kaynaklarına ve ormanlık arazilere sahip olması o devletin siyasal konumunu önemli oranda etkilemektedir. Türkiye üç tarafı denizlerle çevrelenmiş yarımada bir ülke olması ve Asya ile Avrupa kıtalarının kesişim noktasında durması sebebi ile bir geçiş yolu vazifesi görmesi açısından son derece stratejik bir konumda durmaktadır. Karadeniz'e kıyısı bulunan ülkelerin sıcak denizlere inebilmeleri ve dünya ile deniz yolu vasıtasıyla ticaret yapabilmeleri Türkiye'nin hâkimiyeti altında bulunan İstanbul ve Çanakkale Boğazları'nı geçiş yolu olarak kullanmalarından geçmektedir. Bununla birlikte, bir iç deniz olan Marmara Denizi ise iki boğaz arasında önemli bir su kütlesini meydana getirmektedir. Avrupa ile Kafkasların karayolu ile bağlantısı benzer biçimde Türkiye üzerinden

¹⁸ Geoffrey Sloan & Colin S. Gray, "Why Geopolitics?", *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy*, Routledge Publisher, USA, 2013, pp. 1-11, p. 10.

¹⁹ Bert Chapman, *Geopolitics: A Guide to the Issues*, Praeger Publisher, USA, 2011, p. 3.

²⁰ Gearóid Ó. Tuathail & John Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy", *Political Geography*, 1992, Volume: 11, Number: 2, ss. 190-204, s. 191.

²¹ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi*, 6. Baskı, DER Yayınları, İstanbul, 2014, s. 652-653.

sağlanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla Türkiye ulaşım ve ticaret yollarının kesişim noktasında durmaktadır.²²

Bu kesişim noktasının matematiksel konumunu vermek gerekirse Türkiye'nin kuzey yarım kürede 36°-42° paralelleri (36° ve 42° kuzey enlemleri) ve başlangıç meridyenine göre doğuda 26°-45° doğru meridyenleri (26° doğu ve 45° doğu boylamları) arasında konumlanan bir ülke olduğu ifade edilebilmektedir.²³ Bu verilere göre ifade edilebilir ki Türkiye coğrafi açıdan Afro-Avrasya Bölgesi'nin tam ortasında ve jeostratejik bir düzlemin dört boyutlu ekseninin odak noktasında konumlanmaktadır. Bu odak noktasının önemi ekonomik anlamda güçlenen Asya'nın, doğal kaynaklarının zenginliği ile tekrardan gündeme gelen Afrika'nın ve geçmiş dönemlere oranla askeri yeterliliği azalmış Avrupa'nın kesişim noktası olmasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Böyle bir kesişim noktasında duran Türkiye'nin hem jeopolitik hem de jeostratejik değeri oldukça fazladır.²⁴

Bir ülkenin jeopolitik konumu çevresinde yaşanan siyasi olaylara göre değişkenlik gösterebilmektedir. Örneğin, Türkiye'nin Karadeniz'de üstlendiği rol ve jeopolitik konumunun ürettiği siyasi davranışları Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasından önce ve dağıldıktan sonra farklılık göstermektedir.²⁵

Türkiye dünya üzerinde sahip olduğu stratejik konumundan dolayı dünyanın merkezinde yer alan bir konuma sahiptir. Bu bağlamda değerlendirildiği takdirde Türkiye, özellikle Avrupa'yı, Asya'yı, kuzey ve kuzeydoğu ülkelerini ve Orta Doğu'yu ilgilendiren herhangi bir uluslararası krizde kilit rol üstlenme potansiyeline sahiptir. Çünkü Türkiye bağlantı noktalarına sahip bir ülke olarak

²² Hamza Akengin, "Türkiye'nin Jeopolitiği", *Türkiye Coğrafyası ve Jeopolitiği*, (Editör: Meryem Hayır Kanat), Nobel Yayınevi, Ankara, 2016, ss. 1-28, s. 2.

²³ Hamza Akengin, *a.g.e.*, s. 2.

²⁴ Türk Deniz Kuvvetleri Stratejisi, s. 8. https://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/data/icerik/392/DZKK_STRATEJJI.pdf, (Erişim Tarihi: 21.09.2018).

²⁵ Suat İlhan, *Türklerin Jeopolitiği ve Avrasyacılık*, 3. Baskı, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara, 2006, s. 50.

siyasi bir güç merkezi konumundadır.²⁶

Türkiye konumlandığı coğrafyanın özelliğinden dolayı hem Avrupa hem de Asya ülkesidir. Türkiye, aynı zamanda, Akdeniz, Orta Doğu ve Kafkasya üçlemesinin tam ortasında yer alarak bakış açısını farklı bölgelere kadar da genişletme yeteneğine sahiptir. Türkiye bu yeteneğini kullanarak dış politika, yerel ve uluslararası ticaret ve ulusal ve küresel güvenlik konularında başat bir rol üstlenebilmektedir.²⁷

Bir içdeniz olan Karadeniz 422.1983 km²'lik²⁸ alanıyla Türkiye'yi Bulgaristan, Romanya, Ukrayna, Rusya ve Gürcistan ile hem komşu ülke yapmakta hem de siyasal bir iletişimi zorunlu hale getirmektedir. Türkiye, Karadeniz kıyı şeridinde yaklaşık 1685 km'lik bir alana sahiptir.²⁹

Karadeniz hem Asya hem de Avrupa ülkeleri için önemli bir noktada durmaktadır. Karadeniz'e kıyıdaş olan ülkeler için ortak bir zeminde hareket etmek hem kolay hem de rekabet gibi uzun süreçli faaliyetler açısından oldukça zordur. İlgili zorluk Karadeniz'in taşıdığı olduğu ekonomik değerinden, uluslararası güvenlik konularından ve enerji hatlarının geçiş rotası olmasından kaynaklanmaktadır.³⁰

Karadeniz, Asya ve Avrupa devletlerinin ortak birliktelik içerisine girdiği bir noktada konumlanmasından ve bu konumlanmanın da Türkiye'nin jeopolitik konumu gereği Anadolu toprakları üzerinden sağlanmasını zorunlu kılmasından dolayı son derece aktif siyaset üreten bir havzadır.³¹ Bu gerçeklikten dolayı Türkiye, bu kesişim noktasında, tarafları ortak bir zeminde buluşturabilecek ve gerektiği

²⁶ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, 49. Baskı, Küre Yayınları, İstanbul, 2010, s. 116.

²⁷ İbrahim Atalay, *a.g.e.*, s. 390.

²⁸ İbrahim Atalay, *a.g.e.*, s. 73.

²⁹ Ahmet Ertek, "Türkiye'nin Hidrografik Özellikleri", *Türkiye Coğrafyası ve Jeopolitiği*, (Editör: Meryem Hayır Kanat), Nobel Yayınevi, Ankara, 2016, ss. 71-117, s. 72.

³⁰ İlyas Kamalov (Kemaloğlu), "Karadeniz Bölgesindeki Bazı Güncel Sorunlar", *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, 2009, Cilt: 6, Sayı: 21, ss. 13-21, s. 14.

³¹ Alaeddin Yalçınkaya, "Kuruluşundan Günümüze Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü", *Marmara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi*, 2017, Cilt: 5, Özel Sayı, Nisan, ss. 1-16, s. 9.

durumlarda da ilişkileri kontrol edebilecek bir yeterliliğe sahiptir. Daha basit bir açıklama ile Türkiye bu bölgede uluslararası ekonominin ve güvenliğin motor gücünü ve herhangi bir olumsuz durumda ise sigortasını oluşturmaktadır.³² Bu öngörü, Mahan'ın "Deniz Hâkimiyet Teorisi" ile de desteklenmektedir.³³

Karadeniz'e kıyısı bulunan ülkelerin arasında Türkiye, diğer ülkelere göre, en uzun kıyı parçasına sahip ülke konumundadır. Bu coğrafi gerçeklik Türkiye'yi jeoekonomik açıdan üstün konuma getirmektedir. Türkiye Karadeniz sayesinde Doğu ve Kuzey Avrupa'ya ve Kafkaslar ile Orta Asya'ya kolay biçimde açılma imkânına sahiptir.³⁴ Bu açıdan değerlendirildiği takdirde Karadeniz coğrafya, siyaset ve strateji üçgeninin tam ortasında yer alan önemli bir oyun sahası konumundadır. Bundan dolayı Karadeniz'i "doğal jeopolitik merkez" olarak adlandırmak yanlış olmayacaktır.³⁵

Karadeniz, Türkiye için tarihi bir yer kapma savaşının mirasçısı konumundadır. 15. yüzyıldan itibaren Osmanlı Devleti ile Rus Çarlığı arasında meydana gelen hâkimiyet savaşı, Türkiye ile Sovyetler Birliği arasında devam etmiş, Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasına kadar geçen sürede iki kutuplu bir savaş yaşanırken Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasının ardından savaş sistematik bir mücadeleye dönüşmüş ve farklı aktörlerin katılımı ile cephe büyümüştür. Sonuç itibarıyla Karadeniz siyasi, uluslararası güvenlik ve ekonomik anlamda hem bir işbirliği hem de mücadele anlamında "uluslararasılaşmış" bir görünüm sergilemektedir.³⁶

³² Gökhan Koçer, "Karadeniz'in Güvenliği: Uluslararası Yapılanmalar ve Türkiye", *Gazi Akademik Bakış Dergisi*, 2007, Cilt: 1, Sayı: 1, ss. 195-217, s. 198-200; Nadire Filiz İrge, "Karadeniz Havzası Jeopolitiğinde Güç Mücadelesinin Arka Planı ve Bölgesel Güvenliğin Uluslararası Önemi", *Marmara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi*, 2017, Cilt: 5, Özel Sayı, ss. 79-92, s. 80-84-85.

³³ Gökhan Koçer, *a.g.m.*, s. 198.

³⁴ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *a.g.e.*, s. 160-161.

³⁵ Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, "The 'Security Paradoxes' of the Black Sea region", *The Security Context In The Black Sea Region*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, Great Britain, 2010, pp. 3-21, s. 5.

³⁶ Gökhan Koçer, *a.g.m.*, s. 196.

19. yüzyılın son dönemleri ve 20. yüzyılın ilk başlarında gerçekleşen süper güç değişiminde Karadeniz'in bir Avrupa Bölgesi haline dönüşmesi için ilk adım atılmıştır. Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından savaştan galip olarak çıkan devletler Karadeniz'e hükmetmeye çalışmışlardır. Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesi ile bölge devletleri dış politikalarını yeniden yapılandırırken bölgesel hassasiyeti de dikkate alarak önceliklerinin tanımlamalarını tekrardan yapmaya başlamışlardır.³⁷

Karadeniz, stratejik ve ekonomik açıdan değerlendirmek gerekirse, bölge devletleri için küresel siyasi ekonominin Hazar Denizi'nden başlayarak bölge coğrafyasından Avrupa'ya doğru yayıldığı bir çizgide, dünya pazarlarına açılabilme için küresel bir işlev üstlenmektedir. Karadeniz'in potansiyel enerji kaynakları havzayı ve bölge ülkelerini stratejik bir konuma taşımaktadır. Karadeniz dünya ekonomisi için yeni bir pazar ve ticaret fırsatları bölgesi olarak³⁸ üzerinde önemle durulması gereken bir havzadır.³⁹

Karadeniz'in jeopolitik ve jeoekonomik geleceği çoğunlukla Rusya ve Türkiye'nin ilişkilerine bağlıdır. 1990'lı yılların başından beri Türkiye Karadeniz havzasında önemli bir aktör olduğu izlenimini vermektedir. Bu bağlamda Türkiye Karadeniz'in jeopolitik ve jeoekonomik geleceği açısından önemli bir rol üstlenmiştir. Türkiye bu rolünü Rusya ile stratejik bir ortak olarak sürdürdüğü gibi, Rusya'nın rakibi olarak da yerine getirebilmektedir.⁴⁰ Türkiye'nin özellikle Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasının ardından Karadeniz'de daha yoğun

³⁷ Anda Nicoleta Onetiu, "Geopolitical and Geostrategic Dimensions within the Black Sea Basin", *International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences*, 2012, Volume: 2, Special Issue: 1, ss. 238-242, s. 238-239.

³⁸ Panagiota Manoli, *Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea, Building an Inclusive, Innovative, and Integrated Region*, Commissioned Paper for the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, Greece, 2014, p. 5.

³⁹ Akın Alkan, *21. Yüzyılın İlk Çeyreğinde Karadeniz Güvenliği*, Nobel Yayınevi, Ankara, 2006, s. 17; Alaeddin Yalçınkaya, a.g.m., s. 9.

⁴⁰ Alexandr G. Druzhinin, "The Black Sea Region in Modern Russian-Turkish Cooperation: Geo-Strategic Aspect", *International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues*, 2015, Volume: 5, Special Issue, pp. 81-84, p. 81.

faaliyetler içerisinde girmesi ile Karadeniz'in jeopolitik öneminin değişime uğraması aynı zaman dilimine rastlamaktadır.⁴¹

Karadeniz'e hâkim olmak Doğu Akdeniz, Kuzey Orta Doğu, Güney Kafkasya ve Avrupa'nın geri kalanına hükmetmeyi kolaylaştırmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Karadeniz ticari anlamda transit bir koridor olma özelliğine sahiptir.⁴²

Karadeniz'in bölge devletleri ve hatta Amerika Birleşik Devleti için enerji açısından cazibe merkezi haline gelmesi 11 Eylül saldırısının ardından gerçekleşmiştir. Bu sürecin hemen ardından başlatılan terörle mücadele adı altındaki karmaşa içerisinde Orta Doğu artık güvensiz bir ortam olmaya başlamıştır. Bu güvensiz ortam içerisinde petrole bağımlılığını en üst seviyeden hisseden devletler bakış açılarını daha güvenli bölgelere ayarlamaya başlamışlardır. Karadeniz bu dönemde stratejik bir önem kazanmaya başlamıştır.⁴³

Karadeniz havzasında meydana gelebilecek olası bir siyasi istikrarsızlık, güvenlik açığı veya uluslararası anlaşmazlıklar hem Avrupa hem de Asya'yı ilgilendirdiği gibi, aynı zamanda Türkiye'nin geçiş rotası olmasından dolayı, bu hattı kullanan her devleti derinden etkileyebilecektir.⁴⁴

Karadeniz taşıdığı öneme rağmen, bir kimlik bunalımı içerisinde. Çünkü Avrupa ile Asya arasında bir geçiş rotası ve farklı kültürlerin ortak yaşam alanı olarak melez bir birlikteliğin kısır döngüsünü oluşturmaktadır. Karadeniz'e giriş ve çıkış yapılabilmesi için Türkiye'nin sahip olduğu boğaz geçiş yollarına muhtaç olunması,

⁴¹ Liviu Bogdan Vlad, Gheorghe Hurduzeu & Andrei Josan, "Geopolitical Reconfigurations In The Black Sea Area At The Beginning Of The 21st Century", *Romanian Review on Political Geography*, 2009, Year: 11, Number: 1, pp. 65-76, p. 67.

⁴² Byron Chong, *The Role Of The Black Sea In Russia's Strategic Calculus*, 2017. <http://cimsec.org/role-black-sea-russias-strategic-calculus/31805>, (Erişim Tarihi: 15.09.2018).

⁴³ Iulian Lăzărescu, "Energy and Security in the Black Sea Region", *Management and Socio-Humanities (Review of the Air Force Academy)*, 2012, Volume: IX, No: 1(20), pp. 109-115, p. 112.

⁴⁴ Alaeddin Yalçınkaya, *a.g.m.*, s. 10.

ilgili havzaya kıyısı bulunan ve egemen güç olma iddiası ile dünyanın her coğrafyasında varlığını göstermeye çalışan ülkeleri Türkiye ile siyaset açısından hem dost hem de düşman yapabilmektedir.⁴⁵

Devletlerin uluslararası ilişkilerdeki konumunu belirleyen ve siyasi üstünlük için sahip olunması gereken kavram “güç”tür. Bir devletin güçlü olmasını belirleyen etkenlerin en önemlilerinden birisi ise üzerinde konumlandığı coğrafya olduğu için coğrafi şekillerin jeopolitik önemi oldukça fazladır.⁴⁶ Bu aşamada incelenecek olan coğrafi şekil ise kıyıdır.

Kıyı, su ile kara parçasının birleştiği yere verilen isimdir. Farklı bir tanımlamaya göre kıyı, deniz, göl, akarsu, baraj ve gölet gibi doğal veya yapay su kütlelerinin etrafını veya bir kısmını uzun veya kısa bir hat boyunca saran veya takip eden toprak parçasıdır.⁴⁷ Bu toprak parçaları dünyanın hemen her yerinde ekonomik, siyasi, çevresel ve demografik açıdan değerli konumdadırlar. Bu değer dünya nüfusunun önemli bir bölümünün neden kıyı kesimlerinde yaşadığının bir cevabı niteliğindedir.⁴⁸

Kıyısız jeopolitik, kara parçası ile deniz, okyanus veya göl gibi su kütlelerinin karşılıklı ilişkisinin incelenmeye çalışıldığı durumlarda işlevsellik kazanmaktadır. Bir su kütesinin konumunun veya kara parçasına karşı duruşunun incelenmeye çalışıldığı durumda, ilgili unsurların kıyı temel alınarak stratejik açıdan değerlendirilmesi gerekmektedir. Çünkü su kütlesi kıyıdan başlamaktadır. Bir devletin denize veya bir okyanusa kıyısı olması jeopolitik konumunu önemli derecede etkilemektedir.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Nadire Filiz İrge, *a.g.m.*, s. 83.

⁴⁶ Soylap Tamcelik, “Jeopolitik Teoriler Açısından Kıbrıs'ın Önemi”, *Center for Turkish Studies Occasional Paper Series*, Occasional Paper Serie, 2011, Volume:3, No:1, ss. 2-32, s.3.

⁴⁷ Konur Alp Demir, “Bütünleşik Kıyı Alanları Yönetimi Bağlamında Kıyı Kentleşmeleri”, *Manisa Celal Bayar Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Yönetim ve Ekonomi Dergisi*, 2018, Cilt:25, Sayı:2, ss. 409-426, s. 410-412.

⁴⁸ Parimal Sharma, *Coastal Zone Management*, Global India Publications, New Delhi, 2009, p. vii-3.

⁴⁹ Yılmaz Tezkan ve M. Murat Taşar, *Dünden Bugüne Jeopolitik*, Ülke Kitapları,

Bir devletin savaş veya barış zamanında askeri ve ticaret filolarının sığınabileceği, ikmal yapabileceği, ticaret faaliyetlerini sürdürebileceği kıyı bölgelerine ihtiyacı bulunmaktadır. Bu durum da kıyıların jeopolitik önemini arttırmaktadır.⁵⁰

Bir ülkenin kıyıları aynı zamanda o ülkenin sınırlarını da oluşturmaktadır. Bu sebepten dolayı bir ülkeye kıyıdan kolaylıkla yaklaşılabilir olması, o ülkenin jeopolitik açıdan güçsüzlüğünü göstermektedir. Bir diğer ifadeyle kıyılardan ülkenin içine ulaşabilmek ile o ülkenin jeopolitik korumasızlığı doğru orantılıdır.⁵¹

2. Türkiye'nin Karadeniz Politikaları

Türkiye, Karadeniz havzasında var olmak ve ağırlığını hissettirebilmek için uluslararası anlaşmalar içerisine girmek ve bölgede başat bir rol üstlenme çabasını sürdürmektedir. Çünkü Türkiye hem bir Karadeniz ülkesi hem de bu havza üzerinden geçen enerji hatlarının doğrudan ilgilenicisi konumundadır. Bununla birlikte güvenlik konuları ile yakından ilgilenmekte ve ileri bir tarihte olası bir biçimde ortaya çıkabilecek yer altı kaynaklarının da taliplisidir. Bu sebepten dolayı Türkiye uluslararası alanda sesini duyurma gayreti içerisinde. Çünkü Türkiye bu havzada uluslararası siyaseti etkileyebilecek baskın bir güç konumundadır.⁵²

Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Karadeniz'de önemli bir aktör haline gelmesinin başlangıç noktasını Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasının ardından bölgede Türkiye'den daha stratejik niteliklere bir devletin bulunmaması gerçeği oluşturmaktadır.⁵³ Bu gerçekten dolayı Türkiye'nin

İstanbul, 2002, s. 17-19.

⁵⁰ Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Deniz Gücünün Tarihe Olan Etkisi (1660-1812)", *Dünden Bugüne Jeopolitik*, (Yazarlar: Yılmaz Tezkan ve M. Murat Taşar), Ülke Kitapları, İstanbul, 2002, ss. 34-41, s. 36.

⁵¹ Alfred Thayer Mahan, a.g.e., s. 37.

⁵² Giray Saynur Bozkurt, "Security Policy Of Turkey And Russia In The Black Sea Basin", *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, 2011, Sayı: 30, ss. 1-13, s. 3.

⁵³ Kamer Kasım, "Türkiye'nin Karadeniz Politikası: Temel Parametreler ve Stratejiler", *Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu, OAKA Tartışma Platformu*,

Karadeniz havzasına yönelik politikalarının belirlenmesinde jeopolitik konumu yönlendirici etki yapmaktadır. Çünkü Türkiye, sürekli bir biçimde siyasi istikrarsızlıklar, çatışmalar ve savaşlar ile adları anılan Balkanlar, Kafkaslar ve Orta Doğu gibi coğrafyalarda konumlanan ülkeler ile komşu veya uzaktan bağlantılı bir ülkedir. Türkiye bu ülkeler ile geçmişten gelen bir bağının bulunmasından ve bu coğrafyalarda Türk kökenli insanların yaşamasından dolayı kendisini sıcak olayların dışında tutmamaktadır.⁵⁴

Türkiye, jeopolitik ve jeostratejik konumundan kaynaklanan üstünlüklerinden dolayı, bölgede önemli bir oyuncu olarak var olmaktadır. Bu durum Türkiye'nin dış politikasını belirleme aşamasında uygun bir zemin yaratmaktadır. Türkiye'nin bu zeminde, özellikle, Rusya ile ortak hareket etmesi Batılı güçlerin üzerinde düşündükleri bir konuyu gündeme taşımaktadır. Bu bağlamda Türkiye'nin hem kuzey hem de batı ülkeleri ile ortak bir çalışma ortamı yaratması gerekmektedir. Bununla birlikte, Türkiye Karadeniz'e dışarıdan veya kıyıdaş olmayan devletler tarafından müdahale edilmesi konusunda son derece katı bir tutum içerisinde.⁵⁵

Rusya'nın Karadeniz ve Kafkaslar bölgeleri üzerinde otoriter güç olma çabası ile Türkiye'nin kendi alanında var olma ve Türk kökenli devletler ile yakın ilişkiler içerisine girme çabası birbirleri ile çelişkili iki durumu ortaya çıkartmaktadır. Gerçekte bu durum bir çelişki değil, yumuşak bir çatışmaya zemin hazırlayıcı unsurdur. Rusya, Kafkaslar ve Karadeniz bölgelerini, mevcut durumda okunan siyasete göre, terk etme eğilimi içerisinde değildir. Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasının ardından bir bütün olan coğrafyanın bölümlenmesini kendisi açısından bir tehdit unsuru olarak anlamlandıran Rusya, izlediği siyasi stratejik yöntem ile baskın karakterini bölge devletleri üzerinde hissettirmeye çalışmaktadır. Ancak Türkiye'nin de en az Rusya kadar

2007, ss. 172-180, s. 172-173.

⁵⁴ Nadire Filiz İrge, *a.g.e.*, s. 83.

⁵⁵ Burçin Canar, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Karadeniz Politikası", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2012, Cilt: 67, No: 1, ss. 49-80, s. 58-64.

bölge üzerinde ekonomik, siyasi ve askeri hedefleri bulunmaktadır. Bu durumdan iki sonuç ortaya çıkmaktadır. Birincisi, iki güç çarpışacak ve zayıf olan kırılacak, ikincisi ise akılcı bir yöntem ile siyaset yaparak bir ortaklık çerçevesinde iki güç de kendi geleceğini garanti altına alacaktır.⁵⁶

3. Ekonomi, Siyaset ve Güvenlik Açısından Karadeniz

Osmanlı Devleti'nin üç kıtaya yayılmasında ve konumlandığı bölgelerde hâkim güç olmasında denizler üzerindeki egemenliğinin önemli bir payı vardır. Osmanlı Devleti, Akdeniz, Ege ve Karadeniz üzerindeki egemenliği sayesinde çevre deniz ve okyanuslara açılma imkânına erişmiştir. Türkiye'nin Osmanlı Devleti'nden gelen bu gücüne⁵⁷ rağmen, Karadeniz'deki varlığının önemli bir dönüm noktası Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasının ardından Karadeniz'e en fazla kıyısı olan ülke unvanını kazanması ile gerçekleşmiştir. Ancak Karadeniz'in Rusya'nın baskın karakter olma içgüdüğü ile hareket etmesinden kaynaklanan birçok ekonomik ve siyasi temelli sorunu bulunmaktadır. Bu sorunlara çevre kirliliği ile ilgili başlıkların da eklenmesiyle liste uzamaktadır.⁵⁸

Bu bölümde, olası listeyi çok fazla uzatmadan ve çalışmanın ruhu ile doğru orantılı olan, Karadeniz'in yerel ekonomi, küresel siyaset ve uluslararası güvenlik konuları ile bağlantısı incelenecektir.

3.1. Ekonomi

Karadeniz'in jeostratejik ve jeopolitik öneminin kaynağı ticaret ve kaçakçılığa dayanmaktadır. Bu iki unsura güvenlik başlığını da eklemek mümkündür. Bölgenin ticaret hacmini önemli ölçüde etkileyen

⁵⁶ Yılmaz Tezkan, "Belirsizlikler ve Menfaat Çatışmaları Ortamında Türkiye", *Menfaatler Çatışması Ortamında Türkiye*, (Hazırlayan: Yılmaz Tezkan), Ülke Kitapları, İstanbul, 2000, ss. 9-20, s. 14.

⁵⁷ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *a.g.e.*, s. 151.

⁵⁸ Chatham House, *The Black Sea Region: New Conditions, Enduring Interests*, 16 January 2009, Russia and Eurasia Programme Seminar Summary, London, 2009, p. 5. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/160109blacksea.pdf>, (Erişim Tarihi: 18.09.2018).

yasal veya yasa dışı birçok ticari mal bu koridor vasıtasıyla dünyaya açılmaktadır.⁵⁹

Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü (KEİ) 25 Haziran 1992 tarihinde kurulmuştur. KEİ, “Türkiye”, “Azerbaycan”, “Ermenistan”, “Gürcistan”, “Moldova”, “Rusya Federasyonu”, “Ukrayna”, “Bulgaristan” ve “Romanya” kurucu ülkelerinin yanı sıra “Arnavutluk”, “Sırbistan” ve “Yunanistan” ile genişleyen ekonomik bir işbirliği örgütüdür. KEİ’nin amacı aynı coğrafyada yer alan ülkelerin birbirlerinin ekonomik güçlerinden faydalanarak Karadeniz havzasında ortak bir ticari alan yaratmak ve böylece kalkınmaya hız vermektir. Üye ülkeler bu örgüt kapsamında teknolojik, ekonomik ve sosyal ilişkilerini geliştirerek Karadeniz havzasını çok boyutlu yönden istikrarlı bir coğrafya haline getirmeyi amaçlamaktadırlar. Farklı alanların aynı amaç doğrultusunda birleştirilmesi için seçilen motor gücü ve dengeleyici araç ise ekonomidir.⁶⁰ KEİ’nin birinci amacının ekonomik iş birliği olduğu yönünde fikir birliğine varılmakla birlikte, bu sürecin sonucunda ikinci bir amacın varlığı sorgulanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda değerlendirildiği takdirde sadece ekonomik yönden iş birliği içerisine girmenin, Karadeniz’e kıyası bulunan ve çeşitli bağlantılar sonucunda dışarıdan ekleme yapılan ülkelerin tamamının kalkındırılmasına yeteceğini düşünmek iyimser bir yaklaşımı ortaya çıkartmaktadır. Dolayısıyla ikinci bir amaç olarak ilgili ülkelerin sermaye, mal ve insanların serbest dolaşımına olanak verecek.⁶¹

KEİ’nin bir diğer kuruluş amacı Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ortaya çıkan siyasi ve diplomatik boşluğun doldurulması için girişilen

⁵⁹ Duncan Wood, “Preface: Crime and Confrontation in the Black Sea”, *Black Sea Security: International Cooperation and Counter-Trafficking in the Black Sea Region*, (Editors: Fiona Houston, W. Duncan Wood, Derek M. Robinson), IOS Press, Oxford, UK, 2010a, pp. xi-xvi, p. xii.

⁶⁰ Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü (KEİ), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/karadeniz-ekonomik-isbirligi-orgutu-_kei_.tr.mfa, (Erişim Tarihi: 19.09.2018).

⁶¹ Emel G. Oktay, “Türkiye’nin Avrasya’daki Çok Taraflı Girişimlerine Bir Örnek: Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 2006, Cilt: 3, Sayı: 10, ss. 149-179, s. 163.

Türkiye merkezli uluslararası birliktelik kurma çabasıdır. Çünkü Soğuk Savaş döneminde varlığını hissettiren güvenlik sorunlarının Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasının ardından sıcak savaş yöntemi ile değil, ekonomik temelli bir siyaset ile çözümlenmesi gerekliliği ülkelerin dış politikalarının oluşum şekillerine yansımıştır.⁶² Bu eksen etrafında toparlamak gerekirse kıyıdaş ülkeler için eski model Sovyet tarzı merkezden planlanan ekonomik yönetim anlayışı yerine, Avrupa Birliği'nin de bütünleştirici ve aynı zamanda da yerellik ilkesine yaptığı vurgu kapsamında yerel ekonomi anlayışının gelişmiş durumda olduğu ifade edilebilmektedir.⁶³

KEİ'nin, ekonomi bağlamında, Türkiye açısından önemi, Türkiye'nin serbest bölgelerinin ve ticaret hacmi yüksek alanlarının Karadeniz'i Akdeniz'e ve dolayısı ile dünya ticaretine bağlayan veya eklemleyen noktalarda yer alması sebebi ile ilgili yerlerde uluslararası bir örgütlenmenin ve anlaşmanın yapılmış olmasından kaynaklanmaktadır.⁶⁴

3.2. Küresel Siyaset

Dünya siyasi tarihi dikkatli bir biçimde incelendiği takdirde bazı ülkelerin belirli dönemlerde dünyanın otoriter gücü olmaya çalıştığı görülecektir. Örneğin, 17. yüzyılda Hollanda, 19. yüzyılın ortalarında İngiltere ve 20. yüzyıl ve devamında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) baskın karakter olarak ortaya çıkmışlardır. Bu ülkelerin ve ileri bir tarihte ise diğer ülkelerin baskın bir karakter olarak ortaya çıkmalarında siyasi, ekonomik ve ideolojik etkenlerin varlığının göz ardı edilmemesi gerekmektedir.⁶⁵

⁶² Alaeddin Yalçınkaya, *a.g.m.*, s. 2.

⁶³ Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu, "Çok Kutupluluk Tartışmaları ve Karadeniz Havzası'nın Bölgesel Görünümü", *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi*, 2013, Cilt: 8, Sayı: 3, ss. 241-273, s. 254-255.

⁶⁴ Dünyada Küreselleşme ve Bölgesel Entegrasyonlar (AT, NAFTA, PASİFİK) ve Türkiye (AT, EFTA, KEİ, Türk Cumhuriyetleri, EKİT (ECO), İslam Ülkeleri) İlişkileri Özel İhtisas Komisyonu, Türkiye – Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği İlişkileri Alt Komisyonu Raporu, Kitap 4, T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Müsteşarlığı, Yayın No: DPT: 2379 - ÖİK: 443, Ankara, 1995, s. 24.

⁶⁵ İbrahim Atalay, *a.g.e.*, s. 387.

Askeri açıdan küresel siyasetin atar damarının kendisine yol bulup akamadığı ender coğrafyalardan biri olan Karadeniz, 1936 Montreux Boğazlar Sözleşmesi'nin kıyıdaş ülkelere tanıdığı ayrıcalıklara istinaden, küresel siyasetin önemli bir yönlendiricisi konumunda bulunan ABD'nin uçak gemisinin giremediği tek deniz olarak varlığını korumaktadır. Bu sözleşmeye göre Karadeniz'e kıyısı bulunmayan bir ülkenin askeri deniz aracı Karadeniz'de üç haftadan daha uzun süre kalamamaktadır.⁶⁶

Türk Boğazları sistemi İstanbul ve Çanakkale Boğazları ile Marmara Denizi'nden oluşmaktadır. Bu üçlü sistemin en önemli tarafı Karadeniz'i sıcak denizlere bağlamasıdır. Ekonomik, güvenlik ve küresel siyaset açısından Karadeniz'in varlığına değer katan Türk Boğazlar sistemi hem Türkiye hem diğer kıyıdaş devletler hem de Karadeniz'de varlık göstermeye çalışan küresel güçler açısından önem taşımaktadır. Tekrardan ifade etmek gerekirse Türk Boğazları sistemi, Karadeniz'e kıyısı bulunan devletlerin dünya ticaretinden pay alabilmeleri için aracı bir nitelik taşımaktadır.⁶⁷

Türkiye'nin enerjide dışa bağımlı olması, özellikle de Karadeniz'e kıyısı olan Rusya karşısında, siyasi stratejisinin gücünü zayıflatmaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra Türkiye'nin Avrupa ve ABD ile kurduğu yakın ilişki Karadeniz'de olası bir biçimde yapılacak herhangi bir ortaklıkta kendisinden binlerce kilometre uzaklıktaki siyasi stratejik ortağını dolaylı yünden de olsa ilgilendirmektedir.⁶⁸

Türkiye, Karadeniz'de ve Balkanlar'da potansiyel olarak ekonomik, demografik ve siyasi açıdan bölgesel bir gücü sembolize etmektedir. İlgili bölgede Türkiye'nin demografik ve ekonomik güç

⁶⁶ Alaeddin Yalçınkaya, *a.g.m.*, s. 10.

⁶⁷ Türk Boğazları, TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turk-bogazlari.tr.mfa>, (Erişim Tarihi: 06.04.2019).

⁶⁸ Mitat Çelikpala, *Turkey and The New Energy Politics of The Black Sea Region*, Neighbourhood Policy Paper, The Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, A Project of The German Marshall Fund, 2013, Issue: 5, p. 1. [http://www.khas.edu.tr/cms/cies/dosyalar/files/NeighbourhoodPolicyPaper\(05\)\(2\).pdf](http://www.khas.edu.tr/cms/cies/dosyalar/files/NeighbourhoodPolicyPaper(05)(2).pdf), (Erişim Tarihi: 18.09.2018).

potansiyelini dengeleyecek başka bir ülke bulunmamaktadır. Çünkü Türkiye, Balkanlarda Müslüman ve Türk kökenli insanları etkisi altına alabilecek bir güce sahiptir. Dolayısıyla Türkiye, Karadeniz ekseninde hareket ederken Avrupa'nın neredeyse iç kesimlerine kadar uzanabilecek bir konumda durmakta ve sabitlenmeye çalışılan ekonomik ve siyasi dengeleri her an alt üst edebilecek bir yeterliliğe sahip olmaktadır.⁶⁹

Nihai aşamada ise Türkiye'nin Balkanlardaki potansiyel gücü Karadeniz aracılığı ile doğudan batıya doğru taşınan petrol ve doğal gaz hatlarının ve deniz yollarının güvenliği açısından önem taşımaktadır.⁷⁰

Karadeniz'e kıyası olmayan ABD gibi küresel güçlerin bu bölge üzerinde hâkimiyet kurma çabalarının temelinde Karadeniz'in ekonomik ve stratejik gücünden faydalanma gereksinimi yer almaktadır. Rusya ise uzak mesafelerden gelerek bölgeye müdahil olmaya çalışan ABD'yi bölge üzerinde söz sahibi yapmamak için uluslararası stratejiler üzerinde çalışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda enerji, ticaret, ulaştırma, doğal madenler gibi alanlarda bölgesel işbirliğine gidilerek bölgede yalnızca ilgili devletlerin söz sahibi olması girişimlerinde bulunmaktadır.⁷¹

ABD için Karadeniz, yalnızca, dar bir alana sıkışmış bir iç deniz olarak değil, aksine Ren-Tuna Kanalı ile Kuzey Denizi'ne, Volga-Don Kanalı ile de Hazar Denizi'ne çıkış sağlayan anahtar bir nokta olarak görülmektedir. Çünkü Karadeniz'de otoriter varlık gösteren bir devlet olası bir ihtiyaç durumunda hem Kuzey bölgelerine hem de Hazar Denizi aracılığı ile Asya topraklarına hükmedebilecek veya müdahale edebilecek bir yeterliliğe kavuşacaktır. Bu sebepten dolayı Karadeniz'de varlık göstermek küresel siyasetin mutlak bir koşulunu oluşturmaktadır.⁷²

⁶⁹ Ognyan Minchev, *Major Interests And Strategies For The Black Sea Region*, Framework Analytical Review, Institute for Regional and International Relations, Sofia, 2006, p. 17. <http://www.harvard-bssp.org/static/files/122/BlackSeaFrameworkAnalyticalReview.pdf>, (Erişim Tarihi: 18.09.2018).

⁷⁰ Anda Nicoleta Onetiu, *a.g.e.*, p. 240.

⁷¹ Nadire Filiz İrge, *a.g.e.*, s. 80-81.

⁷² Mehmet Seyfettin Erol ve Sertif Demir, "Amerika'nın Karadeniz Politikasını Yeniden Değerlendirmek", *Gazi Akademik Bakış Dergisi*, 2012, Cilt: 6, Sayı: 11, ss. 17-33, s. 19.

Kıyı devleti olan Romanya ise oyuna aktif bir oyuncu olarak dâhil olmakta, Karadeniz için önemli olan radar sistemlerinin bir kısmı Romanya topraklarında konumlanmaktadır. Bu durumun küresel siyaset için önemli ise Çin, İran ve Kuzey Kore gibi olası tehditkâr devletlerden gelebilecek bir füze saldırısına karşı Karadeniz üzerinde müdahale edebilme fırsatını yaratmasıdır. Dolayısıyla Romanya, özellikle, Avrupa için ileri karakol vazifesi gören bir niteliğe sahiptir.⁷³

Romanya'nın Karadeniz için bir diğer önemi ise Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü'nün (NATO) Rusya için geliştirdiği küresel stratejilerinde rol almasıdır. Bu noktadaki temel amaç Rusya'nın sınırlandırılarak edilgen bir konuma geriletmesidir. Romanya'nın Avrupa Birliği'ne üye olması ile birlikte Karadeniz'de yeni bir küresel aktör daha söz sahibi olmaya başlamıştır. Bu aktör sahip olduğu ekonomik ve askeri güç ile Karadeniz'de kurumsallaşmış bir yapılanmanın varlığı için çaba göstermektedir.⁷⁴

Romanya ile birlikte Bulgaristan'ın da Avrupa Birliği üyesi olmasının altında yatan sebep Karadeniz'deki güç odaklarının Batı Cephesi yönüne doğru yöneltilmesini sağlamaktır. Çünkü Avrupa Birliği "komşuluk ilişkileri" bağlamında Doğu'ya ve özellikle de Karadeniz havzasına doğru genişleyerek hâkimiyet alanını fazlalaştırmaya çalışmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Avrupa Birliği Karadeniz'in ekonomik, güvenlik ve siyasi olanaklarından faydalanmaya çalışmaktadır. Bu noktada da Romanya ve Bulgaristan kilit rol üstlenmektedirler.⁷⁵

3.3. Uluslararası Güvenlik

Karadeniz'in, bir bölge olarak, enerji tedariki, kaçakçılık ve bölgesel uzlaşmazlıklar gibi birkaç noktada güvenlik açığı bulunmaktadır. Örneğin, Gürcistan ile Güney Osetya ve Abhazya, Rusya ile Çeçenistan, Moldova ile Transdinyester ve Türkiye ile İran

⁷³ Mehmet Seyfettin Erol ve Sertif Demir, a.g.m, s. 19-20.

⁷⁴ Kamer Kasım, a.g.e., s. 175-176.

⁷⁵ Sertif Demir, "Karadeniz'in Güvenliğini Yeniden Düşünmek", *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, 2012, Sayı: 35, ss. 19- 50, s. 31.

ve Irak destekli bölgesel azınlık sorunları Karadeniz bölgesini uluslararası güvenlik konusunda sorunlu bir hale getirmektedir. Bölgenin güvenlik kaygılarının bir diğer sebebi ise bölgede farklı devletlerin sınırlarının bulunması, zorlu arazi koşulları, terör faaliyetlerinin varlığı, sistematik bir hale gelmiş kaçakçılık faaliyetleri ve tespit edilememiş çok sayıda radyoaktif kirleticinin bulunmasıdır. Örneğin, bölgede bırakılmış veya unutulmuş olan eski Sovyetler Birliği yapımı çok sayıda (yaklaşık 1000 adet) Radyoizotop Termoelektrik Jeneratörü (RTG) ömrünü tüketmiş bir halde imha edilmeyi beklemektedir.⁷⁶

Karadeniz, Orta Doğu'dan Orta Asya'ya uzanan bir çizgide, uluslararası açıdan, kararsız bir yol haritasını oluşturmaktadır. Bu kararsız ortamda Karadeniz her an karışmaya hazır bir coğrafyanın ana kaynağını oluşturmaktadır. Orta Doğu'nun karmaşık dünyasının otoriter güçler tarafından yeteri kadar aşındırılması sonucunda kendilerine yeni kaynak arayan aynı güçlerin Karadeniz'i hedef olarak seçmeleri bölgeyi hem istikrarsızlaştırmakta hem de kazanan bir kazana dönüştürmektedir.⁷⁷

Avrupa Birliği sınırlarına ortak olan Karadeniz'in enerji ve güvenlik konularından ve kıyıdaş ülkelerin kendi aralarında yaşamış oldukları sorunlardan dolayı ortaya çıkan güvensiz ortamı bölgeyi dışarıdan odak noktası haline getirmektedir. Bu açıdan değerlendirildiği takdirde Karadeniz'in kırılğan bir zemin üzerinde durduğu ifade edilebilmektedir.⁷⁸

Karadeniz enerji kaynağı açısından önemli derecede potansiyele sahip olan bir havzadır. Ancak Karadeniz'in bu potansiyelinin

⁷⁶ Duncan Wood, "Executive Summary: Prospects for Black Sea Security Cooperation", *Black Sea Security: International Cooperation and Counter-Trafficking in the Black Sea Region*, (Editors: Fiona Houston, W. Duncan Wood, Derek M. Robinson), IOS Press, Oxford, UK, 2010b, pp. 3-8, p. 3.

⁷⁷ Oleksandr Pavliuk, "Introduction", *The Black Sea Region: Cooperation and Security Building: Cooperation and Security Building*, (Editors: Oleksandr Pavliuk & Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze), Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 2004, pp. 3-13, p. 10.

⁷⁸ Galya Vladova & Jörg Knieling, "Potential and Challenges for the Black Sea Regional Cooperation", *Eastern Journal Of European Studies*, 2014, Volume: 5, Issue: 1, pp. 39-66, p. 45.

kullanılması aşamasında, güvenlik sorunu olan bölgeler ile yakın komşu olmasından dolayı, kararsız bir durum ortaya çıkmaktadır.⁷⁹

Karadeniz'e hâkim olan gücün Orta Doğu ve Orta Asya'ya hükmetme yeterliliğine erişebileceğinden dolayı bu havzaya stratejik bir açıdan yaklaşmak gerekmektedir. Örneğin, Karadeniz, Rusya için güneyden ve belirli noktalarda ise batıdan⁸⁰, Türkiye için ise kuzeyden gelebilecek tehlikelere karşı ileri karakol vazifesinin yapılabileceği doğal bir korunma bölgesini oluşturmaktadır. Türkiye'nin bu noktadaki görevi yalnızca ulusal değil, aynı zamanda uluslararası düzeydedir. Zbigniew Brzezinski'ye göre Türkiye, Karadeniz havzasında istikrar sağlayıcı bir konumda durmaktadır. Bu konumunu Karadeniz'e Akdeniz üzerinden sağlanan giriş ve çıkışları kontrol ederek ve Kafkaslardaki Rusya'nın var olma çabalarını belirli bir noktadan daha fazla ileriye gitmesine izin vermeyerek veya bir denge noktası yaratarak sağlamaktadır.⁸¹ Bu korunma bölgesi açısından⁸² Montreux Boğazlar Sözleşmesi'nin önemli bir fonksiyonu bulunmaktadır. Çünkü Montreux Boğazlar Sözleşmesi çok taraflı yapısı ile siyasi, ekonomik ve stratejik fonksiyonların küresel anlamda değerlendirme altına alınması sonucunda ortaya çıkan "çıkar dengelerini" Karadeniz'e odaklayan ve bu sayede de Türkiye'yi motor gücü haline getiren bir niteliğe sahiptir.⁸³

Güvenlik konusunda belirtilmesi gereken önemli bir başlık ise BLACKSEAFOR (Karadeniz Deniz İşbirliği Görev Grubu) gücüdür. Bu güç tam açılımı ile "Karadeniz Deniz İşbirliği Görev Grubu Teşkiline Dair Anlaşma" biçiminde adlandırılabilir. Buna göre Karadeniz'e kıyısı bulunan devletler olan Bulgaristan, Gürcistan, Romanya, Rusya, Türkiye ve Ukrayna'nın Birleşmiş Milletler

⁷⁹ Akın Alkan, *a.g.e.*, s. 17.

⁸⁰ Akın Alkan, *a.g.e.*, s. 20-22.

⁸¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Büyük Satranç Tahtası*, (Çeviren: Yelda Türedi), İnkılap Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2005, s. 46; Sertif Demir, *a.g.m.*, s. 36.

⁸² Zbigniew Brzezinski, *a.g.e.*, s. 46; Sertif Demir, *a.g.m.*, s. 36.

⁸³ Türk Boğazları, TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turk-bogazlari.tr.mfa>, (Erişim Tarihi: 06.04.2019).

Anlaşması'nda belirtilen hususları dikkate alarak kendi aralarında oluşturacakları iş birliği çerçevesinde güvenlik konularında ortak hareket etmelerinin yolu açılmıştır.⁸⁴ BLACKSEAFOR'un kıyıdaş devletlere olan bir diğer katkısı ise ilgili devletlerin deniz kuvvetlerinden faydalanılarak Karadeniz'de arama, kurtarma ve kanunlara uymayan deniz trafiği ile ilgili konularda işbirliklerinin gerçekleştirilmesidir. Bu işbirliği, aynı zamanda, katılımcı devletlerin oybirliği ile alacakları karar sonucunda Karadeniz dışında da görev yapabilecek niteliktedir.⁸⁵

Sonuç

Karadeniz'e kıyısı olan devletlerin sıcak denizlere ulaşabilmesi için İstanbul ve Çanakkale Boğazları'na muhtaç olması Türkiye'yi konumlandığı coğrafyada söz sahibi yapmaktadır. Bu eksen etrafında bir odak noktası yakalamak gerekirse Türkiye'nin Karadeniz konusunda en büyük söz hakkına sahip olduğu öne sürülebilmektedir. Bu noktada Türkiye diğer bölge devletlerinden siyaset belirleme adına bir adım önde olmaktadır. Türkiye'nin sahip olduğu bu üstünlüğü küresel siyaset belirleme ve ekonomik kararlar alma aşamasında akılcı bir biçimde kullanması gerekmektedir. Bu coğrafyada Türkiye alınan kararlara uyan bir devlet konumunda değil, aksine aldığı kararlara diğer devletleri uymaya zorlayan bir konumdadır. Türkiye'nin bu konumunu küresel siyaset, ekonomi ve uluslararası güvenlik alanlarında etkili bir biçimde kullanması gerekmektedir. Bir diğer anlatım ile Türkiye stratejik açıdan taşların yerlerini değiştirebilecek bir güce sahiptir. Dolayısıyla Türkiye'nin bu konumu ve sahip olduğu potansiyel gücü coğrafya, ekonomi, küresel siyaset ve uluslararası güvenlik gibi ekonomiye ve uluslararası alandaki duruşuna katkısı olan değerler açısından incelemeye alınması gerekmektedir.

Karadeniz'e kıyısı bulunan veya herhangi bir bağı olmadan binlerce kilometre uzaktan gelerek bölgede söz sahibi olmaya çalışan

⁸⁴ Karadeniz Deniz İşbirliği Görev Grubu Teşkiline Dair Anlaşma, https://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/icerik.php?icerik_id=248&dil=tr&blackseafor=1, (Erişim Tarihi: 06.04.2019).

⁸⁵ Kemer Kasım, *a.g.e.*, s. 175.

bir devlet hedeflediği amaca ulaşabilir ise sadece Karadeniz'deki varlığını kullanarak hem Kuzey bölgeleri hem de Asya üzerinde hâkimiyet kurma olasılığına kavuşabilecektir. Çünkü Karadeniz'in bir geçiş ve bağlantı noktası olması gerçeğinin yanında, sıradan bir su kütlesi olmadığı da ifade edilmesi gerekmektedir. Bu eksen etrafında hareket etmek gerekirse Avrupa Birliği gibi bir üst yapılanmanın, özellikle, Karadeniz'e kıyısı bulunan devletleri kendi içine alarak bu su kütlesi üzerinde söz hakkına sahip olma girişimlerinin bulunduğu yönünde bir yorum yapmak yanlış olmayacaktır. Belki de bu sebepten dolayı Türkiye üye devlet sıfatı ile Birlik içerisinde konumlandırılmak istenmektedir. Ancak bu istek karşıt bir tezi de ortaya çıkartmaktadır. Türkiye farklı unsurlar (ekonomi, askeri, diplomasi, nüfus vs.) bağlamında güçlü bir devlettir. Türkiye'nin küresel güçler tarafından kendi amaçları doğrultusunda kullanılamayacağına farkına varılması, bu ülkenin ne içeri alınması ne de kendisinden uzaklaştırılması siyasetini ortaya çıkartmaktadır. Bu durum ise 'yaklaşma ama uzaklaşma da' siyasetini gündeme taşımaktadır. Türkiye ise bu noktada kendi siyasetini üretebilecek bir güce sahiptir. Bu güç, çalışmanın özü itibarıyla yorumlanması gerekirse, Karadeniz'e en uzun kıyı parçasına sahip olunmasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Eğer Türkiye bu gücünü usta manevralarla kullanabilirse, küresel güç olan ABD ve Avrupa Birliği gibi üst yapılanmaları kendi istekleri doğrultusunda yönlendiremeye bile bu unsurların Türkiye'nin zararına olabilecek türdeki oyunlarını bozabilecektir.

Karadeniz, yalnızca, İstanbul ve Çanakkale Boğazları vasıtasıyla okyanuslara açılan bir iç deniz değil, aynı zamanda dünya siyasetine yön verebilen stratejik bir su kütesidir. Karadeniz gibi iç kesimlerde kalmış bir su kütesini değerli kılan nitelik dünya siyasetinde önemli birer oyuncu olan Türkiye ve Rusya'nın bu su kütesine kıyısı olmasıdır. Bu iki ülkeye ulaşmak ve olası bir savaş zamanında üstünlüğü ele geçirmek isteyen herhangi bir devlet Karadeniz'e açılmak zorundadır. Bununla birlikte, özellikle, Türkiye'ye yönelik terörist saldırılarının yoğunlaştırılmasının istendiği her dönemde terör örgütlerinin Karadeniz bölgesinde yapılanmalarına ağırlık verdikleri gözlemlenmektedir. Küresel güçlerin, bir şekilde, Karadeniz'de var

olma çabalarına karşılık, Türkiye'nin ekonomik ve güvenlik stratejileri ile karşılık vermesi, ABD'nin NATO vasıtasıyla Karadeniz'de kendisine bir liman yaratma isteği, kıyıdaş olmayan ülkelerin enerji hatlarını Karadeniz'den geçirerek bu yol üzerinde dolaylı yönden varlığını hissettirmeye çalışması Karadeniz'in jeopolitik, jeostratejik ve jeogüvenlik konularında sahip olduğu değerden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda yeni bir açıdan değerlendirme yapmak gerekirse Karadeniz'in tabanında hangi enerji kaynaklarının ve madenlerin bulunduğunu bilmek ve bunu öğrenebilmek için de bu su kütesinde var olmak isteyen her güç Karadeniz'e hükmetmeye çalışacaktır. Bu da küresel siyaset oyununda eylemli bir oyuncu olmayı gerektirmektedir.

Bir diğer değerlendirme konusu ise güvenlidir. Karadeniz tüm kıyıdaş ülkelere sağladığı koruma duvarını, özellikle Türkiye ve Rusya için de sağlamaktadır. Ancak bu noktadaki önemli basamak Türkiye ve Rusya'nın diğer kıyıdaş devletlerden ekonomi, güvenlik ve siyaset üretebilme yeteneği açısından üstün olmasıdır. Dolayısıyla Karadeniz bu iki devlet arasında paylaşılmaya ve birbirlerine bu alanda üstünlük gösterilmeye çalışılan stratejik bir oyun tahtasıdır. Karadeniz için girişilecek her hamlede önce piyonların öne sürülmesi, kalelerin güvenlik altına alınması ve atların ise satranç tahtasında hareketli bir biçimde kullanılması gerekmektedir. Çünkü bu bölgede girişilecek bir faaliyette aynı eksen üzerinde gidip gelen bir siyaset yerine, bazen köşeli hareketler yapılan hamlelerin benimsenmesi önem taşımaktadır. Bazı durumlarda vezir harekete geçirilse bile şah hiçbir zaman yerinden oynatılmamalı ve Karadeniz'de şahın varlığı her zaman için hissettirilmelidir.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Bu anlatımda söz konusu yapılan satranç ve oyun tahtası benzetmelerinin ilham kaynağına parantez içerisinde yer verilmiştir: (Daha detaylı bilgi için ilgili kaynaktan faydalanılabilmektedir: Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Büyük Satranç Tahtası*, (Çeviren: Yelda Türedi), İnkılap Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2005, s. 7-34.)

Summary

Coastal geopolitics is a concept explaining the strategic contribution of water bodies such as ocean, sea, lake, strait, delta, and river to the geopolitics of a country. Within the framework of this concept and around the same axis, an inland sea as the geographical location of Turkey and the Black Sea can be considered to be located at a point linking Asia with Europe and the Black Sea to Turkey it raises an important position in both Europe and Asia. In this context, the Black Sea to Turkey's geography, economy, value is emerging to be examined in terms of politics and security elements. The fact that the Black Sea stands at the key point of the political, economic and security trilogy in the context of international relations increases the interest in this region. In this study, Turkey's Black Sea will be an emphasis on how it is shaped by the geographical conditions of the policy will apply in the region, the importance of policies on global politics and place will be taken into consideration, the position of the Black Sea to strengthen Turkey's competence in international security issues will be examined. The aim of this study is to discuss the value, place, and importance of the coastal geopolitical issue within the framework of managerial strategies.

The Black Sea is not only a water body in the geography, but also a transitional route that has a strategic importance, a source of energy, and an advocate of defense against the riparian countries. The Black Sea is an inland sea, the protection of its autonomy with certain agreements and the formation of a defense line against external interventions makes this water body special. Therefore, it is important to consider an internal sea with such an importance and to evaluate it strategically and geopolitically. The most important topic of discussion at this point is to determine the sources of the natural autonomy of the Black Sea. While it is easy to understand the right of the states, which have coasts to the Black Sea in this basin, it is not difficult to understand the reason of the interventions that are intended to be outsourced. The emphasis on the coastal geopolitical importance of the Black Sea was given in the study of geopolitic, geostrategic, global politics and economics.

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The Effects of Terrorist Attacks on Regional Economic Growth in Turkey

Türkiye’de Terörist Saldırıların Bölgesel İktisadi Büyüme Üzerindeki Etkileri

Necmettin ÇELİK*

Abstract

The process of balanced and comprehensive regional growth requires political as well as economic stability. Therefore, the effects of political dynamics such as terrorism on regional growth should be investigated for a more comprehensive analysis. This study investigates the effects of terrorist events, which have reached the dimensions of political instability in Turkey, over the growth performance of the regions. In this context, the model has been designed to cover the 2005-2014 period and Turkey’s NUTS-II regions (26 regions) and has been estimated based on the GMM estimator. The obtained findings show the terror events experienced in Turkey to have a statistically significant negative effect on regions’ growth performance. In other words, the problem of terrorism, which has been a frequent ongoing problem in southeast Turkey for nearly 40 years, has hindered economic growth. The other findings of the model indicate the accumulation of physical capital to have positive and statistically significant effects on regional growth rather than the accumulation of human capital.

Keywords: Regional economic growth, Terrorism, Turkey, Dynamic panel data analysis.

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Öz

Dengeli ve sürdürülebilir bir iktisadi büyüme süreci, iktisadi açıdan olduğu kadar politik açıdan da istikrarlı bir yapı gerektirmektedir. Bu sebeple, kapsamlı bir analiz yapılabilmesi için terörizm gibi politik dinamiklerin de bölgesel büyüme üzerindeki etkileri analiz edilmelidir. Çalışmada, Türkiye’de politik istikrarsızlık boyutlarına ulaşan terör olaylarının bölgelerin büyüme performansı üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiştir. Bu doğrultuda, 2005-2014 dönemi ve Türkiye’nin İBBS-II Bölgelerini (26 Bölge) kapsayacak şekilde tasarlanan model, sistem GMM tahmincisine dayalı olarak tahmin edilmiştir. Elde edilen bulgular, Türkiye’de yaşanan terör olaylarının bölgelerin büyüme performansı üzerinde negatif yönlü ve istatistiksel açıdan anlamlı etkilerinin olduğunu göstermektedir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, Türkiye’nin sıklıkla güneydoğu bölgesinde yaklaşık 40 yıldır süregelen terörizm sorunu iktisadi büyümeyi baskılamaktadır. Modelin diğer bulguları ise, beşer sermaye birikiminden ziyade fiziki sermaye birikiminin bölgesel büyüme üzerinde pozitif yönlü ve anlamlı etkilerinin olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bölgesel İktisadi Büyüme, Terörizm, Türkiye, Dinamik Panel Veri Analizi.

Introduction

The process of balanced and comprehensive regional growth not only depends on economic dynamics but also political dynamics. Terrorism, which has achieved a complex structure, is one of these¹ as the long-term decisions of economic agencies depend on a stable structure in terms of both political and economic dynamics, especially

¹ In the absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism, this study accepts the definition from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Accordingly, terrorism is a threat or an actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation Retrieved September 16, 2018 from: <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/>

regarding capital investments. For instance, when terrorism becomes the dominant political factor in a region, it causes uncertainty and insecurity in that region's economic environment. In this process, market dynamics such as productivity, profitability, and costs become insignificant and economic decisions are based on concerns about the future and expectations, not market conditions. When perception of uncertainty and insecurity become more important than market dynamics, terrorism represses the growth process of that region. In other words, terrorism as a political factor has a damaging impact on key macro-economic variables such as investment, unemployment, and inflation.²

Indeed, the empirical literature offers strong proofs regarding this, where the processes of political uncertainty and instability are measured by constitutional or violent determinants. Most indicate the process of political instability to hinder economic growth. For instance, Asteriou and Price,³ Campos and Karanasos,⁴ Sanlisoy and Kok,⁵ and Demirgil⁶ focused on individual countries, respectively England, Argentina, and Turkey, while Barro;⁷ Levine and Renelt;⁸ Alesina et

² Chor Foon Tang and Salah Aboedra, "The Impacts of Tourism, Energy Consumption and Political Instability on Economic Growth in the MENA Countries", *EnergyPolicy*, 2014, Vol: 68, 458-464, p. 460.

³ Dimitrios Asteriou and Simon Price, "Political Instability and Economic Growth: UK Time Series Evidence", *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*, 2001, Vol: 48/4, 383-399, p. 383.

⁴ Nauro F. Campos and Menelaos G. Karanasos, "Growth, Volatility and Political Instability: Non-Linear Time-Series Evidence for Argentina, 1896-2000", *Economics Letters*, 2008, Vol: 100, 135-137, p. 135.

⁵ Selim Sanlisoy and Recep Kok, "Politik İstikrarsızlık – Ekonomik Büyüme İlişkisi: Türkiye Örneği (1987-2006)", *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2010a, Vol: 25/1, 101-125, p. 101.

⁶ Hakan Demirgil, "Politik İstikrarsızlık, Belirsizlik ve Makroekonomi: Türkiye Örneği (1970-2006)", *Marmara Üniversitesi İ.B.B.F. Dergisi*, 2011, Vol: 31/2, 123-144, p. 123.

⁷ Robert J. Barro, "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1991, Vol: 106/2, 407-443, p. 407.

⁸ Ross Levine and David Renelt, "A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth

al.,⁹ and Chen and Feng¹⁰ focused on multiple countries. Sanlisoy and Kok¹¹ and Gurgul and Lach¹² also covered select country groups, respectively middle-income countries and Central/Eastern European (CEE) countries.¹³ All of them offered findings in support of the repressive effects of political instability on economic growth. However, Tavares and Wacziarg¹⁴ covered industrialized countries from 1970 to 1989, Campos and Nugent¹⁵ covered 98 countries from 1960 to 1995, and Arslan¹⁶ covered Turkey from 1987 to 2007;¹⁷ all indicated no systematic relationship to exist between economic growth and political instability. On the other hand, Alesina and Perotti,¹⁸ Svensson,¹⁹ and Aisen and Veiga,^{20,21} covered multiple countries while

Regressions”, *The American Economic Review*, 1992, Vol: 82/4, 942-963, p. 942.

⁹ Alberto Alesina, Sule Ozler Nouriel Roubini and Phillip Swagel, “Political Instability and Economic Growth”, *Journal of Economic Growth*, 1996, Vol.1/2, 189-211, p. 189.

¹⁰ Baizhu Chen and Yi Feng, “Some Political Determinants of Economic Growth: Theory and Empirical Implications”, *European Journal of Political Economy*, 1996, Vol: 12, 609-627, p. 609.

¹¹ Selim Sanlisoy and Recep Kok, “Politik İstikrarsızlık – Ekonomik Büyüme İlişkisi: Kuznets Eğrisi Yaklaşımı”, *Finans, Politik & Ekonomik Yorumlar Dergisi*, 2010b, Vol: 47/541, 9-22, p. 9

¹² Henryk Gurgul and Luksz Lach, “Political Instability and Economic Growth: Evidence from Two Decades of Transition in CEE”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 2013, Vol: 46, 189-202, p. 189.

¹³ Ibid, p. 189.

¹⁴ Jose Tavares and Romain Wacziarg, “How Democracy Affects Growth”, *European Economic Review*, 2001, Vol: 45, 1341-1378, p. 1341.

¹⁵ Nauro F. Campos, and Jeffrey Nugent, “Who is afraid of political instability?”, *Journal of Development Economics*, 2002, Vol: 67, 157-172, p. 157.

¹⁶ Unal Arslan, “Siyasi İstikrarsızlık ve Ekonomik Performans: Türkiye Örneği”, *Ege Akademik Bakış Dergisi*, 2011, Vol: 11/1, 73-80, p. 73.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 73.

¹⁸ Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, “The Political Economy of Growth: A Critical Survey of the Recent Literature”, *The World Bank Economic Review*, 1994, Vol. 8/3, 351-371, p. 351.

¹⁹ Jakob Svensson, “Investment, Property Rights and Political Instability: Theory and Evidence”, *European Economic Review*, 1998, Vol: 42, 1317-1341, p. 1317.

²⁰ Ari Aisen and Francisco Jose Veiga, “How Does Political Instability Affect

Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor,²² Fosu,²³ Darbyet al.,²⁴ and Campos and Karanasos²⁵ covered select countries, respectively all Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, 31 SSA countries, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, and Argentina; all these offered empirical findings on the negative indirect effects of political instability.

Meanwhile, studies measuring the processes of political uncertainty and instability using terrorism as a violent determinant have indicated strong and homogeneous findings. For instance, Asteriou and Price,²⁶ Abadie and Gardeazabal,²⁷ Eckstein and Tsiddon,²⁸ Öcal and Yıldırım,²⁹ and Zakariaet al.³⁰ focused on select countries, respectively England, Spain, Israel, Turkey, and Pakistan,

Economic Growth?,*IMF Working Paper Middle East and Central Asia Department*, WP/11/12, 2011, 1-28, p. 1.

²¹ Ari Aisen and Francisco Jose Veiga, "How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth?", *European Journal of Political Economy*, 2013, Vol. 29, 151-167, p. 151.

²² Kwabena Gyimah - Brempongand Thomas L. Traynor, "Political Instability, Investment and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa", *Journal of African Economies*, 1999, Vol: 8/1, 52-86, p. 52.

²³ Augustin Kwasi Fosu, "Political Instability and Economic Growth in Developing Economies: Some Specification Empirics", *Economics Letters*, 2001, Vol: 70, 289-29, p. 289.

²⁴ Julia Darby, Chol - Won Li, and V. Anton Muscatelli, "Political Uncertainty, Public Expenditure and Growth", *European Journal of Political Economy*, 2004, Vol: 20, 153-179, p. 153.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 135.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 383.

²⁷ Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal, "The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country" *The American Economic Review*, 2003, Vol. 93/1, 113-132, p. 113.

²⁸ Zvi Eckstein and Daniel Tsiddon, "Macroeconomic Consequences of Terror: Theory and the Case of Israel", *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2004, Vol: 51, 971-1002, p. 971.

²⁹ Nadir Öcal and Jülide Yıldırım, "Regional Effects of Terrorism on Economic Growth in Turkey: A Geographically Weighted Regression Approach", *Journal of Peace Research*, 2010, Vol: 47, 477-489, p. 477.

³⁰ Muhammad Zakaria, Wen JunandHasebAhmed, "Effects of Terrorism on Economic Growth in Pakistan: An Empirical Analysis", *Economic Research*, 2019, Vol. 23, 1794-1812, p. 1794.

while Jong-A-Pin³¹ and Tang and Abosedra³² focused on select country groups such as MENA countries. Haggard and Trede³³ also covered developing and transition economies. On the other hand, Gupta et al.,³⁴ et al.,³⁵ Tavares,³⁶ Giskemo,³⁷ Meierrieks and Gries,³⁸ Crain and Crain,³⁹ and Çınar⁴⁰ and Choi⁴¹ focused on multiple countries. All indicated terrorist attacks and other violent dynamics to hinder countries' economic growth performance.

In this direction, the empirical findings indicate terrorism to be a key political determinant of economic growth. Therefore, this study examines the impacts of terrorism on the growth performance of Turkey's NUTS-II regions⁴² over the period of 2005-2014.⁴³ This is

³¹ Richard Jong-A-Pin, "On the Measurement of Political Instability and Its Impact on Economic Growth", *European Journal of Political Economy*, 2009, Vol: 25, 15-29, p. 15.

³² *Ibid*, p. 458.

³³ Stephan Haggard and Lydia Tiede, "The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We?", *World Development*, 2011, Vol: 39/5, 673-685, p. 673.

³⁴ Dipak K. Gupta, M. C. Madhavan and Andrew Blee, "Democracy, Economic Growth and Political Instability: An Integrated Perspective", *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 1998, Vol: 27/5, 587-611, p. 587.

³⁵ S. Brock Blomberg, Gregory D. Hess, and Athanasios Orphanides, "The Macroeconomic Consequences of Terrorism", *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2004, Vol: 51, 1007-1032, p. 1007.

³⁶ Jose Tavares, "The Open Society Assesses its Enemies: Shocks, Disasters and Terrorist Attacks." *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2004, Vol: 51/5, 1039-1070, p. 1039.

³⁷ Gunhild Gram Giskemo, "Exploring the Relationship Between Socioeconomic Inequality, Political Instability and Economic Growth Why Do We Know so Little?", *CMI Working Paper*, 2012, 1-31, p. 4.

³⁸ Daniel Meierrieks and Thomas Gries, "Causality Between Terrorism and Economic Growth", *Journal of Peace Research*, 2013, Vol: 50/1, 91-104, p. 91.

³⁹ Nicole V. Crain and W. Mark Crain, "Terrorized Economies", *Public Choice*, 2006, Vol. 128, 317-349, p. 317.

⁴⁰ Mehmet Çınar, "The Effects of Terrorism on Economic Growth: Panel Data Approach", *University of Rijeka, Faculty of Economics*, 2017, Vol. 35, 97-121, p. 97.

⁴¹ Seung-Whan Choi, "Economic Growth and Terrorism: Domestic, Foreign, and Suicide", *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 67, 157-181, p.157.

⁴² The NUTS Classification (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) is a hierarchical system which is established on the three different levels for dividing up the economic

because terrorism has been a crucial ongoing structural problem in Turkey for about 40 years and has dramatically increased in terms of both frequency and severity since 2012.⁴⁴ Indeed, according to Global Terrorism Database (GTD), while terrorist attacks averaged 15.7 per year for the period of 2002-2011, this figure increased six times to 93.6 per year for the period of 2012-2014. This represents that the impact of terrorism increased in Turkey more than the global average in terms of frequency of events. On the other hand, terrorism spread to Turkey's western regions too while being frequently observed in its southeastern region. Therefore, the potential costs of terrorism on economic growth became more pronounced. In this direction, this study recognizes terrorism as a political determinant of regional economic growth. Accordingly, the first part of the study examines terrorism in Turkey. Next information is given about the characteristic features of the data set and variables. The last section discusses the findings from the System GMM Panel Model.

1. Literature Review

Table 1 includes detail information from the selected empirical literature samples, especially about the relationship between terrorism and economic growth. Accordingly, the studies mainly indicate terrorism to hinder economic growth; however, its impacts can change in terms of a country's development level.

territory of the European Union for the purpose of the collection, development and harmonization of European regional statistics, socio-economic analyses of the regions and framing of European Union regional policies. It is also based on Regulation No 4720/2002 of the European Parliament on the establishment of a common classification of territorial units for statistics. NUTS 2 is generally preferred for the application of regional policies and the improvement of policy recommendations.

⁴³ Due to the lack of data about the several macroeconomic variables for NUTS-II Regions of Turkey, the study covers 2005-2014 period.

⁴⁴ The frequency degree refers to the frequency of occurrence of the terrorist attacks, while the severity degree refers to the number of dead and injured people caused by them.

Table 1. Selected Literature Examples

<i>Author(s)</i>	<i>Model</i>	<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Results</i>
Asteriou & Price (2001)	Period: 1961-1997 Section: England <i>Principle Component Analysis</i>	<i>Terrorist Attacks</i>	Terrorist attacks and other socio-political instability indicators have negative effects on economic growth.
Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003)	Period: 1998-1999 Section: Spain <i>Exposure-Response Functions</i>	Terrorist Attacks	Terrorist attacks have negative impacts on Spain's economic structure by suppressing private investments.
Eckstein & Tsiddon (2004)	Period: 1980:1-2003:3 Section: Israel VAR Model	Terrorism Index	Terrorism has negative impacts on economic growth during two periods.
Blomberg et al. (2004)	Period: 1968-2000 Section: 177 Countries Structural VAR Model	Terrorist Attacks	Domestic terrorist attacks have more negative and statistically significant effects on economic growth than international terrorist attacks.
Tavares (2004)	Period: 1987-2001 Countries: Selective <i>IV Estimator</i>	Terrorist Attacks per capita Casualties per capita	Terror has a negative impact on economic growth; but it is negligible size.
Haggard & Trede (2011)	Period: 1985-2004 Section: Developing and Transition Countries Panel Model Analysis	Civil War	Violence is the major restriction factor on economic growth process
Giskemo (2012)	Period: 1950-2004 Section: 188 Countries Simultaneous Equations Model	Conflict Index	Conflict has negative impacts on economic growth.
Meierrieks & Gries (2013)	Period: 1970-1991 1992-2007 Section: 160 Countries Dynamic Panel Model	Terrorist Attacks	Terrorism has crucial negative impacts, especially on African and Islamic countries. Yet, its main destructive effects are observed in anti-democratic countries.

Öcal & Yıldırım (2010)	Period: 1987-2001 Section: Turkey Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR)	Terrorist Incidents	The negative effects of terrorist incidents are more pronounced in Eastern and Southeastern provinces than Western.
Zakaria et al. (2019)	Period: 1972-2014 Section: Pakistan GMM	The Number of Deaths	The effects of terrorism on foreign direct investments, domestic investments and economic growth are negative and statistically significant.
Crain & Crain (2006)	Period: 1968-2002 Section: 147 Countries Panel Data Analysis	Terrorist Attacks	Terrorism has negative impacts on macroeconomic variables of countries such as GDP, investments and tourism.
Çınar (2017)	Period: 2000-2015 Section: 115 Countries Fixed and Random Effects Panel Models	Terrorist Incidents	Terrorist attacks have negative impacts on economic growth especially in low-income countries.
Choi (2015)	Period: 1970-2007 Section: 127 Countries Panel Data Analysis	Domestic and Foreign Terrorist Events	Industrialized countries are less likely to be affected by domestic or foreign terrorist events.

2. Terrorism in the World and Turkey

Neither the literature nor international relations have a consensus about the definition of terrorism due to both the different perspectives of governments and its complex structure. For instance, differences are found for the concept of terrorism among the United Nations, European Union, and other institutions' definitions. For instance, terrorism is defined as "criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be

invoked to justify them” in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 from December 9, 1994 titled *Declarations on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism*.⁴⁵

On the other hand, “criminal acts (murder, hostage taking, physical injuries etc.) aiming seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a government or an international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act and/or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization” are evaluated as terrorist attacks in Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, EU’s response to counter terrorism.⁴⁶

Finally, terrorism is the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal by fear, coercion, or intimidation according to definition of National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.⁴⁷ This study takes this last definition into consideration.

In this direction and with respect to statistics compiled from GTD in association with START, the number of terrorist attacks all over the world was 156,772 for the period of 1970-2015; 33% of these occurred just in the period of 2012-2015 period. On the other hand, while the number of terrorist attacks was 3,115 during 2002-2011, this figure increased more than four times to 13,024. In addition, the number of terrorist attacks that occurred in just 2014-2015 is the same as 40% of the attacks that occurred in the last 10 years. The dramatic rises in attacks can be seen in Figure 1.

⁴⁵ UNGA, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, 49/60 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 1995, p. 4, <https://www.ilsa.org/Jessup/Jessup08/basicmats/ga4960.pdf>, Access Date: 27.09.2019

⁴⁶ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:4322328>, Access Date: 27.09.2019.

⁴⁷ START, “Global Terrorism Database, Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables”, 2018, p.10




Figure 1. The number of terrorist attacks in the world⁴⁸

Both the percentage of terrorist attacks targeting civilians and the severity of terrorist attacks in terms of dead and injured have dramatically increased all over the world. For instance, the percentage of terrorist attacks resulting in death was 51% during 2001-2015 but had been 42% during the period of 1990-2000. In addition, the percentage of terrorist attacks targeting civilians directly or indirectly increased from 23% to 33% in this period.

Meanwhile, terrorist attacks have also been increasing dramatically in Turkey. Figure 2 indicates terrorist attacks to have decreased noticeably during 2009-2011;⁴⁹ however, since 2012 they have increased dramatically. In fact, while terrorist attacks averaged 15.7 annually in the period of 2002-2011, this figure grew to 93.6 for the period of 2012-2014 according to GTD, an approximately six-fold increase. Therefore, the impact of terrorism has increased in Turkey more than the global average in terms of frequency.

⁴⁸ Global Terrorism Database (GTD), START.

⁴⁹ According to GTD, there were only four terrorist attacks in 2009.




Figure 2. The number of terrorist attacks and casualties in Turkey⁵⁰

Similarly, the severity of terrorist attacks has increased prominently in Turkey. For instance, the share of terrorist attacks resulting in death increased to 38% in 2012-2015 from 32% in 2002-2011. In other words, the number of terrorist attacks increased from 82.7 to 308.3 per year. Therefore, the impact of terrorism increased in Turkey less than its global average in terms of severity. Indeed, Figure 3 indicates that 58% of terrorist attacks resulted in no deaths or injury in Turkey while this percentage was 46% for the rest of the world. In addition, the share of terrorist attacks resulting in 11-50 dead or injured people was only 7% in Turkey, while this was 13% for the rest of the world.

⁵⁰ Global Terrorism Database (GTD), START.




Figure 3. The distribution of terrorist attacks in Turkey and the world⁵¹

According to Figure 4, terrorist attacks targeting civilians in Turkey increased from 73 to 150 from the periods of 2002-2011 to 2012-2015. This corresponds to a 105% increase, approximately. This is one main reason for the increase in the severity of terrorism in Turkey.




Figure 4. Changes in terrorist attacks targeting civilians in Turkey⁵²

⁵¹ Global Terrorism Database (GTD), START

In addition to these changes, the impact areas of terror spread over a wide eastern and southeastern geography after 2012. This can be seen in Figures 5 and 6. Before 2012, terrorist attacks had frequently been observed in eastern and southeastern Turkey; after 2012, these events had spread to all of Turkey's NUTS-2 regions.



Figure 5. The regional distribution of terrorist attacks (2002-2011)⁵³



Figure 6. The regional distribution of terrorist attacks (2012-2014)⁵⁴

⁵² Global Terrorism Database, START.

⁵³ It is compiled from Global Terrorism Database.

⁵⁴ It's compiled from Global Terrorism Database.

Consequently, when considering the increases in impact areas, frequency, and severity of terrorism, Turkey has become more vulnerable. In other words, terrorism can hinder the growth performance of the regions located particularly in eastern and southeastern Turkey. Therefore, terrorism should be investigated as a potential political determinant of balanced and comprehensive regional growth.

3. Data and Variables

This study investigates the effects of terrorist attacks on economic growth over the period of 2005-2014 in Turkey's NUTS-II regions. The econometric model's dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita, which reflects the economic growth that basically means increasing economic output. The independent variables are:

- The growth rate of terrorist attacks ($TERROR_{ATTACKS}$);
- The growth rate of human public capital investments in health and education per capita (PCI_{HUMAN}) as a regional physical capital;
- The growth rate of graduate students per capita ($EDUCATION_{HIGHER}$) as a regional human capital;
- Initial real GDP per capita ($y_{i,t-1}$) inconsideration of the convergence hypothesis.

The explanations and expectations regarding these variables are shown in Table 2. When taking the empirical literature into consideration, the negative relationship between terrorist attacks and economic growth performance can be predicted.

On the other hand, taking into consideration the variables of both higher education as human capital and human public capital investments as physical capital may result in a positive coefficient through their positive externalities. Finally, a negative lagged value for the dependent variable indicates divergence of the process within a region; otherwise, there is convergence.

Table 2. Characteristics of Variables

2005 – 2014 26 Regions	Symbol	Definition	Foreseen	Sources
Dependent Variable	$y_{i,t}/y_{i,t-1}$	The growth rate of real GDP per capita		TurkStat
Convergence	$y_{i,t-1}$	Initial real GDP per capita	+/-	TurkStat
	<i>POP</i>	The growth rate of population	-	TurkStat
Human Capital Stock	<i>EDUCATION</i> _{HIGHER}	The growth rate of graduate students per capita	+	TurkStat
Physical Capital Stock	<i>PCI</i> _{HUMAN}	The growth rate of human public capital investments (health and education) per capita	+	Ministry of Development
Terrorist Attacks	<i>TERROR</i> _{ATTACKS}	The growth rate of terrorist attacks	-	GTD START

TurkStat: Turkish Statistic Institute

START : National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

GTD: Global Terrorism Database

4. Empirical Methodology and Model

Econometric model includes panel dataset covering 2005-2014 period and Turkey's NUTS-II regions.⁵⁵The functional form of it is:

⁵⁵ In panel data analysis, the three different model can be used as Pooled/Mixed, Fixed Effects, and Random Effects Panel Models. The main problem of Pooled Panel Model, in which a single constant term is determined for each cross-section and, depending on this, which is based on the homogeneity assumption between cross-sections, is that it does not discriminate between cross-sections and cannot say whether or not inter-variable

$$\ln\left(\frac{y_{i,t}}{y_{i,t-1}}\right) = \gamma \ln(y_{i,t-1}) + \beta \ln(X_{i,t}) + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(y_{i,t}) - \ln(y_{i,t-1}) \\ = \gamma \ln(y_{i,t-1}) + \beta \ln(X_{i,t}) \\ + \varepsilon_{i,t} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where $i = 1, \dots, 26$ (Cross-section), $t = 2005, \dots, 2014$ (period). With $\alpha = 1 + \gamma$, Eq. (1) becomes:

$$\ln(y_{i,t}) = \alpha \ln(y_{i,t-1}) + \beta \ln(X_{i,t}) + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (3)$$

$$\text{and } \varepsilon_{i,t} = \mu_i + v_{i,t} \quad (4)$$

where y_{it} stands for the real income per capita of region i at the end of period t ; $X_{i,t-1}$ is a vector of the economic determinants of growth such as physical and human capital stock and terrorist attacks; μ_i are region-specific effects and $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ is the error term.

The lagged value of the dependent variable is the independent variable in (3). It is known as a dynamic panel model. Because y_{it} is a function of μ_i , $y_{i,t-1}$ is also a function of μ_i . Therefore, $y_{i,t-1}$ is correlated with the error term and renders the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent even if $v_{i,t}$ is not serially correlated. It is similar to the *FE* estimator. This bias does not vanish as the number of individuals increases, so the *FE* estimator is inconsistent for large values of n and small values of T ⁵⁶. For large time periods, the bias becomes very small and the problem disappears⁵⁷. However, because only 10 periods exist

relationship is the same as all cross-sections in time (Gujarati and Porter, 2012, p.594).

⁵⁶ Badi H. Baltagi, *Econometric Analysis of Panel Data*. 5th Edition, Wiley Publication, United Kingdom, 2013, p. 155.

⁵⁷ Ari Aisen and Francisco Jose Veiga, *Ibid*, p. 154.

in the econometric model for 2005-2014, bias might become a significant problem.⁵⁸ Therefore, the econometric model has been estimated using the Roodman⁵⁹ System-GMM estimator.⁶⁰

5. Empirical Results

The findings from the dynamic panel model as based on the System-GMM estimator without spatial parameters are presented in Table 3. The findings indicate terrorist attack to hinder regional growth performance, which is consistent with Asteriou and Price⁶¹, Blomberg et al.,⁶² Eckstein and Tsiddon,⁶³ Giskemo,⁶⁴ Meierrieks and Gries,⁶⁵ Öcal and Yıldırım,⁶⁶ Zakaria et al.,⁶⁷ Crain and Crain,⁶⁸ Çınar,⁶⁹ and Choi.⁷⁰ A region's growth rate decreases by 0.5% for a

⁵⁸ According to the Monte Carlo Simulations is different cross and period examples estimated by Judson and Owen (1999), even if $t = 30$, this bias could correspond to 20% of actual value of coefficient.

⁵⁹ David Roodman, "How to Do xtabond2: An Introduction to "Difference" and "System" GMM in Stata", *Stata Journal*, 2009, Vol: 9/1, 86-136.

⁶⁰ These estimators are designed for dynamic "small-T, large-N" panels that may contain fixed effects and separate from those fixed effects--idiosyncratic errors that are heteroskedastic and correlated within but not across individuals. On the other hand, before estimation, potential spatial dependency between variables investigated because of the regional patterns of GDP values reflecting spatial dependency as cluster. Because, in case that there is spatial effect (spatial dependency) between the variables to be analyzed but this effect cannot be considered, the Least Squares (LS) estimator will include several problems such as effectiveness or biased problem by types of spatial dependency (Anselin, 1998). However, according to findings of LM_{LAG} and LM_{ERR} Tests employing for this purpose, there isn't any spatial dependency between variables.

⁶¹ Dimitrios Asteriou and Simon Price, *Ibid*, p. 383.

⁶² S. Brock Blomberg, Gregory D. Hess, and Athanasios Orphanides, *Ibid*, p. 1007.

⁶³ Zvi Eckstein and Daniel Tsiddon, *Ibid*, p. 971.

⁶⁴ Gunhild Gram Giskemo, *Ibid*, p. 4

⁶⁵ Daniel Meierrieks and Thomas Gries, *Ibid*, p. 91.

⁶⁶ Nadir Öcal and Jülide Yıldırım, *Ibid*, p. 477.

⁶⁷ Muhammad Zakaria, *Ibid*, p. 1794.

⁶⁸ Nicole V. Crain and W. Mark Crain, *Ibid*, p. 317.

⁶⁹ Mehmet Çınar, *Ibid*, p. 97.

⁷⁰ Seung-Wan Choi, *Ibid*, p.157.

10% increase in terrorist attacks.

Meanwhile, investments in human public capital under health and education (PCI_{HUMAN}) have positive and statistically significant effects on a region's growth performance; this is consistent with Shioji,⁷¹ Baldacci et al.⁷² A 10% increase in health and education public capital investments increases the regions' growth rate by 0.2%.

In addition, no statistically significant relationship has been found between a higher educated population and growth. In other words, the positive externalities of human capital on growth do not occur in Turkey; this is consistent with Pereira and Aubyn⁷³ and Delgado et al.⁷⁴ An insufficient higher education system in terms of both qualitative and quantitative dynamics and economic production patterns may be the potential reason for this result as sectorial links from potential clusters have generally low or medium technological dynamics in Turkey.⁷⁵ Finally, Turkey's NUTS-II regions diverge from each other slowly in terms of GDP per capita; this is consistent with Berber et al.,⁷⁶ Gezici and Hewings,⁷⁷ Karaca,⁷⁸ Gezici and Hewings.⁷⁹

⁷¹ Etsuro Shioji, "Public Capital and Economic Growth: A Convergence Approach", *Journal of Economic Growth*, 2001, Vol: 6, 205-227, p. 205.

⁷² Emanuele Baldacci, Benedict Clements, Sanjeev Gupta and Qiang Cui, "Social Spending, Human Capital, and Growth in Developing Countries", *World Development*, 2008, Vol: 36/8, 1317-1341, p. 1317.

⁷³ Joao Pereira and Miguel St. Aubyn, "What Level of Education Matters Most for Growth? Evidence from Portugal," *Economics of Education Review*, 2009, Vol: 28/1, 67-73, p. 67.

⁷⁴ Michael Delgado, Daniel J. Henderson and Christopher F. Parmeter, "Does Education Matter for Economic Growth?", *IZA Discussion Paper 7089*, 2012, 1-27, p. 1.

⁷⁵ Sedef Akgungor, Nese Kumral and Necmettin Celik, "Türkiye'de Sektörel İleri – Geri Bağlantılar, Kümelenmeler ve Bölgesel Uzmanlaşma", *17. Ulusal Bölge Bilimi ve Bölge Planlama Kongresi (BBTMK2017) Bildiri Özetleri*, Burdur, 2017, 13-14, p. 13.

⁷⁶ Metin Berber, Rahmi Yamak and Seyfettin Artan, "Türkiye'de Yakınlaşma Hipotezinin Bolgeler Bazında Gecerliliği Uzerine Ampirik Bir Calisma: 1975-1997", *9. Ulusal Bolge Bilimi Kongresi*, Trabzon, 2000, 51-59, p. 51.

⁷⁷ Ferhan Gezici and Geoffrey J. D. Hewings, "Regional Convergence and the Economic Performance of Peripheral Areas in Turkey", *Review of Urban & Regional*

Table 3. System GMM Panel Model Results

<i>26 Regions 2005-2014</i>	Dependent Variable: $y_{i,t}/y_{i,t-1}$
$y_{i,t-1}$	-0.09*
<i>POP</i>	-0.07
<i>PCI</i> _{HUMAN}	0.02**
<i>EDUCATION</i> _{HIGHER}	-0.02
<i>TERROR</i> _{ATTACKS}	-0.05***
Constant	0.12***
AR (1) stat.	-4.53 [0.000]
AR (2) stat.	-0.29 [0.770]
Sargan Test stat.	113.57 [0.000]
Hansen Test stat.	22.36 [0.004]
Number of Instruments	14
Number of Groups	26
Number of Obs.	234

Note: *, **, *** symbols stand for a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. Statistics in parentheses () stand for robust standard errors, statistics in brackets [] stand for *p*-values.

Development Studies, 2004, Vol: 16/2, 113-132, p. 113.

⁷⁸ Orhan Karaca, "Türkiye'de Bölgeler Arası Gelir Farklılıkları: Yakınsama Var Mı?", *TEK Tartışma Metni 2004/7*, 2004, 1-16, p. 1.

⁷⁹ Ferhan Gezici and Geoffrey J. D. Hewings, "Spatial Analysis of Regional Inequalities in Turkey", *European Planning Studies*, 2007, Vol: 15/3, 383-403, p. 383.

Conclusion

The frequency and severity of terrorist attacks have increased dramatically and begun to spill over to all NUTS-2 regions of Turkey, especially since 2012. Therefore, terrorism, which has been an ongoing problem in Turkey for approximately 40 years, has become a more sensitive factor on the economy since then. From this perspective, the problem must be taken into consideration in order to establish balanced and comprehensive regional economic growth and solve structural economic problems such as migration and regional inequalities. Therefore, the study investigated the effects of terrorist attacks on economic growth as a political determinant for the period of 2005-2014 in Turkey's NUTS-II regions in addition to several economic determinants.

The empirical findings indicate terrorism to directly hinder regional growth performance in Turkey. In addition, the repressive effects of terrorism on economy being higher since 2015 can be predicted due to the dramatic rise in attacks. In this respect, solving the terrorism problem is a crucial issue for establishing balanced and comprehensive regional development in Turkey. For this purpose, the concepts of terror and terrorism must first be separated from one another, and then the potential economic, political, social, psychological, and spatial dynamics of terrorism should be detected and proactive measures must be taken into account⁸⁰ as terrorism being

⁸⁰ Necmettin Celik, *Kırılgan-Başarısız Devlet Olgusu ve Terörizm Açmazı (Sosyo-İktisadi ve Politik Dinamikleri Dâhilinde)*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ege Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İzmir, 2014, 1-86, p. 85; Necmettin Celik, "Toplumsal Parçalanma, Sosyal Dışlanma ve Terörizm", *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika Dergisi*, 2015, Vol: 11/44, 157-280, p. 157; Necmettin Celik, "İktisadi, Politik ve Mekansal Dinamikleri Dâhilinde Küreselleşen Terörizm", *SAREN Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi*, 2016, Vol: 23/12, 163-204, p. 163; Mehmet Karacuka and Necmettin Celik, "Kırılgan-Başarısız Devlet Olgusu ve Terörizm İlişkisi", *Gazi İİBF Dergisi*, 2017a, Vol: 19/1, 20-41, p.20; Mehmet Karacuka and Necmettin Celik, "Globalizing Terrorism and It's Economic-Politic Dynamics", Halil İbrahim Aydın, Magdalena Ziolo and Aniela Balacescu (ed.), *Economic Development Global and Regional Studies*, IIOPEC Publication, London, 2017b, 301-315, p. 301.

a more complicated concept has several dynamics other than security patterns. Therefore government and policy makers must take into consideration and analyze in detail the conditions and dynamics of terrorist structures⁸¹.

When struggling with the economic dynamics of terrorism, investments in human and physical capital, especially in education towards regions located in eastern and southeastern Turkey, may be essential tools. In addition, leading employment incentives may be another policy tool for this purpose. This is because, as regional inequalities decrease in terms of development level, opportunity costs for terrorism increase and terrorist groups will lose their domination. However, these effects will essentially be limited. Therefore, regional structural problems urgently need to be solved.

Özet

Dengeli ve sürdürülebilir iktisadi büyüme süreçleri iktisadi istikrar kadar politik istikrar süreçlerine de dayalı olarak şekillenmektedir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, politik istikrarsızlık boyutlarına ulaşan şiddetli terör olaylarının iktisadi dinamiklere etki etmesi ve işleyen piyasa mekanizmasına zarar vermesi kuvvetle muhtemeldir. Başka bir ifadeyle, politik istikrarsızlık süreçleri iktisadi büyüme performansını baskılayacak bir unsur haline dönüşebilmektedir. Bu sebeple, daha kapsamlı ve uygun iktisadi analizlerin yapılabilmesi terörizm gibi politik dinamiklerin de irdelenmesini gerektirmektedir.

Nitekim, Türkiye yaklaşık 40 yıldır terörizm sorunuyla karşı karşıya olan ve gerek insani; gerekse de maddi açıdan büyük kayıplar yaşayan bir ülke konumundadır. Türkiye’de 1980’lerden beri süregelen terörizm sorununun özellikle 2012 yılından itibaren daha belirgin bir şekilde hissedildiği görülmektedir. Buna ek olarak, genellikle, ülkenin doğu ve güneydoğu bölgelerinde yoğunlaşan terör olaylarının,

⁸¹ Necmettin Celik, 2014, Ibid, p. 68.

2012 yılından itibaren, neredeyse tüm ülke geneline yayılarak. iktisadi büyümeyi baskılayıcı bir unsura dönüştüğü söylenebilir. Bu sebeple, çalışmada, 2005-2014 dönemi ve Türkiye'nin 26 adet İBBS-2 Bölgesi kapsamında, terörizm sorunun dengeli ve sürdürülebilir bölgesel iktisadi büyüme üzerindeki potansiyel etkileri incelenmiştir. Bu doğrultuda tahmin edilen Sistem GMM Panel Model bulguları, terör olaylarının bölgelerin büyüme performansı üzerinde negatif ve istatistiksel açıdan anlamlı etkileri olduğunu göstermektedir. Bulgulara göre, yaklaşık 40 yıldır Türkiye'nin güneydoğu ve doğu bölgelerinde süregelen ve 2012 yılından itibaren sıklık, sertlik ve etki alanı gibi unsurlar ekseninde şiddetini arttıran terör olaylarının bölgesel iktisadi büyümeyi baskıladığı anlaşılmaktadır. Bu sebeple, dengeli ve sürdürülebilir bir bölgesel iktisadi büyümenin tesis edilebilmesinin temel noktalarından birinin de terörizmle mücadele olduğu unutulmamalıdır. Bu noktada, terörizmin muhtemel iktisadi, politik, toplumsal, psikolojik ve mekansal dinamiklerine yönelik çalışmaların genişletilmesi ve terörizm sorununa salt askerî açıdan değil, aynı zamanda proaktif güvenlik önlemleri ekseninde de bakılması faydalı olacaktır.

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The Ontology of Security and its Implications for Maritime Security*

Güvenliğin Ontolojisi ve Deniz Güvenliğine
Dair Çıkarımlar

Çağdaş DEDEOĞLU**

Abstract

A substantial number of state and non-state actors have published strategies for maritime security and governance in the last decade. These strategies have been criticized in the sense that they do not reflect the ever-changing nature of security context. The critics mostly deal with adaptation to new risks and threats from an anthropocentric perspective. This study instead focuses on the comparison of the classical and post-classical ontologies of security. It assumes that the classical ontology of security enables certain assumptions while ignoring others. Thus, an ontological critique appears to be a necessity to address the security concerns of the complex global security context adequately. With this, this paper contributes to Christian Bueger's maritime security matrix from a paradigm-oriented approach. As a result, the paper makes a case for the post-classical ontology of security and defines its main features as diffusion, interrelation, adaptation, non-linearity, and inclusiveness. This paper concludes that the ontological turn would be an asset for

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sustainable maritime security governance.

Keywords: *Anthropocene, Complexity, Ontology of Security, Maritime Security, Post-Classical Ontology.*

Öz

Devletler ve devlet-dışı aktörler, son on yılda, deniz güvenliği ve yönetişimi hakkında stratejiler yayımlamıştır. Ardından, bu stratejilerin, değişen güvenlik bağlamını yansıtmadığı hususunda eleştiriler ortaya çıkmıştır. Fakat bu eleştiriler, çoğunlukla, yeni risk ve tehditlerin insan-merkezci bir anlayışla stratejiye eklenmesiyle ilgilenmektedir. Bu çalışma ise, güvenliğin klasik ve klasik sonrası ontolojilerinin karşılaştırmasına odaklanmaktadır. Burada temel varsayım, klasik güvenlik ontolojisinin her zaman bazı varsayımları dikkate alıp bazılarını görmezden geldiği şeklindedir. Bu nedenle, ontolojik eleştiri, karmaşık küresel güvenlik ortamının güvenlik kaygılarına tam olarak yanıt vermek için gereklidir. Bu durum karşısında, bu çalışma, Christian Bueger'in deniz güvenliği matrisine de paradigma temelli bir yaklaşımla katkı sunmaktadır. Sonuçta, bu çalışma, güvenliğin klasik-sonrası ontolojisini öne çıkarmakta ve bu ontolojinin temel özelliklerini yayılma, karşılıklı ilişki, uyum, doğrusal olmama ve içermeye şeklinde tanımlamaktadır. Böylesi bir ontolojik dönüşün, sürdürülebilir deniz güvenliği yönetişimi için elzem olduğu değerlendirilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Antroposen, Deniz Güvenliği, Güvenliğin Ontolojisi, Karmaşa, Klasik-Sonrası Ontoloji.*

Introduction

Different conceptualizations of maritime security (or marine security) aim to selectively target some or all of various security concerns such as piracy and armed robbery, terrorism, sea trafficking—and human trafficking—, biological and chemical pollution, and climate change. These concerns continue to expand, and their character is hybrid, that is, they cannot be understood and responded by a conventional approach. In this respect, Maritime Security has taken shape in the interaction of national and international governance as

well as of various approaches and policies in the current global security situation.

Due to global dependency on maritime trade,¹ maritime security has received much attention, mostly in economic terms. States have presented individual and organized efforts concerning maritime governance. Although the academic literature and practical efforts on maritime security have been expanding, especially for the last decade,² the works focusing on diverse maritime security issues are still rare.³ The main factor affecting institutional efforts has been the fear of maritime terrorism.⁴ Such efforts have also considered additional factors based on their agenda. For example, NATO published its Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) in 2011, guided by the 2010 Strategic Concept.⁵ However, the AMS has been later criticized by other authors. The critics state that the strategy does not reflect the dramatically changed security situation of the post-2011 era and draw attention to new risks and threats.⁶ This study does not aim to make a similar list of maritime security challenges. Instead, it aims to focus on the ontological premises and the ways through which understandings of security have been constructed.

Two arguments have so far dominated the debate about the future of maritime security and governance. Some argue that the global

¹ The UNCTAD Secretariat, "Review of Maritime Transport 2011"; Chambers and Mindy Liu, "Maritime Trade and Transportation by the Numbers"; Zhang, "Chinese Capitalism and the Maritime Silk Road."

² Bekkevold and Till, *International Order at Sea*. Flynn, "The EU's Maritime Security Strategy." Denmark et al., "Diplomacy and Controversies in Global Security Studies."

³ Algan, "Environmental Security in the Aegean Sea"; Cariou and Psarafitis, "International Symposium on Maritime Safety, Security and Environmental Protection."

⁴ Martin N. Murphy, *Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to International Security* Routledge, London, 2013 <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203759318>; Christian Bueger, "What Is Maritime Security?," *Marine Policy* 53, March 2015, 159–64, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2014.12.005>.

⁵ NATO, "Alliance Maritime Strategy."

⁶ Horrell, Nordenman, and Slocombe, "Updating NATO's Maritime Strategy."

maritime domain is an anarchical one,⁷ while the others approach to maritime affairs from the perspective of international order.⁸ Most understandings of maritime security have been developed based on new risk perceptions. In this sense, they reflect the general trend of the field of international security studies, that is, they largely disregard “*analytical, philosophical, normative and epistemological assumptions.*”⁹ However, there are rare yet comprehensive attempts in the field of security studies in general,¹⁰ and particularly, in maritime security studies.¹¹ As a contribution to the latter, this paper addresses the ontological dimension of the hegemonic paradigm of security. It assumes that the classical ontology of security shapes mainstream understandings of security by allowing certain assumptions while excluding others. With this, this paper proposes an inclusive approach to maritime security. Based on the paradigmatic relationship between individual ontologies¹² and security, a debate on the ontologies of security may have some implications for an inclusive maritime security strategy at the global level.

1. On the Ontology of Security

This study assumes that existing works in the field of security studies rely on different paradigms such as positivism, post-positivism, constructivism, and critical theory.¹³ Understanding this reliance is crucial since paradigm functions as a riverbed through which various theories flow. Paradigms are metaphysical forms that include specific positions on ontology (our belief about the nature of reality),

⁷ Sloggett, *The Anarchic Sea: Maritime Security in the 21st Century*.

⁸ Bueger and Edmunds, “Beyond Seablindness.”

⁹ Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 21.

¹⁰ Michael C. Williams, “Identity and the Politics of Security”; Mitchell, “Only Human?”

¹¹ Bueger, *op. cit.*

¹² In this study, “ontologies” is used in plural form since individual ontologies differ.

¹³ For a comparison of these paradigms, please see Egon G. Guba and Yvonna S. Lincoln, “Paradigmatic Controversies, Contradictions, and Emerging Confluences.”

epistemology (our belief about our knowledge of reality), axiology (the effects of ethics and values on our knowing), and teleology (our belief about the direction and outcome of our research). They are, therefore, cosmological statements. Theories, on the other hand, are statements that exist within specific paradigms.¹⁴ Thus, paradigm limitations also restrict the theory. Keeping Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm shift¹⁵ in mind, a theory explains any (social) phenomena within a paradigm in a normal science activity, but when it cannot do it effectively, this is either because the theory or the paradigm that this theory rests on are lacking. Then, there will arise the necessity for improving the theory. Unless such improvement occurs successfully, the moment will soon arrive for a paradigm shift.

For Mertens et al., a paradigm shift is also an ethical obligation when social justice issues that affect marginal groups motivate the researcher to question the metaphysical foundations of researching the "real" world. What Mertens et al. aim to reach as a result of paradigm shift is the transformative paradigm, a new paradigm that seeks "to bring visibility to members of (marginal) communities."¹⁶ A discussion about the transformative paradigm is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, the study of security at the paradigmatic level can also be regarded as an ethical obligation since there is a link between hegemonic security discourse and the study of security. This link is integral to the legitimacy of governments and their policies since security discourses are implemented to determine which values are essential to be secured.¹⁷ With these concerns, this study focuses on the concept of security from an ontological aspect.

¹⁴ For the details of the personal communication with Denzin and Lincoln, see Mertens et al., "Utilization of Mixed Methods for Transformative Purposes."

¹⁵ Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.

¹⁶ Mertens et al., op. cit., p. 5; Donna M. Mertens, "Transformative Paradigm: Mixed Methods and Social Justice," *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 1, no. 3, July 2007, 212–25, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1558689807302811>.

¹⁷ Matt McDonald, "Climate Change and Security: Towards Ecological Security?,"

In the related literature, two different terms combine the words of ontology and security. The first term, “*ontology of security*”, is widely used in computer science, particularly in web applications. The second term, “*ontological security*,” is common in security studies¹⁸ and has a different meaning than the ontology of security or security ontology. While the former corresponds to the security of individuals and sometimes of institutions concerning their survival concerns, the latter points out the metaphysical foundations of security-related assumptions of individuals, groups, or societies. Although the ontologies of security have not become a prominent debate in the field of security studies so far,¹⁹ some studies question the metaphysics understandings of security and its related discourses. For example, Matt McDonald compares the prevalent discourses of security, such as national security, international security, and human security, and draws attention to the position of ecological security discourse.²⁰ These discourses differ in terms of security referent (nation-state, international society, or people), threat perception (sovereignty, global stability, or individual livelihood), agent (state, international organizations, or states, NGOs, and the international community). McDonald uses this classification to show how the discourses diversify regarding their positions about the securitization of climate change, but such a

International Theory 10, no. 2, July 2018, 153–80, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971918000039>, p. 158.

¹⁸ Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 3, September 2006, 341–70, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066106067346>; Bahar Rumelili (ed.), *Conflict Resolution and Ontological Security: Peace Anxieties*, Routledge, 2014, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315796314>.

¹⁹ The syllabus of the Ph.D. course, named “Security Ontology,” taught by David A. Welch, is an exception. In this syllabus, Welch states that the course is an opportunity “to explore and explain whether you think we should understand ‘security’ in a way that privilege human beings above all.” I think the question that Welch asks is ontological, therefore, corresponds to the position of this paper. For details, David A. Welch, “GGOV630/PACS634/PSCI678: Security Ontology.”

²⁰ McDonald, op. cit.

classification also has implications for security studies. Both scientific and non-scientific communities' approval of a specific security discourse is dependent on the balance of power among competing interest groups. This dependency also implies to what extent governments and societies affected by politics welcome a security paradigm. Ecological security discourse thus challenges the other three discourses in three aspects. First, ecosystems constitute its primary referent. Second, its threat perception focuses on the balance between current political, social, and economic forms. Third, its primary agent is people with their raising political awareness. With this, the ecological security discourse may respond to climate change differently than the discourses mentioned above. This outcome is closely related to the ontology of security as the working mechanism behind security discourse. The ever-changing global security context today constitutes a challenge for the classical ontology of security and its related security discourses and creates a demand for change. To better understand this challenge, the next section will discuss how the global security context has changed.

2. The Governance of Complex Insecurities and Some Ontological Questions

In 1957, Picasso finished an extended series of variations on *Las Meninas* (The Maids of Honor) that was originally painted by Velazquez in 1656 (Figures 1 & 2). The series was both a confrontation with one of the essential works in the history of Spanish painting and commentary on the events in Spain, observed by Picasso from his exile in France. From a different point of view, both works were representatives of their zeitgeist. The subject-object relationship differs between different zeitgeists, and this is reflected by the ontologies penetrating the lives of artists and scientists. Therefore, the comparison of the two versions may be helpful comprehend the transformation of global politics and international relations in three centuries. While the former *Las Meninas* was produced in the Westphalian period, the latter was done during the Cold War. Many differences can be found between these two works; however, it is important to note that the depiction of reality

is extremely conditioned by their times. It appears that while Velazquez portrayed a much clearer web of relations, Picasso did not or could not prefer to do this. This comparison helps to imagine complexity as the defining feature of the second half of the 20th century and the 21st century's first two decades. This feature translates into questions about the governance of complex insecurities.



Figure 1. Velazquez's Las Meninas (1656) **Figure 2.** Picasso's Las Meninas (1957)

The advanced techno-industrial systems reinforced the complexities of our age, especially regarding the relationship between humans and their environments. Human influence over ecosystems has dramatically increased since the industrial revolution. Some scholars, therefore, posit that the Earth has entered a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene.²¹ Some others make a particular emphasis on “*the great acceleration*” of human-induced environmental change since 1945.²² What these different accounts point to is the wide spectrum of risks

²¹ Paul J. Crutzen, “Human Impact on Climate Has Made This the ‘Anthropocene Age,’” *New Perspectives Quarterly* 22, no. 2 (2005): 14–16, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5842.2005.00739.x>.

²² McNeill and Engelke, *The Great Acceleration: An Environmental History of the Anthropocene since 1945*.

such as ocean pollution, climate change, and biodiversity loss. However, the questions related to the concept of security —security of whom, how much security, and security through which instruments— still consider the issues of governance from a human-centered perspective and fail to adequately address these risks. This outcome is not surprising when someone considers the transformation of governance systems.

The emergence of state apparatus, as we know it, coincides with the advent of positivism in natural sciences, which is followed by increased anthropogenic activities. Since the late 17th century, the positivist paradigm and rationalism, have dominated the formation of modern national systems and the international order.²³ As Walker puts it, state sovereignty was, in a sense, a response to the dilemma caused by the Cartesian challenge to pre-modern belief in divine hierarchical order.²⁴ While the human mind has become “*rationalized*” during the modern era, its hierarchical character has remained almost unchanged. This one-dimensional rationalization²⁵ was also consistent with the transition from imperialism to colonialism and capitalism. These developments paved the way for the two world wars and, eventually, the “*new*” world order. However, this order has never been an inclusive one due to the hegemony of modernist, rationalist national security discourse. The journey of the concept of security, in Latin *securitas*, towards a collective meaning,²⁶ has also echoed these positivist trends. With this, Keohane differentiates the rationalistic and reflective approaches to international institutions and insists that most of the realist and liberal works belong to the rationalistic camp.²⁷

²³ David Chandler, *Resilience: The Governance of Complexity* Routledge, London, 2014, p. 21.

²⁴ Walker, “Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics.”, p.10.

²⁵ For a conceptualization of one-dimensionality, see Herbert, *One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*.

²⁶ Emma Rothschild, “What Is Security?”, p. 63.

²⁷ Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (1988): 379–96, p. 382.

Buzan and Hansen also emphasize that international security studies did not reflect the elaborative theoretical concerns, especially during the superpower relations of the Cold War.²⁸ As any concept developed by the Cartesian thinking, the concept of security was guided by a modernist, isolated, and linear understanding of reality. This understanding has served the reproduction of colonialisms in a postcolonial milieu²⁹ such that national security is a discursive reflection of this postcolonial colonialist ontology. In this context, Sangarasivam states that:

*“National security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. Security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories.”*³⁰

“Settler colonial logics” that Sangarasivam emphasizes can also be read as a critique of classical ontology. In classical ontology, there remains a huge gap between subject and object. This gap triggers an “indefinite sense of insecurity” and allows the implementation of “legitimate violence” in response to uncertain insecurities. In other words, the term security dilemma reflects in the classical paradigm with its onto-epistemological assumptions, although theorists have long defined it as an unsolvable issue of the global security context. This is even true for critical analytical works. For instance, in a recent report, the authors state that “once the essence and concept of security have been delineated, it is, in a third step, possible to think about the

²⁸ Buzan and Hansen, op. cit., p. 35.

²⁹ Sökefeld, “From Colonialism to Postcolonial Colonialism.”

³⁰ Yamuna Sangarasivam, “Ecological Ontologies of Sovereignty and Insecurity: Settler Colonial Logics of National Security,” *Critical Studies on Security* 5, no. 2, May 4, 2017, 203–6, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2017.1320880>, p. 203.

pursuit of security.”³¹ However, they do not wonder what motivates the researcher to decide on the essence and concept of security. It is the ontology that manifests itself as a distinct concept rather than philosophy. While philosophy can be taught through specific pedagogies, it is not easy to teach ontology. It is about how and under what terms we define our existence. It is performed on various occasions. It is embedded in the complex web of life in which we try to survive. Accordingly, this complexity prevents a step-by-step security analysis similar to what those authors attempted.

Another implication of Sangarasivam’s claim is that there should be a distinction between the ontology of security and security as an ontological status. While the ontology of security indicates the study of metaphysical issues that affects the conceptualization of security, security as an ontological status corresponds to the conceptualization of security as an existential phenomenon. The historical processes, mentioned above, have resulted in investing more in developing new strategies from anthropocentric paradigms, and less in the ontological understandings of security. However, these processes have shaped the current worldviews of researchers and practitioners. Since they are about knowledge production, they may also have some epistemological implications. For example, pedagogies and teaching materials heavily relied on the ideological dualism of the Cold War period, and this prevented international relations students from developing multidimensional and multilevel perspectives. At that time, the perspective largely reflected in the ongoing legacy of classical ontology in social science circles.

On the other hand, the classical ontological position has started to lose its hegemony within the scientific community due to scientific developments of the 20th century, e.g., the ones in physics. Since then,

³¹ Marc von Boemcken and Conrad Schetter, “Security: What Is It? What Does It Do?,” The Reflection Group “Monopoly on the Use of Force 2.0?” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Berlin, 2016, p. 2.

the approaches to the depiction of reality have changed. For instance, David Chandler depicts the new world as “*more fluid, more interconnected, and complex*.”³² This new condition does not allow reductionist, modernist analyses to be successful. Here, the post-classical ontology may be an alternative to the classical one since the former does not treat the subject and object distinctly. Further, the subject does not stand at the center of governance. Mutual constitution and transformation³³ are keywords in the post-classical ontology. The post-classical ontological position, therefore, radically affects the perception of security. While adaptation to the changing security context is considered possible in classical ontological assumptions, such adaptation efforts contain the risk of creating new vulnerabilities according to the post-classical approach.³⁴

Concerning the post-classical ontology of security, Chandler’s discussion of chaos theory and complexity theory helps to discover some conceptual possibilities. Although both derived from scientific developments of the 20th century, chaos theory sticks to “*the deterministic ontology of chaos*” while the complexity theory rests on an “*emergent causality*.”³⁵ Their distinction stems from their disciplinary origins. The chaos theory, originated from quantum mechanics, assumes an unforeseeable character in any spatiotemporal context. On the other hand, the complexity theory, rooted in the principles of thermodynamics, evolutionary biology, and computational mathematics,³⁶ focuses on the possibility of governing any entity within its causal relations. For Chandler, the complexity theory explains today’s world politics better, and the governance of its complexity necessitates a post-classical ontology.

³² David Chandler, op. cit., p. 22.

³³ Henry Farrell and Martha Finnemore, “Ontology, Methodology, and Causation in the American School of International Political Economy,” *Review of International Political Economy* 16, no. 1, February 16, 2009, 58–71, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290802524075>, p. 59.

³⁴ David Chandler, op. cit., p. 11.

³⁵ *ibid.* p. 25.

³⁶ *ibid.*, p. 26.

The same is true for the ontology of security. Indeed, the expanding literature on security and particularly on maritime security, shows that authorities choose to govern the complexity in practice. However, without focusing on the security paradigm that guides minds and actions, governance practices cannot become more inclusive and effective.

Today's security context continues to be explained through a modernist, dualist paradigm which marginalizes some groups of wider security community including animals, workers, natives, and women. The use of the term "*security environment*" also reflects such a modernist position. Under this ontology, we place ourselves at the center of the universe. Accordingly, we value our priorities and analyze the surrounding issues. However, this ontology always excludes some others. In line with Mertens et al.'s emphasis on the visibility of marginal communities, this paper suggests a paradigm change can help to improve this ontology.

3. A Secure Understanding of Maritime Security?

In the previous two sections, I approached the concept of security from an ontological point of view and attempted to show that the mainstream assumptions about security are not independent of modernist, dualist understandings of reality. Following this, I suggested an ontological turn towards a post-classical position to capture the complexity of today's insecurities. What might this turn offer for the understanding of maritime security? Following the previous comments on the contested nature of security,³⁷ Bueger also emphasizes the contested nature of maritime security.³⁸ This study proposes that the acceptance of an ontological turn in security studies will enable the researchers to reach a consensus on the nature of maritime security. Also, this will be the first step to create both inclusive and effective doctrines for maritime security governance.

³⁷ W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts"; Buzan, People, States and Fear; McDonald, "Climate Change and Security."

³⁸ Bueger, op. cit.

The contested nature of the concepts used in international politics leads to both “*the salience as well as disagreements*” according to Bueger.³⁹ The author states that such disagreements can trigger crises. Maybe, they do. It may be better to have crises rather than to ignore them, or not to pay enough attention to them. Because even if our ontological position prevents us from paying enough attention to the crises, they are with us. For example, human trafficking or the rise of sea levels are two facts, causing security problems independently from our acknowledgment of them. Individuals can ignore or try to tackle them. This decision is related to the connections between the ontologies and discourses. For instance, Bueger asks whether climate change and sea disasters are maritime security issues.⁴⁰ The answer to this question depends on how the nature of security is understood, and this understanding is rooted in individual ontologies and has epistemological, methodological, and axiological consequences. In short, the answer is about the security paradigm. The security paradigm may allow us to accept climate change and disasters at sea as maritime security issues or not. It also enables us to see climate change and interruption of maritime trade routes as equally important security threats or not. Their level of importance is also independent of our judgment.

Bueger’s maritime security matrix meets almost every criterion related to maritime security governance.⁴¹ The matrix, on the one hand, facilitates the researchers and practitioners who work on maritime security issues. On the other hand, it frames their understanding of maritime security and limits the analyses. So, in a Kuhnian sense, Bueger’s paradigm helps to overcome analytical problems, but it also promotes a specific way of thinking. This does not mean that Bueger’s paradigm is good or bad. However, one should consider under which circumstances this paradigm, or any other, might work effectively, and

³⁹ Bueger, op. cit., p. 160.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, p. 159.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p. 161.

ask whether an alternative might be possible.

Considering the four dimensions of the matrix (marine environment, economic development, national security, and human security), it is not clear how two different issues given under two different dimensions, e.g., inter-state disputes of sea power and pollution of blue economy, will be reconciled in practice if the inter-state dispute is a significant contributor to marine pollution. Bueger appears to be aware of this challenge since he discusses “*security practices and communities of practice*” separately and in a detailed way.⁴² Elsewhere, Bueger and Edmunds focus on the example of the western Indian Ocean and examines maritime security innovations at three levels of epistemic, coordination, and operational.⁴³ I attach importance to their use of the concepts of the maritime security community and epistemic level to elaborate my question of reconciliation. In any community, whether it is a security community or another one, e.g., a residential community, there always are negotiations about knowledge and how to handle things. Under some circumstances, especially when consensus is not reached, a conflict exists. For example, a residential community may face some difficulties in handling waste management and recycle activities of the building if the necessary measures potentially affect the interests of some residents. Particularly if those residents have more power to influence the decision-making process, it may be harder to achieve inclusive and effective decision-making. Moreover, the same may be right for the accepted forms of knowledge about the health outcomes of waste management.

Similarly, it may be costly to reconcile the interests of some members of the global security community. A recent comparative study on sea powers indicates this challenge. According to Denmark et al., the sea powers, namely the UK and the USA, produced more cases of violent action between 1816 and 1914, also in the post-1946

⁴² *ibid.*, p. 162-3.

⁴³ Bueger and Edmunds, *op. cit.*, p. 1302.

period, caused fewer death situations in their actions, though, compared to the land powers such as China and Russia.⁴⁴ This finding also implies that the possession of sea power had previously been about having the power to exploit overseas territories, and it has later become relevant to the competition in global trade. Such competition, which is inherited from the colonial-imperial past, means that any measures to prevent overexploitation and marine pollution and to regulate international trade in a fair way will potentially affect the companies registered in these sea and land powers. In this sense, the Arctic rivalry showed by Russia's sovereignty claims or by the confrontation between Canada and Denmark,⁴⁵ and the importance Greenland for the USA and Denmark⁴⁶ are yet other consequences of security practices and policies sanctioned by the classical paradigm and its ontological beliefs. This is a governance problem, but it is primarily an ontological one. This ontological problem shows itself in the distribution of roles and responsibilities as well as in the member profiles of international governing bodies. For example, the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, whose members are only selected among geologists, geophysicists, and hydrographers, redefine and reshape the Arctic's future. This commission deals with sovereign rights on the Arctic. However, the Arctic glaciers may completely disappear soon,⁴⁷ and this may change the rules of the game for all stakeholders.

⁴⁴ Denmark et al., op. cit.

⁴⁵ Voronkov, "The Russian Claim for an Extended Continental Shelf in the Arctic."

⁴⁶ Nils Wang, Damien Degeorges, *Greenland and the New Arctic: Political and Security Implications of a Statebuilding Project* (Cph.: RDDC Publishing House, 2014).

⁴⁷ Ashifa Kassam, "Canada's High Arctic Glaciers at Risk of Disappearing Completely, Study Finds," *The Guardian*, July 17, 2018, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/18/canadas-high-arctic-glaciers-at-risk-of-disappearing-completely-study-finds>; Aslaug Mikkelsen, *Arctic Oil and Gas: Sustainability at Risk?*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2008), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203893746>."

Discussion: The Post-Classical Ontology and Maritime Security

In its classical formulation, the ontology of security is anthropocentric. The classical ontology of security is a definitive characteristic of the Anthropocene, and this is not a coincidence: The Anthropocene is characterized by human domination as a reflection of hierarchical subordination. In this epoch, security is defined in the relationship between “*us*” and “*our environment*.” Thus, the conceptualization of security is based on a friend-enemy distinction. In such a distinction, “*our environment*” consists of both human and non-human enemies. Although multiple challenges of the current global system have been forcing the governments to reconsider their security strategies, the main question has remained unanswered: Is an anthropocentric security approach based on the classical ontology capable of maintaining sustainable security?

National security policies supported by the ideological parameters of Cold War conflict focused on how one state might achieve superiority over the other. Although different voices have been raised since the mid-Cold War period, they could not create a real challenge for the hegemonic security paradigm. As a result, the attempts at developing an alternative ontology of security have remained weak. They also stuck in the anthropocentrism of the actors within the global system. Under these circumstances, security policies only lead to the securitization of new issues without adequately questioning the conditions that generate security concerns for all the members of the Earth community from a multi-dimensional perspective. Thus, the answer to the above question is “*no*.”

To better address the irreconcilability between different issues such as the inter-state dispute and marine pollution and to ensure the sustainability of ecosystems, one should primarily focus on the concept of security at the paradigmatic level. Then, the next step will be the paradigm shift as an extension of the ontological turn. In this way, the holistic thinking may be a possibility for maritime security. The holistic thinking will enable a decentralized approach that considers all different issues as parts of the maritime domain. In this way of thinking, maritime security is not located at the center of its

surrounding environment as the classical ontology suggests. In addition, none of the issues are of top priority in the strategy. For example, sovereignty rights in the Arctic cannot be considered more important than the wellbeing of all living things in that region in the post-classical ontology.

The complexity of problems in the maritime domain demands equal consideration of different security issues at the ontological level. This constitutes an essential stage of sustainable maritime security governance. Moreover, there are enough reasons to develop a paradigm that provides the tools to see the complex connections between a human being and an Arctic bear. In such a complexity, the new paradigm must go beyond the ontology of security based on the “*us-other*” distinction.⁴⁸ This study has, therefore, attempted to examine the post-classical ontology of security. The central tenets of this ontology are diffusion, interrelation, adaptation, non-linearity, and inclusiveness.

1. *Diffusion* means that the security referent should not be at the center of governance.

2. *Interrelation* means that the security of a state or an international body cannot be isolated from the security of Others.

3. *Adaptation* means that the security referent always adapts to new conditions; however, this may be very costly.

4. *Non-linearity* means that the causality cannot be taken from a linear analytical perspective because unforeseen factors may intervene and change the outcome.

5. *Inclusiveness* means that biocentric ethics enables an inclusive epistemology that understands security not as a zero-sum game but as an everlasting quest for sustainability.

To conclude, the ontology debate has two implications for maritime security research and practices. First, the ontologies of

⁴⁸ For a detailed discussion on “the other-as-enemy” see: Odysseos, “Radical Phenomenology, Ontology, and International Political Theory.”

researchers shape the prospects of scientific thinking. Second, the ontologies of practitioners shape the making of international relations. An ontological questioning is, therefore, crucial at both theoretical and practical levels. In academic circles, the scholarship about maritime security should be judged based on scientific evidence. Also, governments should support the development of the post-classical ontology of security as a way of peacemaking. Such a transformation may take time; however, the recent changes in both military and civilian circles have made clear that the paradigmatic transformation derived from an ontological turn has appeared on the horizon for both security studies and the field of maritime security. More research is still needed on the political-economic and socio-cultural factors affecting ontologies of security.

Özet

Devletler ve devlet-dışı aktörler, son dönemde, deniz güvenliği ve yönetimi hakkında stratejiler yayımlamaktadır. Deniz güvenliğinin farklı kavramsallaştırmaları korsanlık ve silahlı soygun, terör, insan kaçakçılığı da dahil olmak üzere deniz kaçakçılığı, biyolojik ve kimyasal kirlenme ve iklim değişikliği gibi güvenlik kaygılarının bir veya birkaçını hedef almaya çalışır. Söz konusu kaygıların artmakta oluşu ve melez karakteri düşünüldüğünde, klasik bir yaklaşımla anlaşılıp yanıt verilmesinin artık mümkün olmadığı söylenebilir.

Ancak küresel ekonominin büyük oranda deniz ticaretine bağımlı oluşu nedeniyle deniz güvenliği hala öncelikli olarak ekonomik kaygılar temelinde şekillenmektedir. Bir yandan devletler tekil olarak veya birbirleriyle iş birliği içerisinde deniz güvenliğine ilişkin birtakım çabalar ortaya koymakta, diğer yandan akademik alanda önemli bir birikim oluşmaktadır. Fakat gerek kavramsal boyutta gerekse uygulama boyutunda deniz güvenliğine yönelik farklı kaygıları dikkate alan çabalar sınırlı kalmaktadır. NATO'nun 2011 İttifak Deniz Stratejisinde görülebileceği gibi, bu çabalar daha çok teröre odaklanmakta ve uluslararası güvenlik ortamının sınırlı bir analizinden beslenmektedir. Bu stratejilerin eleştirilirse güvenlik kaygısı listesini

uzatmak seçeneğine yönelmektedir. Ancak sunulan alternatifler, uluslararası güvenlik ortamının üzerine bina edildiği ontolojik, yani gerçekliğin algılanışına dair, kabulleri yeterince dikkate almamaktadır.

Bugün, deniz güvenliğine bakışta iki ana hat öne çıkmaktadır. İlki denizlerdeki küresel gerçekliği anarşi üzerinden okurken diğeri bu gerçekliği uluslararası düzen çerçevesinde ele almaktadır. Bu iki kutup arasında dağılım gösteren görüşlerin çok azı, yeni risk ve tehditleri analizlerine dahil ederken “*analitik, felsefi, normatif ve epistemolojik varsayımları*” dikkate almaktadır. Christian Bueger’in deniz güvenliği matrisi bunu yapan ender çalışmalardan olup denizlerde uluslararası düzenin sağlanması noktasında farklı kaygıları çerçevelemeye çalışmaktadır. Bu makale, hâkim güvenlik paradigmasının ontolojik bir analizini yapmak suretiyle Christian Bueger’in deniz güvenliği matrisine de katkı sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Burada temel varsayım, hâkim güvenlik paradigmasının klasik ontolojiden beslenmekte olup her zaman bazı varsayımları dikkate alırken bazılarını görmezden geldiği şeklindedir. Ontoloji ve güvenlik arasındaki ilişki temelinde, bu çalışma, güvenliğin ontolojik bir incelemesine odaklanarak deniz güvenliğiyle ilişkili meselelerin de başarılı bir biçimde güvenleştirilmesinin yollarını tartışmaktadır.

Makale yukarıdaki kaygılar temelinde üç ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. Girişin ardından gelen birinci bölüm güvenliğin ontolojisine odaklanmakta ve bir kavramsal tartışma sunmaktadır. Bu bölüm, güvenliğin ontolojisini, ontolojik güvenlikten ayrı bir kavramsallaştırma olarak sunarken, ekolojik güvenlik paradigmasının (ya da paradigma olma ihtimali taşıyan yorumunun) ve buna bağlı ontolojik ve epistemolojik kabullerin, hâkim güvenlik paradigmasını güvenlik göndergesi, tehdit algısı ve aktör gibi unsurlar açısından nasıl zorlamakta olduğunu göstermektedir. İkinci bölüm, uluslararası güvenlik ortamının, araştırmacıyı sormakla yükümlü bıraktığı ontolojik sorularla ilgilenmekte ve bunu yaparken David Chandler’ın klasik ontoloji ve klasik-sonrası ontoloji ayırımına başvurarak güvenliğin klasik-sonrası ontolojik yorumu için zemin hazırlamaktadır. Bildiğimiz anlamda devlet aygıtının ortaya çıkışı, geç 17. yüzyıl sonrasının pozitivist, rasyonalist eğilimleriyle örtüştüğü için ontolojik kabulleri de

Kartezyen dünya görüşünün sömürgeci emellerle kaynaştığı insan-merkezci bir gerçekliğe işaret etmektedir. Ancak bu gerçekliğin sürdürülebilir olmadığı artık birçok açıdan kanıtlanmış durumdadır ve bunun deniz güvenliği açısından da yansımaları söz konusudur. Bu nedenle çalışmanın üçüncü bölümü, yeni bir kavramsal zeminde Christian Bueger'in deniz ortamı, ekonomik gelişme, ulusal güvenlik ve insan güvenliği dörtlüsüne oturan deniz güvenliği matrisini masaya yatırmaktadır. Söz konusu matrisin dört boyutuna dair varsayımları birbiriyle uzlaşma olasılıkları açısından gözden geçirip klasik-sonrası bir ontolojik konumdan tartışmak bu bölümün temel amacını oluşturmaktadır. Bu tartışma, deniz güçlerinin küresel ölçekteki çatışma alanlarını yansıtan güncel örneklere dayanmaktadır.

Sonuçta makale ekosistemlerin çalışma ilkelerinin, denizlerde meydana gelen devletlerarası anlaşmazlıklar ve ortaya çıkan kirlilikler gibi birbiriyle uzlaşmaz ve pazarlık konu olamayacak durumları kaldıramayacağını göz önünde bulundurarak güvenliğe paradigma seviyesinde yaklaşmakta ve daha temel bir uzlaşma için çözüm aramaktadır. Çözüm için öncelikle güvenlik meselelerinin ontolojik seviyedeki eşitliğini dikkate almak gerekmektedir. Bu nedenle, çözüm olarak güvenliğin klasik-sonrası ontolojisine odaklanmakta ve bu ontolojinin temel özelliklerini yayılma, karşılıklı ilişki, uyum, doğrusal olmama ve içerme şeklinde özetlemektedir. Yayılma, güvenlik göndergesinin yönetişimin merkezinde olmayışını; karşılıklı ilişki, bir devletin veya uluslararası oluşumun güvenliğinin başkalarının güvenliğinden ayrı düşünülmemeyeceğini; uyum, güvenlik göndergesinin yeni durumlara her zaman uyum sağlayabileceğini ama bunun maliyetinin bazen çok fazla olacağını; doğrusal olmama, her zaman yeni etkenlerin devreye girdiği bir ortamda nedenselliğin doğrusal analitik bir bakış açısıyla anlaşılamayacağını; içerme ise biyo-merkezci bir ontolojinin güvenliği sıfır toplamlı bir oyun olarak değil, bir sürdürülebilirlik arayışı olarak çerçeveleyen, dahil edici bir epistemolojiyi mümkün kılacağını anlatır. Nihayetinde deniz güvenliğinin klasik-sonrası bir ontoloji temelinde analizinin en azından iki sonucu bulunmaktadır. İlki, araştırmacıların ontolojileri deniz güvenliğine dair akademik yazını şekillendirmektedir. İkinci olarak da uluslararası

aktörlerin ontolojileri, düzen veya düzensizlik şeklinde, uluslararası sistemi belirlemektedir. Dolayısıyla gerek akademide gerekse uluslararası yönetim çevrelerinde bilimsel gerçeklikler hesaba katılarak söz konusu klasik-sonrası ontolojinin sesine kulak verilmelidir.

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Civil-Military Relations in Egypt Since 2013*

2013'ten Sonra Mısır'daki Sivil-Askerî İlişkiler

Özüm Sezin UZUN** - Ahmed ELERIAN***

Abstract

The military has been a powerful and active actor in Egyptian politics since Naser period. By the collapse of the Mobarak regime as a result of the popular demonstrations in 2011, hopes for democratization increased; however, the military coup against Morsi administration once again changed the balance in civil- military relations in favor of the military and led the military to become dominant actor in both Egyptian politics and economics. This article analyzes civil-military relations in Egypt since July 2013 and attempts to understand to what extent the military was empowered by the privileged rights in both politics and economics. Within that framework, given rights and power by the constitution to the military, gained privileged rights at the executive, legislative and judiciary levels, economic power and activities of the military, and its influence over media and civil society were examined. This article argues that on the one hand military has been certainly consolidating its dominancy in Egyptian politics and economics since 2013, on the other hand the military involvement in politics and economics has been deteriorating institutionalism and efficiency of the Army itself.

Keywords: Egypt, civil-military relations, military coup, El Sisi.

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Öz

Asker, Nasır döneminden beri Mısır siyasetinde güçlü ve etkin bir aktör olmuştur. 2011 yılında halk ayaklanmasıyla sona eren Mübarek rejiminden sonra Mısır'da demokratikleşme ihtimaline dair umutlar yeşerse de Mursi yönetimine karşı yapılan askeri darbeyle asker-sivil ilişkisindeki denge bir kez daha askerler lehine kaymış ve Mısır siyaseti ve ekonomisinde askerlerin başat aktör olmalarını hızlandıran bir süreç yaşanmıştır. Bu makale Temmuz 2013 yılından sonraki süreçte Mısır siyasetindeki asker-sivil ilişkisini analiz etmekte ve askerlerin hem Mısır siyasetinde hem de ekonomisinde elde ettikleri ayrıcalıklı haklarla ne kadar güçlendiklerini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, anayasanın askerlere tanıdığı haklar, yasama-yürütme-yargı katmanlarında askerlerin edindikleri ayrıcalıklar, askerlerin ekonomik güçleri ve faaliyetleri, ve medya ve sivil toplum üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiştir. Makale, 2013 yılından itibaren Mısır siyaseti ve ekonomisinde askerlerin ayrıcalıklı konularının güçlendiğini savunmakla birlikte, bu sürecin Mısır ordusunun kurumsal ve askeri verimliliğini de azalttığını öne sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mısır, asker-sivil ilişkisi, askeri darbe, El Sisi.

Introduction

Egypt, in which military has always had important role in politics, entered a new phase in the aftermath of popular uprisings against Mobarak regime in 2011. When a military coup happened in 2013, the civil-military relations in Egyptian politics once again started to be discussed. Regarding the literature on civil-military relations, the primary concern has always been understanding the roots of domination of military in politics and figuring out the ways to make civilian authorities to dominate. Taking into consideration theoretical studies on civil-military relations, this article attempts to understand military role in Egyptian politics since 2013. It primarily aims to explain to what extent and in what means the military is dominating the politics, while viewing the continuities and changes on the civil-military relations in Egypt. However, it is observed that the impacts of

expanding power and authority of the military regime on the sufficiency of military itself have been mostly ignored in the literature on civil-military relations. Therefore, this article will attempt to fill this gap in the literature explaining the impact of unbalanced civil-military relations on the Army itself. In conclusion, this article argues that the dominancy of authoritarian regime, which aims to consolidate its legitimacy through military, is not only deteriorating democratization process but also diminishing the professional efficiency of military itself. Within that framework, this article will respectively analyze constitutional, executive, legislative, judicial and economic power of military, its influence on media and civil society and its professional efficiency with such a huge political and economic power.

1. Theoretical Framework: Civil-Military Relations

Emergence of the contemporary theories on civil-military relations is originated to the beginning of the Cold War. Samuel Huntington, who introduced the concept of professionalism in analyzing civil-military relations, mentioned the concepts of responsibility, corporateness and expertise. Responsibility is the sentiment of the military considering its responsibility towards the society it guards. Expertise is specialization in managing the violence. Corporateness is the structure and attached values, which holds its uniqueness over other forms of corporations¹. Huntington also examines what he called the ‘military mind’, which is described as conservative realist. Huntington proposes that professionalism and the ethics arising from the ‘conservative realist military mind’ are positive contributors to the military efficiency. He also differentiated two types of civilian controls over the military. The first one is the “subjective control”, which could be done by minimizing the military power and maximizing the civilian power through governmental institutions, constitution or social classes.

¹ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and The State*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, London, 1957, s. 8-10.

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The second type is the “objective control”, which could be achieved by maximizing military professionalism, as Huntington describes it by militarizing the military, rather than civilizing it. He viewed the approach of subjective control as harmful to the military professionalism and efficiency.² Morris Janowitz disagrees with Huntington and assumes that the military should follow values and ethics of the society and not to be differentiated from it.³

One of the major critics that faced the early theorization of Huntington and Janowitz is their concentration on the United States and consideration of the Cold War context. However, in the post-Cold War period, not only the meaning of security has changed, but also its actors and the role of state have altered. Agency Theory and Concordance Theory are some of the recent studies that regard factors emerged in the post-Cold War period.

Within the Agency Theory framework, Feaver viewed the relations between the civilians and the military as the relations between master and servant. Civilians possess supremacy and the military subordinates to the civilians. Moreover, Feaver assumes two modes of the military behavior. When the military is obedient and following the civilians’ policies, this is called ‘working’, but when the military is not in complete obedience to civilian policies, it is considered ‘shirking’. Feaver’s assumption here is that the military will try to affect policies whenever it is contraindicated with its preferences. What is ought to be done in these cases that the civilians monitor the military and determine any ‘shirking’ manner and punish it. This theory focuses on the late periods in the USA, namely the Clinton and Bush periods⁴.

² Huntington, *a.g.e.*, s. 83-85.

³ Noboru Yamaguchi and David A. Welch, “Soldiers, civilians, and scholars: making sense of the relationship between civil-military relations and foreign policy”. *Asian Perspective*, 29(1), 2005, s. 213-232.

⁴ *a.g.e.*

Within the Concordance Theory framework, Schiff concentrated on three main actors in the civil-military relations: the military, the political elites and the citizenry. Schiff underlines that these actors should develop cooperative relations. The importance of Schiff's theory lies in its focus on the prediction of military intervention, taking into consideration social and cultural dynamics.⁵ The Concordance Theory does not take into account the type of the political regime, whether it is democratic or not, as preliminary condition to reach the state of concordance, as long as the dialogue and accommodation attributes are present, and the road is pacified for the concordance. Huntington sees the military mind as conservative realist, and the professionalism ethics as prerequisite for military efficiency. When the society ideology is different from military ideology, i.e. the society adopts one of the anti-military ideologies as Huntington describes it, the solution for protecting the military ethics lies in the separation of the institutions between civilians and the military. On the other hand, Schiff proposes no specific form of the relative relations between the military institution and the civilian ones in a way that guarantees the military more authority over its the military affairs. There can be either separation or elimination of boundaries between the civil and military institutions or even another form that lies in the range between those two ends. The most important question is which form of relation will be more accepted by the active actors in the civil-military relations in the wake of their cultural, social and historical context. So, the unique core assumption of Schiff is the rejection of attributing the civilian control of military or the prevention of military intervention to specific condition or form other than the 'concordance' state as target.

Civil-military relations in the Middle East is mostly considered with the democratization process. Bishara states that the problem of civil-military relations in the Middle East is historically rooted. The problem lies in the need for state- and nation-building role of the Arab

⁵ Leman Basak Ari. "*Civil-Military Relations in Turkey*". Submitted to the Department of Political Science Texas State University, Texas, 2007, s. 20-24.

armies. As Huntington starts his theorization from examining the emergence of modern armies in the west, Bishara examines the emergence of the Arab armies seeing it as an extension of regional organizations of the Ottoman Army, later these armies developed under the foreign occupation. Moreover, the Arab Armies played crucial role during the independence struggle and the establishment of post-independence states. Besides what have been mentioned before on the historical context constraints on Huntington's theory, Bishara adds an important critique to Huntington core concept of professionalism. Huntington proposed professionalism as positive value, yet Bishara examines the side effects that may arise from the professionalism, for example; obedience even in committing illegal and unethical orders; cover up the committed crimes, driven by the brotherhood linkage and inferior view to the civilian politicians.⁶ Bishara also differentiates two types of coups. The first type of coup, which he calls the radical coup, small group of officers, usually middle rank, perform a movement against the regime and control the state. The other type of coup is that when the military itself perform a coup against the political process, which had launched it. The early coups in Egypt, Syria and Iraq resembles the first type. While the Algerian coup in 1992 and 2013 coup in Egypt resembles the second type. Bishara views the rule in Arab states not as military rule but personalistic rule, where the military is used for consolidation of the regimes and guarantee of its persistence in the face of oppositions and popular uprisings⁷.

2. Understanding Civil-Military Relations in Egypt

The army in Egypt especially at the beginning of the Arab Spring gained respect of the Egyptian people as it was considered aligned with the revolution against Mubarak. During Mubarak period, the military was not under heavy criticism because the National

⁶ Azmy Bishara, "*al-Jaysh wa-al-siyāsah*". Bayrūt. al-Markaz al-‘Arabī lil-Abhāth wa-Dirāsāt al-Siyāsāt, Beirut, 2017, s. 25-26.

⁷ *a.g.e.* , s. 30-36.

Democratic Party and the Ministry of Interior were more dominant politically and military role in politics was limited. Economic activities of the military were also less apparent in 2011, than the corrupt National Democratic Party (NDP), and less brutal than Interior Ministry and police forces. Moreover, Egyptians, who benefited from the agrarian reforms implemented by Nasser and witnessed Sadat's 'victory' in 1973 against Israel, hold positive image of the military that was recalled during 2011 revolution days. Also, at that time, when the political tension aroused between the political parties and economic difficulties increased, some people were favor of the military intervention.

Even though the military has always been an influential actor in Egyptian politics, the constitution issued after the 2013 coup, guarantees several political and economic privileges to the military. Therefore, Concordance Theory is relatively more useful in analyzing the Egyptian case, since it takes into consideration historical, cultural and social variables. In the Egyptian case, keeping privileged constitutional position, protecting its economic empire and maintaining superiority in decision-making process, especially in the military affairs, over the civilian leaders are the primary goals of military. For example, by the post-coup constitution the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) started to be headed by the Minister of Defense, who is military officer not civilian; in contrast to 2012 constitution where president headed the SCAF. Furthermore, post-coup constitution gave clear dominance to the military in the National Defense Council, in contrast to 2012 arrangements.⁸

Moreover, political elites, represented in the presidency and the government, and the political parties failed to reach the formula of resolving disputes and setting the rules of the access to power. The shocking part, as Bishara describes, it is the promotion and justification

⁸ Risa Brooks, "Understanding Shifts in Egyptian Civil-Military Relations Lessons from the Past and Present". (2015), DCAF a centre for security, development and the rule of law, Geneva, s. 25.

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of the military intervention in Egypt by the civilian intellectuals, who were supposed to adopt liberal and democratic values⁹. One of them is Mohamed El Baradei, the Nobel prize awarded, who accepted being Vice President, but resigned after Rabia massacre against pro-Morsi supporters. While the protests on 30th of July demanded early presidential elections, the elites cheered the coup declaration. Mona Makram Ebid, at her lecture in Middle East Institute in the US, stated that on the morning of 30th of June 2013, she was invited to a meeting with the former Minister Al Kafrawy with a group of politicians and were told that the army needs them to write a request for intervention, which was signed by about fifty political figures. She stated that they demanded the army to ‘intervene to prevent civil war in Egypt.’¹⁰

Finer proposes that when both the disposition and the opportunity are present for the military, it will intervene in politics, yet the level of intervention will depend on the political culture in that state. In low political culture states, he proposes that:

*intervention by pressure and blackmail often occurs; but, in addition, the military are just as likely to come out into the open, overtly overturning governments and installing others (displacement) or even supplanting the civilian régime for good, installing itself in its place*¹¹.

This is what exactly happened in the recent coup in Egypt, when the military ousted elected President and the military leader came to power as new President. The civil-military relations in Egypt is highly constrained by the unchallenged position of the Army as the founder of the republic, and the economic and political interests of the military represents the core issues that hinders the civilian control. Before 2011, the military was subordinated to the President, who mainly came from

⁹ Azmy Bishara, “*al-Jaysh wa-al-siyāsah*”. Bayrūt. al-Markaz al-‘Arabī lil-Abhāth wa-Dirāsāt al-Siyāsāt, Beirut, 2017, s.101.

¹⁰ Middle East Institute , Mona Makram-Ebeid on Egypt's Political Future. [video], 2013

¹¹ Samuel Finer, “The man on horseback”. (1962). Pall Mall Press Limited Cromwell Place, London, s.110.

military, now the military is represented by El Sisi, who is himself dominant in nearly every fields in Egypt.

3. Power and Authority of Military in Egyptian Politics: Continuities and Changes

Literatures on civil-military relations, which are primarily deal with the problems caused by the dominancy of military in politics, brought the issues of measurement of military influence into the agenda. Huntington, for instance, mentions the affiliation to the army and its leaders, the economic and human resources, and the prestige and popularity of the military as the measurement variables for military influence in politics.¹² Regarding the measurement of military power, Huntington also mentions the correlation between the levels of authority and power.¹³ In addition to Huntington's measurement variables, the power and authority of military in the constitutional, executive and judicial levels, representing three main pillars of balancing authorities in any state, will be examined in order to provide insights about the degree of infiltration of the military to the state apparatus.

As mentioned, the military has always been an influential actor in the Egyptian politics. However, the military coup of 2013 represents new trend in the Egyptian politics. The military was more involved in economics especially during Mubarak period; the politics was dominated with National Democratic Party and by using the Ministry of Interior as repression tool for political opposition. During the years of Arab Spring, the military in Egypt was responsible for the transitional period and was supposed to transit the power to civilians. Therefore, the military coup in 2013 is the first time that the military makes dislocation of the political group from power and replace it by the military leadership in pure coup action since 1952 coup. It also represents the type of military coup, where the military coups against political process was initiated by the military itself. The escalation of

¹² Huntington, *a.g.e.*, s. 88-89.

¹³ *A.g.e.* s. 86.

Muslim Brotherhood to power represented in Morsi presidency constituted threat for the military interests due to the historical and ideological contrasts between the two factions. Therefore, the military decided to control the power and the post-coup period witnessed exaggerated consolidation of military power, not even on the expense of opposition, but also on the expense of allied groups like General Intelligence and the businessmen. The consolidation of the political authorities is explained in the constitutional changes with respect to the previous constitutions. The increased dominance and presence of military figures in executive and legislative fields is also very new development in Egypt. In addition, the unprecedented economic privileges that was guaranteed to the military in the coup regime encouraged by El Sisi himself as president. The military also controlled the media and eliminated any potential opposition even those who supported the coup. The new position of the military assumed by this article will be more explained in detail in each of the pre-mentioned aspects in the following parts.

3.1. Constitutional Level

When Mubarak was ousted in January 2011 uprising, SCAF suspended the constitution, which was active since 1971. On 19 March 2012, a new constitution was planned to be drafted by an elected committee from the two chambers representatives. After the election of the two houses of representatives, the People Assembly (Majlis El Sha'b) and the Consulting Assembly (Majlis El Shura), which was dominated by Muslim Brothers Islamist coalition, new constitution drafting committee was formed. On 13 June 2012, the committee was deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Supreme Court and hence dissolved. Later, another committee was formed and then witnessed political conflict between Muslim Bothers coalition and opposition parties that ended with wide resignations from opposition parties protesting the dominance of Islamist parties. On 22 November 2012, Morsi issued constitutional decree that fortified the committee from dissolution and the draft was approved in referendum in 2012. When Morsi was ousted on 3 July 2013, the leaders of new regime

appointed *Committee of Ten*, which was then replaced by *Committee of Fifty* to draft constitution. The new draft, by which military power in politics has increased constitutionally, was approved by the referendum on January 2014.

The new constitution guarantees the Minister of Defence, who is usually served in the higher positions in the military, to stay in office for two successive terms as a tool of immunity from dismissal. This empowerment creates a situation, in which the President does not have full authority over the Minister of Defence. The new constitution also suggests that SCAF would be headed by the Minister of Defence, not by the President. The composition of National Defence Council, which is the sole institution to have a right for overseeing the budget of military, has also been in change in favor of the military over civilians. Even though the representative of military dominated National Defence Council during the Morsi period, it was not as high as in the post-coup constitution.

3.2. *Executive Level*

The changes at the executive level are significant to understand the military dominancy in Egyptian politics. The first cabinet that was established immediately after the coup composed by the wide participation of civilian politicians from different political orientation. After a while, it is observed that President El-Sisi preferred to work with technocrats rather than bureaucrats, who are from political groups or parties. By the establishment of new military regime, political allies as they may hold contradictory political views were marginalized and the ex-military officers were empowered in the executive apparatus. The majority of governors' positions were regained by the military, in contrary to the period of Morsi which marked decrease in the numbers of ex-militaries in the governors comparing to the period of Mubarak. On 7 February 2015, El Sisi appointed eleven ex-military and police officers to the governmental positions.¹⁴ On December 2015, eleven

¹⁴ Attiya Nabil, "Egypt: Decrease in Number of Military Personnel in New Governors Movement," BBC News Arabic. (Arapça), 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/arabic/>

new governors replaced dismissed ones. Four out of eleven were military officers and included some police generals.¹⁵ Again, on September 2016 six new governors were appointed five of them were ex-military officers.¹⁶ The last move in February 2017 produced governor's council with seventeen generals from military and police.

Looking at only the numbers of ex-military and police officers in the governors may not be enough to understand the dominant role of military in Egyptian politics. Sub-levels of the governorates in the regions and neighbourhoods are also composed by ex-military and ex-police officers. For example, the largest governorate and the capital Cairo; the Governor have three deputies two of them are ex-officers; one from military and one from police.¹⁷ Cairo is divided into four main regions; northern, southern, eastern and western. The western region, for instance, includes nine neighbourhoods; four out of nine is chaired by ex-military generals and one is headed by ex-police general.¹⁸ These examples demonstrate the influence of military personnel in the top-level positions in the governorates as a reward for their loyalty to the military regime.

Other organizations like the seaports exhibited the same pattern of military personnel concentration. The Egyptian seaports are classified into four major areas under four organizations; Alexandria

multimedia/2015/02/150207_egypt_gov [Erişim tarihi: 6 Ekim 2018].

¹⁵ "The generals control the new governors' movement and take the oath", (Arapça), 2015, *Al Araby*, <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2015/12/26/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1> [Erişim tarihi: 6 Ekim 2018].

¹⁶ "Egypt: The military governors' movement", (Arapça), 2016, *Noonpost*, <http://www.noonpost.org/content/13846> [Erişim tarihi: 6 Ekim 2018].

¹⁷ "Cairo Governorate Official Gate. Regions and Neighbourhoods," (Arapça) 2018, [http://www.cairo.gov.eg/areas/default_copy\(4\).aspx](http://www.cairo.gov.eg/areas/default_copy(4).aspx) [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

¹⁸ *A.g.e.*

Ports authority, Port Said Ports Authority, Red Sea Ports Authority and Damietta Ports Authority. Military Generals chair the four ports organizations; three of them are navy generals.¹⁹ In Alexandria Ports Authority, the board of members consists of seventeen members; five of them are military officers including the chairperson.²⁰ This data shows the penetration of the military personnel into the high-level positions inside the Egyptian Seaports administration.

As a conclusion, the presence of military officers at the governmental managerial positions, specifically in the provincial administrations, shows the influence of military in politics. These political rewards and second career trend originates from Mubarak period and was nearly untouched during Morsi period. Morsi also appointed military generals to the administrative authorities following this tradition. Nevertheless, El Sisi regime extensively used this system to reward his loyal officers and gain the required patronage over military officer to counter any negative action inside the army and assure its alignment with the new regime.

3.3. Legislative Level

The legislative field also witnessed increased influence of the military. The first level of influence was delaying of the formation of legislative branch, which afforded El Sisi with the power of issuing decrees. El Sisi used this authority actively to issue large number of decrees (in total 342 decree were issued before the parliament was elected, most of them by El Sisi and small number by Interim President Adly Mansour), which would be approved later when the legislative

¹⁹ Egyptian Seaports Authorities internet sayfası, (Arapça) 2018, <http://www.emdb.gov.eg/ar/content/56-%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

²⁰ Alexandria Port Authority internet sayfası, Representatives, 2018, <http://apa.gov.eg/index.php/en/board-of-director> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

branch is formed. The second level is designing the election law that will create more advantageous position for El Sisi favored political parties and groups. On the one hand, the parliament would work in favor of the regime with nearly no opposition, on the other hand the parliament would be a tool for full support of the regime and punishment of the oppositions. The approved legislations also favored El Sisi and the economic activities of the military and facilitated it. The quantitative measure of the military as a member of the Parliament showed the presence of influential percentage of the military and police ex-personnel in the parliament, where 71 retired Generals from military and police are active.²¹ This is also another characteristic of the affiliation to the military that augments its political power in the legislative field. The regime attempts to produce tamed parliament was successful, this step was important because the SCAF was clashing with MB over their control on the legislative branch. The post-coup regime favored friendly legislative branch that would ease its control over the politics.

Pro-regime list won all the 120 seats; it was a coalition of Free Egyptian party and old Mubarak regime figures named Love of Egypt. Free Egyptian Party was financed by the Egyptian wealthy man Naguib Swaris and won 65 seats from list and independents.²² This coalition was widely claimed to be formed by security apparatus.²³ Second winner by 53 seats was Nation's Future Party strongly tied to El Sisi. The Salafist party Al Nour, which supported the coup although

²¹ Mahmoud Hussein, "Learn the Professions of the Parliament Members". Youm7 (Arapça) 2015, <https://www.youm7.com/story/2015/12/27/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%8059-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8%D8%A7/2510807> [Erişim tarihi 11 Kasım 2018].

²² Jan Claudius Völkel (2017). "Sidelined By Design: Egypt's Parliament in Transition". *The Journal of North African Studies*, 22(4) s. 609.

²³ A.g.e., s. 609.

it was part of Muslim Brotherhood coalition in the previous elections was supported by the Gulf monarchies. It only won 11 seats after major media campaign against it.²⁴ 116 of the MP were businessmen representing nearly one fifth²⁵, besides 71 retired Generals from military and police.²⁶ Abd El Al was elected as the Head of The Parliament on the day of inauguration and declared that the task of the parliament is supporting the government.²⁷ In contrast to the monitoring task of the legislative body, he demanded the representatives not to be critical to the government. Moreover, he issued gag order prohibiting discussion on the economic crisis.²⁸

From the functional perspective, the parliament passed several legislations in the favor of the regime and the military dominance. The parliament approved increases in the pension of retired military officers twice; 10% in July 2016 and 15% on the following year on July 2017, and by 15% on June 2018.²⁹ In addition, the parliament

²⁴ A.g.e. s. 609.

²⁵ A.g.e. s. 608.

²⁶ Mahmoud Hussein, "Learn the Professions of the Parliament Members". Youm7 (Arapça) 2015, <https://www.youm7.com/story/2015/12/27/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%8059-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8%D8%A7/2510807> [Erişim tarihi 11 Kasım 2018].

²⁷ Jan Claudius Völkel, "Sideline By Design: Egypt's Parliament in Transition". *The Journal of North African Studies*, 22(4), 2017, s. 610.

²⁸ A.g.e., s. 610.

²⁹ "El Sisi period: Ninth Increase in military Personnel Wages After Diplomats and Ministers". Arapça, *Alaraby*, (2018). [online] Available at: <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/economy/2018/4/19/%D8%B9%D9%87%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%88%D9>

approved terrorism law that allow the military trials for civilians, apply harsh penalties for the terrorism-related crimes and shield military officers.³⁰ On July 2018, the parliament passed a law giving El Sisi the authority to immune military officers from prosecution in events related to the period between the coup in July 2013 and the inauguration of parliament on January 2016.³¹ When MP Mohammed Anwar Sadat, who was the chairman of Human Rights Committee until 2016, criticized the increase in pensions Abd El Al told him ‘you are not allowed to talk about the soldiers who paid the blood tax.’³²

3.4. Judiciary

Judiciary played crucial role in supporting the new regime. Interim President after the coup was the head of Supreme Constitutional Court. It seems that Judiciary has been a tool of political repression by giving hard sentences to the opposition political groups, who opposed the coup regime, those sentences issued by the judiciary were mostly suspected to be of political nature. In addition, Judiciary provided the cover for the military and security forces to freely crack down on the dissents by giving light sentences even in the extreme cases that witnessed involvement of security personnel in the killing out of the law. The post-coup period witnessed the reactivation of exceptional courts related to the emergency state with special authorities and forms.

The military itself participated in the judicial campaign through military trials for civilians. El Sisi issued law no. 136 in 2014 that demanded the military forces to help police forces in protecting vital

%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86 [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

³⁰ Jan Claudius Völkel, “Sideline By Design: Egypt’s Parliament in Transition”. *The Journal of North African Studies*, 22(4), 2017, s. 611.

³¹ “Egypt passes law that could shield top military brass from prosecution” *Reuters*, (Arapça), 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-parliament-military/egypt-passes-law-that-could-shield-top-military-brass-from-prosecution-idUSKBN1K61L7> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

³² Jan Claudius Völkel, “Sideline By Design: Egypt’s Parliament in Transition”. *The Journal of North African Studies*, 22(4), 2017, s. 611.

organizations, potential protest spots, such as universities, industrial factories, roads, bridges and railways.³³ By including these spots under the military protection, the law authorized the military courts to oversight any cases related to the violations of this law. This law resulted in more than 7,000 civilians to be on trial in military courts between 2014 and 2015; 3,000 out of those 7,000 were on trial in the first five months after the law.³⁴ On June 2016, President expanded the military courts authority to include 2 km diameter around public properties, which causes civilians to be exposed for military trials and contradicts with the normal authorities naturally practiced by civil courts. In addition, on August 2016, the parliament extended the active period of law no. 136 until 2021.³⁵ Furthermore, on April 2017, President El Sisi declared the emergency status in the country; this brought Emergency courts, which were linked to Mubarak regime exploitation against oppositions, into action again on January 2018.³⁶ Moreover, President could add military officers to these courts.³⁷ In

³³ Sahar Aziz, "The Expanding Jurisdiction of Egypt's Military Courts," 2016, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/64840> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

³⁴ *A.g.e.*

³⁵ Sahar Aziz, "The Expanding Jurisdiction of Egypt's Military Courts," 2016, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/64840> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

³⁶ Yasin Boutiti, "Egypt Creating 'State Security Emergency' Courts and Define Its Related Cases," (Arapça) 2018, https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/920861-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%B0-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA/ [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

³⁷ Rana Mamdouh, "Keeping Courts in a State of Emergency," 2018, <https://madamasr.com/en/2018/07/10/feature/politics/keeping-courts-in-a-state-of-emergency/> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

fact, the military itself has now extensively been present through expanding the authorities of military courts resulting in wide military trials for civilians.

3.5. *Media and Civil Society*

The Egyptian media, which prohibits any opposition views against the new regime, has also been controlled by the military after the coup. The military started to acquire the media enterprises under its direct administration or under the General Intelligence. The control of media by the military was used against the civil society by undermining NGOs, which have been described as destabilizing actors and linked with foreign states by media. This propaganda was accompanied by new legal frame that directed to strengthen the state monitoring over the NGOs. The post-coup period witnessed domination of the military over media and marginalization of the civil society. People, who were key elements in the extensive opposition campaign against Morsi; were eliminated from TV programs or from writing in journals during El Sisi presidency. For instance, Yousri Fouda, Mahmoud Saad and Amr El Lithy are some of the banned names in media. Bassem Youssef, who was presenting highly popular sarcasm show, was also prohibited after two episodes only. Belal Fadl and Alaa Al Aswani were prohibited from writing.³⁸ All these names adopt secular and anti-Islamist orientation. In 2017, the government banned 114 of websites based in Qatar and Turkey, which are seen as pro-

³⁸ Mustafa Mehana, "Blocking Media in Egypt" (Arapça), *Qantara*, 2017, <https://ar.qantara.de/content/%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%88%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9%D9%87-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%AD-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%9F> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

Morsi supporters.³⁹ Moreover, it banned other websites belong to registered Egyptian media organizations, like Egypt Daily News.⁴⁰

3.6. Economic Activities

Economic activities of the Egyptian military, which is organized through several economic organizations and enterprises, are also considered as an important parameter to understand the extent of military power. Those organizations were primarily for military purposes; however, by the peace accords with Israel in 1979 they started to have non-military economic role as well. The military also enjoyed special advantages while practicing its businesses, such as exemptions of tariffs and taxes. In fact, the private sector and foreign investors are reluctant to compete with the privileged military in business, which badly affects Egyptian economy.

The details of military budget, which was estimated around 4.5 billion USD in 2016, is considered national secret and exclusively overlooked by the SCAF.⁴¹ Although President El Sisi stated that the military share in economics is not exceeding 2%⁴², there are some estimations argue that its ratio is between 20 and 60%.⁴³ El Sisi encouraged the assignment of economic projects to military firms, justifying that the private sector would take much more time to accomplish the requested projects.⁴⁴ The Egyptian army is also

³⁹ *A.g.e.*

⁴⁰ *A.g.e.*

⁴¹ "The Officers' Republic, The Egyptian Military and Abuse of Power." Transparency International UK ,(2018). s. 8.

⁴² "Special Report: From War Room to Boardroom. Military Firms Flourish in Sisi's Egypt," *Reuters*, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-military-economy-specialreport/special-report-from-war-room-to-boardroom-military-firms-flourish-in-sisi-egypt-idUSKCN1IH185> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

⁴³ Abigail Hauslohner. "Egypt's 'Military Inc' Expands Its Control of The Economy". *The Guardian*, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/egypt-military-economy-power-elections> [Erişim tarihi 4 Nisan 2018].

⁴⁴ "Special Report: From War Room to Boardroom. Military Firms Flourish in Sisi's Egypt," *Reuters*, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-military-economy->

economically powerful, since it has right to open bank account and practice economic activities through number of entities, including the Ministry of Defence with dozens of commercial ventures, the Military Production Ministry with its 20 companies, National Service Products Organization (NSPO) with its 21 companies, National Authority for Military Production, Arab Organization for Industrialization with its at least 12 companies and Armed Forces Engineering Authority.⁴⁵

Economic activities of the Army penetrated nearly every single field of the Egyptian economy. For instance, the National Service Products Organization (NSPO) firms covers the following fields: 10 companies in Agriculture and Food Industry, 5 in the Industrial Field and 2 in the Engineering Field.⁴⁶ In 2016, NSPO was awarded thousands of feddans of state lands dedicated for fish farms.⁴⁷ New cement plant has being built in Beni Suef city south Cairo under NSPO, the plant worth 1.1 billion USD.⁴⁸ Armed Forces Engineering Authority mainly controls the mega infrastructure project in partnership with major MNCs as General Electric and Mitsubishi.⁴⁹ The AFEA was awarded a contract worth 4.7 billion EGP that nearly equal 266 million USD for national roads projects including 22 road, 30 bridge and 11 tunnels.⁵⁰ The military also owns 51% of a company responsible of the New Administrative Capital project. Five out of 13 members of board are from

specialreport/special-report-from-war-room-to-boardroom-military-firms-flourish-in-sisi-egypt-idUSKCN1IH185 [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

⁴⁵ A.g.e.

⁴⁶ “The Officers’ Republic, The Egyptian Military and Abuse of Power.” Transparency International UK ,(2018). s. 9.

⁴⁷ A.g.e., s. 12 .

⁴⁸ “Special Report: From War Room to Boardroom. Military Firms Flourish in Sisi’s Egypt,” *Reuters*, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-military-economy-specialreport/special-report-from-war-room-to-boardroom-military-firms-flourish-in-sisi-egypt-idUSKCN1IH185> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

⁴⁹ “The Officers’ Republic, The Egyptian Military and Abuse of Power.” Transparency International UK ,(2018). s. 9.

⁵⁰ A.g.e, s. 12.

the armed forces.⁵¹ In 2013, El Sisi encouraged the military to establish international schools offering American and British curriculum, which was finalized in March 2015 with Badr International Schools.⁵²

In May 2019, Military Production Ministry, which was established in 1954 to produce grenade launchers, pistols and machine guns, signed memorandum to build 2 billion USD solar plant in partnership with Chinese firm.⁵³ It established 44 projects of installing solar panels on educational buildings and established solar energy stations in Cairo in 2017 and declared it has another contract for another station worth 4.37 million EGP (248 thousand USD).⁵⁴ The Military Production Ministry also owns Maadi Co. for engineering industries; the company produces green houses, medical devices and gyms.⁵⁵ Heliopolis Co. for Chemical Industries is also under the Ministry of Military Production controls 20% of the paints market in Egypt and planning to control major share of the market.⁵⁶ These are some economic activities of the Military Production Ministry and for the fiscal year 2018/2019, it is expected that its revenue is around 15

⁵¹ “The Most Important 32 Information on The New Administrative Capital,” (Arapça), 2018, <https://www.propertyfinder.eg/blog/%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9/> [Erişim tarihi 11 Kasım 2018].

⁵² “The Officers’ Republic, The Egyptian Military and Abuse of Power.” Transparency International UK ,(2018). s. 12.

⁵³ “Special Report: From War Room to Boardroom. Military Firms Flourish in Sisi’s Egypt,” *Reuters*, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-military-economy-specialreport/special-report-from-war-room-to-boardroom-military-firms-flourish-in-sisi-egypt-idUSKCN1IH185> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

⁵⁴ “The Officers’ Republic, The Egyptian Military and Abuse of Power.” Transparency International UK ,(2018). s. 12.

⁵⁵ “Special Report: From War Room to Boardroom. Military Firms Flourish in Sisi’s Egypt,” *Reuters*, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-military-economy-specialreport/special-report-from-war-room-to-boardroom-military-firms-flourish-in-sisi-egypt-idUSKCN1IH185> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

⁵⁶ *A.g.e.*

billion EGP.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the Egyptian army is exempted from Value Added Tax (VAT) on goods that fall under the military needs and national security. However, it was reported that hotels and event halls are also free from VAT.⁵⁸

Last but not least, the army has unlimited control over desert areas constituting 94% of the Egyptian territories.⁵⁹ In December 2015, a decree was issued stating that revenues from selling processes will be directed to establish new military zones. This declaration would most likely to be viewed as legalization for the selling of lands as way for investment⁶⁰ and lands could be used as patronage tool over civilians.

There are also some doubts about the army's economic activities in the Egyptian market. After severe shortage in baby milk's formula in September 2016, the military announced it had exported large quantities selling it at half price of the market.⁶¹ After drug shortage in 2017, the army declared it would establish pharmaceutical production company.⁶² In addition, when the government-imposed taxes on air conditions parts, the army announced importing parts from China that of course will be exempted from taxes and tariffs.⁶³ Such incidents inevitably resulted in discouraging foreign investors to invest in Egypt. A commercial officer in western embassy in Cairo, for instance, emphasized reluctance of foreign investors stating that "investors were

⁵⁷ A.g.e.

⁵⁸ A.g.e.

⁵⁹ "The Officers' Republic, The Egyptian Military and Abuse of Power." Transparency International UK ,(2018). s. 10.

⁶⁰ A.g.e, s. 10.

⁶¹ Heba Saleh, "When the Egyptian army means business," *Financial Times*, 15 December 2016, <https://www.ft.com/content/49b5d19a-bff6-11e6-9bca-2b93a6856354> [Erişim tarihi 11 Kasım 2018].

⁶² "The Officers' Republic, The Egyptian Military and Abuse of Power." Transparency International UK ,(2018). s. 12.

⁶³ Jamal Boukhari, "Egypt's Conscripts Serving The Army's Economic Empire," 2017, *Al Araby*, <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/9/5/egypts-conscripts-serving-the-armys-economic-empire> [Erişim tarihi 11 Kasım 2018].

reluctant to invest in sectors where the military is expanding or in one they might enter.”⁶⁴

4. Impacts of Authoritarian Decision on the Functionality of Military

Most of the literatures on civil-military relations focus on the negative impacts of the military intervention in politics on the democratization process. On the one hand, the expansion of power and authority of the military negatively affects the democratization process; on the other hand, however, it becomes more vulnerable to the leader, who is seeking for consolidating his own authority. There are studies that explain how the unbalanced civil-military relations, making military-related decisions to consolidate authoritarian regime, could negatively affect the efficiency of the military. Brooks, for instance, argues that the military regime, which tends to develop centralized decision-making authority, would decrease the efficiency of military itself.⁶⁵ If the appointments to the military positions are made solely by the motivations for consolidating authoritarian leader’s legitimacy, this would result in decreasing the military effectiveness in its professional duties. Moreover, the military regime would decrease homogeneity within military and accumulations of expertise the adversely affect the military performance, which in return reduces the possibility of cooperation and coordination within military.⁶⁶

As aforementioned, the SCAF acquired independence from the civilians in the military affairs. This independency includes the institutional ones. SCAF represents the leadership of the Egyptian

⁶⁴ “Special Report: From War Room to Boardroom. Military Firms Flourish in Sisi’s Egypt” *Reuters*, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-military-economy-specialreport/special-report-from-war-room-to-boardroom-military-firms-flourish-in-sisi-egypt-idUSKCN1IH185> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

⁶⁵ Risa Brooks “Civil-Military Relations In The Middle East”. *The Future Security Environment in the Middle East*, (2004) *RAND Corporation*. s. 141

⁶⁶ *A.g.e.*, s. 141-148

military and has been politically active since January 2011. While El Sisi was looking for presidency, he wanted to guarantee that there would not be any move from the military against him. SCAF undergone crucial changes after the military coup and especially during the first term of El Sisi presidency, these changes resulted in almost new SCAF members.⁶⁷ In general, it was politically driven, which means that professional quality, skills and experiences were not the selection criteria.

After the approval of candidacy of El Sisi for presidency by SCAF,⁶⁸ its membership increased from 20 to 23 members.⁶⁹ Following the decrees, appointments to the military positions started to be made by El Sisi relatively and frequently earlier than the traditional pattern, which resulted in shorter period at the office.⁷⁰ The frequent changes in the military positions result in two important consequences; the one is preferring loyalty than professionalism, which is caused unsurprisingly by the lack of legitimacy of politicians and inevitably affects the quality and efficiency of the Egyptian Army. The second is creating the continuation of military's penetration to the politics and economics, as a result of their appointments to the relatively less influential, but profitable governmental positions.

Since El Sisi needs the support from military, he attempted to

⁶⁷ Egypt State Information Services page (2014). Adly Mansour issues decree reforming SCAF. [online] Available at: <http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/84685?lang=ar> [Accessed 11 Dec. 2018].

⁶⁸ "The Army Accepts El Sisi Candidacy For Presidency," 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2014/1/27/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1> [Erişim tarihi: 11 Aralık 2018]

⁶⁹ Egypt State Information Services page (2014). Adly Mansour issues decree reforming SCAF. [online] Available at: <http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/84685?lang=ar> [Erişim tarihi 11 Aralık 2018].

⁷⁰ Gilad Wenig, Egypt's New Military Brass. (2014) [Washingtoninstitute.org](http://www.washingtoninstitute.org). <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/egypts-new-military-brass> [Erişim tarihi 11 Aralık 2018].

create a council, which would not pose any serious threat against him. Therefore, he appointed trusted names to the influential positions. For instance, Sedki Sobhy was appointed as Chief of Staffs and Mahmoud Hegazy became the Head of Military Intelligence. In addition, Ahmed Wasfy the chief of the 3rd field army was assigned to less influential role as the Head of Training Authority.⁷¹ The second important change happened a year later in April 2015, when Mohamed El Shahat replaced Salah El Badry as Head of Military Intelligence, Ossama Mounir replaced Ossama El Gendy as Navy Forces Commander, Nasser El Asy replaced Mohamed El Shahat as Commander of the 2nd Field Army.⁷² These changes were made when the army was facing increased insurgency, especially in Sinai.

On December 2016, El Sisi once again issued presidential decree, resulting in a new shuffle in the armed forces, including the dismissal of Abd Elmonem El Tarras, the Commander of the Air Defence Forces. El Tarras was thought to be potential candidate to become Chief of Staff, as representing the last SCAF member from 1973 October war fighters.⁷³ El Sisi ignored El Terras and appointed his brother-in-law Hegazy, who was the Head of Military Intelligence. His dismissal also demonstrated the attempt of El Sisi for ending any potential political threat to himself, since El Tarras had ties with Sami Anan, ex-Chief of Staff. Since Sami Anan declared his candidacy for Presidential election, but withdrew immediately in 2014, he started to

⁷¹ *A.g.e.*

⁷² Deena Helmy. "In The Era of Sisi Life Cycle of Army Leaders is not Complete" (Arapça), 2017, *ida2at* <https://www.ida2at.com/in-the-era-of-sisi-life-cycle-of-army-leaders-is-not-complete/> [Erişim 11 Aralık 2018].

⁷³ "El Sisi Dominates SCAF October Generation excluded," (Arapça), 2016, *Al Araby*, <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2016/12/18/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%87> [Erişim tarihi: 11 Aralık 2018].

be perceived as a potential political competitor. Therefore, it is mentioned that as a result of tension and competition between El Sisi and Anan, the new regime payed attention to keep military personnel, who either worked with or have ties with Anan, away from the high military positions.⁷⁴ Also, appointment of El Tarras by El Sisi as his consultant demonstrates the policies of the regime to ensure its control on the ex-high position military personnel.

By the same presidential decree, Ahmed Khaled Hassan replaced Ossama Mounir and became the Navy Forces Commander.⁷⁵ Ossama Mounir was appointed in April 2015 and dismissed in December 2016.⁷⁶ His predecessor, Ossama El Gendy, was influential figure within the SCAF, so decrease the influence of El Gendy could be meaningful for the El Sisi regime. However, this necessitated to make two-round changes to escape from El Gendy's influence.

These changes within the Egyptian military reduces its efficiency and sufficiency, specifically in countering terrorism, which could easily be tracked from the report of Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. According to that report, in the first year after the coup, for instance, an average of 19 attacks were reported monthly. The major insurgent group, Ansar Beytul Maqdes (ABW) in Sinai Peninsula announced its allegiance to ISIS and changed its name to Welayet Sina on November 2014. Till April 2018 Welayet Sina

⁷⁴A.g.e.

⁷⁵ Deena Helmy. "In The Era of Sisi Life Cycle of Army Leaders is not Complete" (Arapça), 2017, *ida2at* <https://www.ida2at.com/in-the-era-of-sisi-life-cycle-of-army-leaders-is-not-complete/> [Erişim 11 Aralık 2018]; 2017, <https://www.ida2at.com/in-the-era-of-sisi-life-cycle-of-army-leaders-is-not-complete/> [Erişim 11 Aralık 2018].

⁷⁶ "El Sisi Dominates SCAF October Generation excluded excluded," (Arapça), 2016, *Al Araby*, <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2016/12/18/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%87> [Erişim tarihi: 11 Aralık 2018].

claimed 995 attack resulting in 558 casualties among security forces and 329 among civilians. The major attack of Welayet Sina was downing of the Russian plane over Sinai, killing 224 passengers and leading to harm the Egyptian tourism sector and raising doubts about the level of security in the Egyptians airports. Welayet Sina targeted Christians and Sufis; the major attack happened on a Sufi mosque killing 311 prayer. From August 2017 until April 2018 an average of 14 attack monthly were reported. After the military coup the state reported nearly 1800-security operations, 39% of them were in Sinai. Until April 2018, 27,000 were reported to be arrested in counter-insurgency operations. Those operations resulted in nearly 7,000 casualties 95% of them in Sinai.⁷⁷

Various groups emerged after the coup and used violence as a mean of political opposition against the coup. While the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) officially announced that they adapt peaceful policy for opposing the coup, some groups were viewed as being formed by MB youth who adopted different thoughts, such as Allied Popular Resistance Movement, Hassm and Liwaa al-Thawra. From August 2015 until January 2018 an average of 3 attacks per month were reported with at least one causality.⁷⁸

Lastly, what happened in Oasis attack also represents a clear example for the lack of coordination within military. On 20th of October 2017, a group of security forces that were working under the Ministry of Interior moved to arrest the members of Hassm, who are former MB members and support violent acts, in the training camp in the western desert. As the forces were on its way it was attacked from all sides resulting in more than fifty casualties. Then, it was discovered that it was a trap of an Al Qaeda-affiliated group.⁷⁹ About this case, it

⁷⁷ “Five Years of Egypt’s War on Terror” *The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy*, <https://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/TIMEP-ESW-5yrReport-7.27.18.pdf> [Erişim tarihi 11 Alarık 2018].

⁷⁸ *A.g.e.*

⁷⁹ “Did Al Wahat Accident Overthrow Hegazy?” (Arapça), 2017, *Al Araby*,

is known that the army was not informed and there was a delay in sending surveillance planes to the accident place that helped terrorists to withdraw their injured members and take over some weapons and assets from the police forces.⁸⁰ The lack of coordination due to competition between various organizations can be also noticed in the previous accident. The police forces moved without reporting to the military forces. It was also thought that Chief of Staff Hegazy did not order the planes to move as he was waiting the police forces to ask for help.⁸¹ In fact, such incidents are increasing doubts about the efficiency of the military professional performances, specifically in counter-terrorism, and the impacts of military regime on the military itself.

Another important trend that can be noticed is the conciliation after the dismissal, appointing the dismissed officers in symbolic nominal places or ones that include material privileges. When El Gendy was removed from Navy Forces, he was appointed in the Suez Canal Authority as Deputy Chair, the same applies to his successor, Ossama Mounir, who followed the same path. Removal of Salah El Badry, who was the Head of Military Intelligence in 2015 and Taher Abdallah, who was the Head of Engineering Authority, were appointed as Assistant Defence Minister.⁸² Ahmed Ali, who was the spokesperson of the Armed Forces, was also appointed as Information Secretary in the Presidency, then as military attaché in one of the Egyptian embassies.⁸³ Mohamed El Assar, who was also one of prominent figures of SCAF

<https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2017/11/1/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A3%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%8A-1> [Erişim tarihi 16 Aralık 2018].

⁸⁰ A.g.e.

⁸¹ A.g.e.

⁸² Deena Helmy. "In The Era of Sisi Life Cycle of Army Leaders is not Complete" (Arapça), 2017, *ida2at* <https://www.ida2at.com/in-the-era-of-sisi-life-cycle-of-army-leaders-is-not-complete/> [Erişim 11 Aralık 2018].

⁸³ A.g.e.

after January 2011 and was known for his role in the military cooperation with US and preventing any sanctions following the coup, was appointed as the Military Production Minister, which represents one of the important tools that controls the army economic activities.⁸⁴ While the position provides economic privileges, it deprives him from the membership of the SCAF, which possess both political and institutional power. In fact, appointment of the ex-high position military personnel to the politically less, but economically more privileged position in the government, perfectly guarantees their political loyalty and deepens their involvement into politics and economics.

In fact, the post-coup period is characterized by shorter stay of officers in high-level positions in comparison with the previous periods. When El Sisi started his second term, he appointed Mohommad Zaki, as Minister of Defence, dismissing Sobhy. Chief of Staff, Hegazy was also dismissed in 2017, 3 years after the appointment. Between 2014 and 2017, there were two different Commanders of Air Defence and three different commanders of the Navy Forces. According to Helmy, serving in the same position for shorter term would be caused by some different reasons; one of them could be the desire to prevent any commander from forming popular base in any of the important positions, which may cause to any threat against or potential competition with El Sisi. The second reason could be the desire of elimination of dissent members from the Army. Third reason could be the political will for the formation of stable SCAF composition, which could bear increased power vis-a-vis the presidency.⁸⁵ In addition, the current regime would aim to gain the support of the Army through these appointments.

⁸⁴ Mohamed El Bahrawi. "Mohamed El Assar "the diplomat" the engineer of Egypt-US relations. 2015 online] *Almasryalyoum.com*. Available at: <https://www.almasyalyoum.com/news/details/813625> [Accessed 11 Dec. 2018].

⁸⁵ Deena Helmy. "In The Era of Sisi Life Cycle of Army Leaders is not Complete" (Arapça), 2017, *ida2at* <https://www.ida2at.com/in-the-era-of-sisi-life-cycle-of-army-leaders-is-not-complete/> [Erişim 11 Aralık 2018].

Conclusion

The power of military in Egyptian politics has always been the case. However, it seems that the popular movements, which toppled down the Mubarak regime, were not successfully created a ground for a democratization process through ending the authoritarian rules and the dominancy of military in politics. The expansion of power and authority of military in Egyptian politics could be seen at different levels and through different tools; such as constitutional, executive and judicial power of military and its influence over media and civil society and finally its economic power. The continuity of unbalanced civil-military relations in Egypt and its deterioration in the post-coup of 2013 does harm not only the political life but also the military itself, resulting in deficiency of its functional duties.

Özet

Asker, Nasır döneminden beri Mısır siyasetinde güçlü ve etkin bir aktör olmuştur. 2010 yılında halk ayaklanmasıyla sona eren Mübarek rejiminden sonra Mısır'da demokratikleşme ihtimaline dair umutlar yeşerse de Sisi yönetimine karşı yapılan askeri darbeye asker-sivil ilişkisindeki denge bir kez daha askerler lehine kaymış ve Mısır siyaseti ve ekonomisinde askerlerin başat aktör olmalarını hızlandıran bir süreç yaşanmıştır. Bu makale Temmuz 2013 yılından sonraki süreçte Mısır siyasetindeki asker-sivil ilişkisini analiz etmekte ve askerlerin hem Mısır siyasetinde hem de ekonomisinde elde ettikleri ayrıcalıklı haklarla ne kadar güçlendiklerini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, anayasanın askerlere tanıdığı haklar, yasama-yürütme-yargı katmanlarında askerlerin edindikleri ayrıcalıklar, askerlerin ekonomik güçleri ve faaliyetleri, medya ve sivil toplum üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiştir. Makale, 2013 yılından itibaren Mısır siyaseti ve ekonomisinde askerlerin ayrıcalıklı konumlarının güçlendiğini savunmakla birlikte, bu sürecin Mısır ordusunun kurumsal ve askeri verimliliğini de azalttığını öne sürmektedir.

2013 yılından beri, Anayasal olarak askerler güçlenmişlerdir. Yürütme erkinde eski askerler, sadece devlet görevlerinde değil, aynı

zamanda etkin olan Limanlar, İdari Gözetim Makamı gibi diğer kurumlarda da önemli görevlere atanmaktadırlar. Yasama erkinde Parlamentoda bulunan askeri kökenli milletvekillerinin sayısı da artmaktadır. Yargı erkinde de askeri yargının güçlendirilerek siyasi muhalefeti kontrol altında tutma amacının varlığından söz edilebilir. Askerlerin siyaset ve ekonomideki etkinliklerini gösteren bir diğer gösterge de yürüttükleri ekonomik faaliyetlerdir. Medyanın kontrolünün de askerler elinde olduğu dikkate alındığında sivil toplumun gelişiminin nasıl baskılandığı ve 2003 yılından itibaren Mısır'da askeri rejimin sağlama süreci anlaşılabilir.

Asker-sivil ilişkilerinin incelendiği kuramsal ve/veya teorik çalışmaların birçoğu, gücün askerlerin elinde yoğunlaşması durumunu, demokratikleşme sorunsalı çerçevesinde analiz etmişler, askeri yeterlilik ve etkinlik açısından değerlendirmemişlerdir. Bu makalede savunulduğu gibi Mısır siyasetinde ve ekonomisinde askerler lehine değişen sivil-asker dengesi, sadece Mısır siyasetini etkilememekte, aynı zamanda Mısır ordusunun da özellikle askeri anlamda etkinliğini zayıflatmaktadır. 2013 yılından itibaren artan askeri atamalarda askeri yetkinlik ve yeterlilik yerine siyasal sadakatın öncellenmiş olduğu görülmekte, bu durumun askeri-otoriter bir rejimi sağladığı gibi, güvenlikle ilgili karşılaşılan son gelişmeler dikkate alındığında Ordu'nun yetkinliğine ve etkinliğine zarar veriyor olduğu vurgulanmıştır.

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The Present Role of Anti-Drone Technologies in Modern Warfare and Projected Developments*

Modern Savaşta Anti-Drone Teknolojilerinin
Mevcut Rolü ve Olası Gelişmeler

Tolga ÖZ** – Serkan SERT***

Abstract

As by many scholars pointed out “Autonomous drones are being called the biggest thing in military technology since the nuclear bomb”. The idea behind MAD doctrine is that if both sides were to fight a full-scale war with nuclear weapons, there would be no winners and both would be mutually annihilated. This impasse has relatively kept the world from erupting into another all-encompassing war. In the matter of drones, continuing proliferation of them with their technological components that pioneered in 1917 with the first pilotless winged aircraft in history, ramped up by the first commercial drone permits by the FAA in the US recognizing the potential of non-military, non-consumer drone applications in 2006. Concordantly academic literature rather has been filled with the hypothesis of using drones; particularly armed ones can spark long term security and stability. But the snowballing use of contemporary drones is obviously inclined to make the world a more conflicting place both in civilian and military domains. This has been

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progressing as a worldwide pain point that there's not been reached any forcible remedy like MAD doctrine in nuclear confrontation. Within this problematique margin, our study firstly provides awareness how growing number of increasingly capable drones in our skies poses obvious challenges. And as second, it enables the academics to familiarize recent types of counter drone technologies and instruments, and lastly outlines trajectory of counter-technology in times to come.

Keywords: Drone, Anti/Counter UAS/Drone, Detection & Neutralization of Drones, Defense Management.

Öz

Birçok bilim insanının belirttiği gibi, “Otonom dronlar, askeri teknolojide nükleer bombanın icadından bu güne en büyük buluş olarak nitelendirilmektedir. MAD doktrininin ardındaki fikir, iki tarafın da nükleer silahlarla büyük çaplı bir savaşta kazananın olmayacağı ve karşılıklı olarak yok olacağı yönündedir. Bu çıkmaz, göreceli olarak dünyayı, her şeyi kapsayan bir savaşa dönüştürmekten alıkoymuştur. 1917 yılında tarihteki ilk insansız uçakla başlayan ve teknoloji ile birlikte sürekli gelişmeye devam eden dronlar 2006 yılında Amerikan Federal Havacılık Dairesi'nin ticari dron kullanılmasına ilk defa izin vermesi ile yaygınlaşmaya başladı. Buna paralel olarak akademik literatürde özellikle silahlı dronların uzun vadeli güvenlik ve istikrarı tehdit edebileceğine ilişkin dron kullanımı ile ilgili çok sayıda hipotez bulunmaktadır. Ancak, modern dronların hızla çoğalan kullanımı dünyayı hem sivil hem de askeri alanlarda açıkça daha çatışmalı bir yer haline getirme eğilimindedir. Bu husus, nükleer çatışmada MAD doktrinin aksine herhangi bir etkili çözüm bulunamamış evrensel düzeyde tanımlanamayan bir sorun olarak devam etmektedir. Bu sorunsal çerçevesinde, çalışma öncelikle giderek artan sayıda kabiliyetli dronların nasıl aşikar sorunlar yarattığı konusunda farkındalık sağlamakla birlikte literatüre en son anti-dron teknolojilerini ve araçlarını tanıması yönünde katkı yapmakta ve öngörülebilir karşı teknolojinin yol haritasını ana hatlarıyla belirlemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Drone, Anti/Karşı Drone, Drone'ların Tespiti ve Etkisiz Hale Getirilmesi, Savunma Yönetimi.

Introduction

Certain figures have played an significant role in geopolitics and world affairs. For instance, Pakistani nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan, built a network in the 1990s that smuggled technology and nuclear know-how to rogue regimes in Iran, North Korea and Libya, drastically complicating the global security landscape.¹ Again Edward Snowden, the former National Security Agency contractor responsible for copying and leaking vast troves of classified information, impacting security procedures for how other countries and notably the US handle classified information.² Individuals and small groups have the potential to use an array of new and emerging technologies, virtual currencies, encrypted communications, artificial intelligence (AI) and ever-increasingly drones. Given that, there is a steady drumbeat of warranted concern over the potential use of specific technologies by non-state actors. The combination of these technologies—as evidenced in the Saudi scenario, where a drone was used in conjunction with a deliberate disinformation campaign perpetrated through social media, individuals or small groups with nefarious intent will soon be able to modify and repurpose the technology to cause chaos.³ As for drones, there is growing security concern among civilian and military sectors. As a consequence, a new market has already been boomed for countering existential and potential threats posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS).

This paper firstly provides awareness how growing number of increasingly capable drones in our skies poses obvious challenges,

¹ The Guardian Website, “Pakistan releases 'father' of nuclear bomb from house arrest,” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/06/nuclear-pakistan-khan> (Access Date: 17.01.2019).

² Paul Szoldra, “This is everything Edward Snowden revealed in one year of unprecedented top-secret leaks”, <https://www.businessinsider.com/snowden-leaks-timeline-2016-9> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

³ Colin P. Clarke, “A Terrorist's Dream: How Twitter and Toy Drones Could Kill a Lot of People”, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/terrorists-dream-how-twitter-toy-drones-could-kill-lot-26288> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

including espionage and weaponization. And as second, it enables the academics to scrutinize different types of counter drone technologies, and outlines trajectory of non-kinetic counter-measures in times to come.

1. Security Threats Posed by Drones

A growing number of increasingly capable drones in our skies pose obvious challenges.⁴ In spite of being relatively new technology, drones of varying types and sizes are readily available for consumer purchase. Where there were once one to two predator drones, now there are delivery drones, hobby drones and sightseeing drones. Some experimentation in taking a drone apart revealed that most ready-to-ship drones come with the same electronics as a smartphone or tablet.⁵ Indeed drones have gained a huge popularity as toys among the general public. With ever-growing capabilities in performance, cameras, GPS, and radio links, the number of drone applications is rapidly expanding, stirring the imagination of inventors and hobbyists alike but with limited aeronautical knowledge.⁶ To face the safety, security and privacy issues associated to the development of these UAS operations, many countries have already promulgated their national UAS regulation but hardly any action have been launched against small UAS flying at Very Low Level (VLL)- 500ft and below.⁷

⁴ Jon Hegnares, “The Past, Present And Future Of Anti-Drone Tech”, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/01/26/the-past-present-and-future-of-anti-drone-tech/> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

⁵ Kelly Yyver, “A Future Full of Drones — and the Advanced Threats They Present”, <https://securityintelligence.com/a-future-full-of-drones-and-the-advanced-threats-they-present/> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

⁶ Rene Van Der Heiden, “NCI Agency helps protect NATO operations against drone attacks”, <https://www.ncia.nato.int/NewsRoom/Pages/180529-Drone.aspx> (Access Date: 17.01.2019).

⁷ Antoine Joulia, Thomas Dubot ve Judicael Bedouet, “Towards a 4D Traffic Management Of Small UAS Operating At Very Low Level”, www.icas.org/ICAS_ARCHIVE/ICAS2016/data/papers/2016_0064_paper.pdf (Access Date:17.01.2019).

Even the cheapest drones have fully operational Wi-Fi, radio frequency and Bluetooth antennas or a combination of all three⁸. The ease of use and accessibility of the latest drone models opens the door to those who would use drones for unintended and malicious purposes. It would be irresponsible to ignore the need for counter-drone technology. One of the reasons counter drone/anti-drone e-technology has become such a big issue in 2018 relates to scenarios where drones could be used to threaten the privacy of people, protected places, large events or critical infrastructure.

In civilian domain the potential to use this cutting-edge technology against civilian populations is staggering. Nefarious drone uses within Industrial Domains based on recent past events in the world can be outlined as;

- Drones flying directly over nuclear cooling towers, where they can simply be shut off or drop while carrying an explosive payload,⁹
- Drones for reconnaissance on sensitive areas such as critical power units causing blackout,¹⁰
- They can watch and document security patrols in proximity of public venues, arenas, events national laboratories and governmental buildings by cooperating required hacking devices, spying cameras and sensitive microphones.¹¹

⁸ Rene Van Der Heiden, "NCI Agency helps protect NATO operations against drone attacks", <https://www.ncia.nato.int/NewsRoom/Pages/180529-Drone.aspx> (Access Date: 17.01.2019).

⁹ RT Website, "Unidentified drones flying over French nuclear power plants, probe launched", <https://www.rt.com/news/200887-france-drones-nuclear-plants/> (Access Date: 17.01.2019).

¹⁰ India Ashok, "Drone crash: Rogue UAV knocks out power line causing widespread blackout", <https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/drone-crash-rogue-uav-knocks-out-power-line-causing-widespread-blackout-1625876> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

¹¹ UK Progressive Website, "The flying of unauthorized drones at stadiums prompts

- Because of some prominent enterprises having developed technology that captures data on potential customers' characteristics by marking any individual's home of roof, driveway, landscaping etc. private individuals may experience drone incidences as it is unclear how this data will be used out of providing maximum customer satisfaction.¹²

The first threat came into public view in Turkey was a drone controlled by state television channel-TRT for recording Victory Day celebrations caused panic among statesmen and the public in August 2015. This date can be accepted as triggering milestone for Turkey to attach importance to drone threat from legal, technical and even sociopsychological context. Once more in February 2016, a hobbyist-drone landed by a student in presidential compound set second concrete case for Turkey thusly handheld RF and GNSS jamming ASELSAN anti drone equipment started to be full operational for governmental protection.¹³

Among dozen examples in the world that exposed to media from 2013 to date, probably the most strong effective incident occurred in August 2018, two drones packed with explosives flew toward Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in what the government has described as a failed assassination attempt. The Venezuelan military knocked one of the drones electronically. The second drone crashed into an apartment building about two blocks from where Maduro was speaking to hundreds of troops.¹⁴

safety concerns", <https://ukprogressive.co.uk/the-flying-of-unauthorized-drones-at-stadiums-prompts-safety-concerns/article32097.html> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

¹² Dedrone Website, "Worldwide Drone Incidents", <https://www.dedrone.com/resources/incidents/all> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

¹³ Haber46 Website, "Anıtkabir töreninde drone paniği, askerler çekim yapan aracı vuracaktı", <https://www.haber46.com.tr/politika/anitkabir-torende-drone-panigi-askerler-cekim-yapan-araci-vuracakti-h116581.html> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

¹⁴ Erin Kelly, "Venezuela drone attack: Here's what happened with Nicolas Maduro", <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/08/06/venezuela-drone-attack-nicolas-maduro-assassination-attempt-what-happened/913096002/> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

Another matter introducing alarming security concerns is supposed to be airports and their airspace. Without any identifying factors on the drone itself, airports and flight operators must brace for any possibility or reason for an airspace interruption. The US airports have been experiencing about 600-700 drones incidents flying too close for comfort to airports and airplanes, according to a report from the Federal Aviation Administration and it is estimated that drone sales are expected to reach 7 million in 2020 which presumptively will skyrocket the drones around airports.¹⁵

Within the scope of legislation, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) warned that as of 2016, of the 191 states within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 63 so far had regulations already in place for drones, nine states have pending regulations, while five have banned their use. Moreover, it is stated that there's not a consistency across the regulations, to help harmonize global rules.¹⁶

The first airport incident was reported in Turkey at Atatürk Airport in February 2015, affected air traffic security adversely.¹⁷

The inference is that since consequences of a too close encounter or potential airborne collision between a commercial UAV and an airplane would have a catastrophic outcome, controlling drones more efficiently and reducing the threat originating from them over airspace is an ongoing battle for civil aviation authorities.¹⁸

¹⁵ Jonathan Vanian, "Drones Are Still Flying Dangerously Close to Airplanes and Airports", <http://fortune.com/2016/03/28/drones-flying-too-close-airplanes-airports/> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

¹⁶ Agence France-Presse, "Drones becoming 'real' threat to commercial aviation: IATA", <http://2016.mb.com.ph/2016/02/15/drones-becoming-real-threat-to-commercial-aviation-iata/#rbZlqrCDIsztMMKl.99> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

¹⁷ Hürriyet Website, "Atatürk Havalimanı'nda Drone için tabelalı önlem", www.hurriyet.com.tr/video/ataturk-havalimaninda-drone-icin-tabelali-onlem-122501 (Access Date:17.01.2019).

¹⁸ Slavimir S. Nikolić, An innovative response to commercial uav menace – anti-UAV

In the military domain, small drones have been proliferating at a rate that has already alarmed battlefield commanders to ponder the issue of how to counter them since the beginning of 1990's. Related to this, one of the first publicly released academic documents dates back to 1992, a us naval post graduate school thesis titled with “Anti-UAV Defense Requirements For Ground Forces And Hypervelocity Rocket Lethality Models” by Joseph J. Beel., in which it analyzes the threat that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) pose to U.S. ground forces. The study refers to the prophetically suggested need for counter-UAV measures, even though technological maturity of UAV's had not been reached to the level it already has been at present.¹⁹

But particularly as a corporate endeavor, the NCI (NATO Communications and Information) Agency has recently acquired a deep understanding of drone detection and countermeasures. As a centre of excellence for Electronic Warfare and sensor systems, the Agency's Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) team is well positioned to apply knowledge gained through the delivery of operational capabilities using similar technologies to help the counter-drone challenge.²⁰ The Agency also has a thorough grasp of the available counter-drone systems on the market, acquired through a recent market survey performed in the last quarter of 2017. As such, the Agency intends to release an Invitation for Bid (IFB) for NATO procurement, which had already been planned in mid-2018.²¹

Falconry, *VOJNO DELO*, 4/2017., http://www.odbrana.mod.gov.rs/odbrana-stari/vojni_casopisi/arhiva/VD_2017-4/69-2017-4-14-Nikolic.pdf (Access Date: 17.01.2019).

¹⁹ Joseph J. Beel, Anti-Uav Defense Requirements For Ground Forces And Hypervelocity Rocket Lethality Models“, March 1992, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a252727.pdf> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

²⁰ Rene Van Der Heiden, “NCI Agency helps protect NATO operations against drone attacks”.

²¹ NCI Agency, “Notification of Intent to Invite Bids”, https://www.ncia.nato.int/Industry/Documents/NOI-IFB-CO-14685-UAS_Notification%20of%20Intent.pdf (Access Date:17.01.2019).

Particularly in the conflict in Syria and Iraq, many groups operate a wide variety of drones, which give even the most poorly funded actors an aerial command of battle space that can prove decisive in engagements.²² Virtually Hezbollah and Hamas were pioneers of exploiting the possibilities offered by drone technology, but DEASH has presented very impressive development of the drone program. They initially used drones for surveillance and for propaganda purposes, but there has been a rapid increase of weaponised drones. There was a rapid increase in reports on DEASH's use of weaponised drones after the group announced the establishment of a separate drone unit in January 2017.²³ Also Turkey received her share from a bomb-laden mini drone attack by DEASH on Sept. 27, on the 35th day of Euphrates Shield operation in Syria.²⁴ As a result of domino effect among terrorist groups, Turkish security forces seized a bomb-laden drone reportedly made by outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) militants in the eastern province of Ağrı on November 11, Hakkari Çukurca September & November 18, Şırnak October 18. The bomb-laden drone, which is used as an air attack method by DAESH groups in Iraq and Syria, was reportedly seen used in a plot by the PKK for the first time.²⁵

One striking example of events in military domain is an attack on Russian forces in Syria on January 5th executed by 13 home-made, GPS guided drones having 100 km range. The craft involved in these

²² Arthur Holland Michel , “Counter-Drone Systems.”, *Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College*, February 20, 2018, <http://dronecenter.bard.edu/counter-drone-systems/> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

²³ Truls Hallberg Tønnessen , “Islamic State and Technology – A Literature Review”, *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 11, No. 6 (December 2017), pp. 101-111.

²⁴ Yeniçağ Gazetesi Website, “Yeniçağ: IŞİD, Drone ile Mehmetçiğe saldırdı!”, <http://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/isid-drone-ile-mehmetcige-saldiridi-147012h.htm> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

²⁵ Hürriyet Daily News Website “PKK’s bomb-laden drone seized in Turkey’s east”, <http://www.hurriyetcailynews.com/pkks-bomb-laden-drone-seized-in-turkeys-east-122299> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

attacks resembled hobbyists' model aircraft. They had three-meter wingspans, were built crudely of wood and plastic, and were powered by lawnmower engines. Each carried ten home-made shrapnel grenades under its wings. The craft may thus have been a cheap, garage-built copy of captured kit.²⁶ This event also illustrates the specter state- and non-state-sponsored package raid of swarm-drones implying being capable of flying autonomously in formation. As pointed out in CBS news "Autonomous drones are being called the biggest thing in military technology since the nuclear bomb", a new generation of drones is coming. Only this time they are autonomous -- able to operate on their own without humans controlling them from somewhere with a joy stick, can go about 10,000 nautical miles on a tank of gas, each of those tiny drones is flying itself.²⁷

To put in a nutshell, in a Pentagon's official research publication, one military official very clearly highlights the drone-peril that. It is only a matter of time before drones will be used to carry chemicals, explosives, small arms or kamikaze into any facility, person or throng of crowds... The clock is ticking, and we don't want to wait until it's too late.²⁸

2. Overview of Existing Counter Drone Measures and Challenges

As suggested above, sharp rise in incidences of security violation by unauthorized drones causing increased actions of nefarious and terror attempts worldwide has opened up evolution of counter drone measures. Recently counter-drone industry has been growing very rapidly. As of the beginning 2018, The Center for the Study of the

²⁶ The Economist, "Home-made drones now threaten conventional armed forces", <https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2018/02/08/home-made-drones-now-threaten-conventional-armed-forces> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

²⁷ David Martin, "New Generations of Drones set to Revolutionize Warfare", <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-autonomous-drones-set-to-revolutionize-military-technology/> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

²⁸ Wim Zwijnenburg, "Terrorist Drone Attacks Are Not a Matter of 'If' but 'When'", <https://www.newsweek.com/drones-isis-terrorist-attacks-453867> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

Drone at Bard College identified more than 230 C-UAS products produced by 155 manufacturers in 33 countries. These products range from detection, identification to neutralization purposes.²⁹

At the present moment there are no such a system which could protect for hundred percent from the drones, because each object has different area, infrastructure, security policy or location issues.³⁰ However determining type of the target and its threat level is the backbone of defense logic with regards to establishing timely and proper reaction against any medium generated from air. In this sense the first step is to find and alert the presence of the threat, right after to classify the nature of it.

The current air defense systems have traditionally been designated for protection of airspace from manned aircraft that are large and fast moving assets. They potentially present challenges in the fields of cost, efficiency, range and collateral damage. For Instance among other projects, the American army is hurriedly upgrading its shoulder-launched Stinger missiles, which are used to attack low-flying aero planes and helicopters, not designed to hit small drones. The upgrade adds a proximity fuse which detonates when the missile is close enough to destroy a drone without actually having to make contact with it. But the upgrades cost about \$55,000 each (on top of the basic \$120,000 cost of a Stinger), so only 1,147 are being purchased—about two per team, which is hardly enough to tackle a swarm of drones. Another emphasis focused by the armies is counter air operation to stop drones before they can take off. Any attempt for prevention drone threat in preparation or sustainment phase along with drone-assembly and storage facility is another story. But when there are no runways or hangars, and drones can be operated from houses

²⁹ Arthur Holland Michel, “Counter-Drone Systems.”, *Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College*, (Access Date:17.01.2019).

³⁰ Anti-Drone Website “Anti-drone system overview and technology comparison”, <https://anti-drone.eu/blog/anti-drone-publications/anti-drone-system-overview-and-technology-comparison.html> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

and garages, finding bases to attack is far from easy.³¹

The main non-kinetic detection and identification technologies suggesting both opportunities and challenges for development of industrial counter drone measures can be encapsulated as bellows;

- *Optical and Infrared*

Electro-optical systems can only operate during daytime, and might confuse a drone with a bird or an airplane. A camera scans the area to detect and identify a potential drone. The monitoring can be done on the visible or infrared spectrum. The issue is that drones are small and difficult to see. They also have a limited heat signature compared to traditional aircraft with combustion engines. These type of sensors are not very suitable for the detection phase.³²

- *Acoustic Sensors*

Drones emit a distinctive buzzing sound that can be picked up by sensitive microphones in order to give an estimated direction and distance of the drone. However acoustic sensors rely on a library of sounds emitted by known drones, and might therefore be deaf to drones not covered by the library. Besides they are not able to precisely identify threats because of noisy backgrounds (e.g., airport, city downtown), or drone tuning limiting detection capability.³³

- *Electronic Support Measures*

RF detection systems only detect certain frequency bands in a library that needs to be regularly updated considering the rapid growth of commercial drones. The key of detection is to adjust the right sensitivity, selectivity-frequency to detect the drone. If the system is attuned too sensitively, it may lower discrimination of drone from any

³¹ The Economist, “Home-made drones now threaten conventional armed forces”, (Access Date:17.01.2019).

³² Arthur Holland Michel, “Counter-Drone Systems”.

³³ Oliver Kmia, “The Technical and Legal Challenges of Anti-Drone Systems”, <https://fstoppers.com/aerial/technical-and-legal-challenges-anti-drone-systems-193666> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

other flying object (e.g. pigeon). Adding the fact that the operating environment is becoming full of authorized and unauthorized drones, C-UAS systems must be able to have the capability to identify friend or foe. Most commercial drones are constructed of plastic and are difficult to spot electronically because they fly low to the ground and don't carry a transponder to signal their positions. But in comparison radar seems more promising than optical&infrared imaging for threat confirmation.³⁴

When it comes to neutralization (Interdiction (soft kill) and/or destruction (hard kill), with small numerous drones, which are difficult to detect, identify and track, jamming could be an obvious measure by disrupting the radio links between the operator and the drone, or confusing its GPS navigation. But jamming is not effective against autonomous ones that are pre-programmed via GPS again.³⁵ In practice the destruction of drones can be done by firearms from ground or air requiring missile and laser but solutions are not cost effective. New technologies are under development such as electromagnetic pulse and high energy microwaves. But their promise are still in question whether they can be used in urbanized environment that can cause them falling into ground. And all these concerns influence in counter-drone industry.

3. Counter-Drone Market Scope

This rapidly emerging global Counter-Drone market might be segmented as below according to financial expenditure in the market via five orthogonal money trails, and these categories are: mitigation, defense, end-use, and region-based.

In the first level, the mitigation market segment has been split into destructive and non-destructive systems. Destructive systems are

³⁴ W.J. Hennigan, "Experts Say Drones Pose a National Security Threat — and We Aren't Ready", www.time.com/5295586/drones-threat/ (Access Date:17.01.2019).

³⁵ The Economist, "Home-made drones now threaten conventional armed forces".

used completely to destroy the working components of drones. Destructive mitigation systems are sub categorized as; Laser Systems, Missile Effectors, and Electronic Counter Measure Systems.

In this section the data regarding this so-called segment has been provided by the publication of “Anti-Drone Market” by Grand View Research company which is currently accessible main and single open-source in related subject-matter.³⁶

As the first categorization, mitigation systems occupied the leading market share in the global counter-drone market in 2016 in terms of revenue. Also, it is found out that destructive system global market is the fastest growing segment by providing market growth from \$266.1 mn in 2015 to \$1.733 bn by 2024, following an estimated CAGR 24.8% from 2016 to 2024.

Comparatively, non-destructive system global market anticipated to witness a sluggish growth in the near future by providing lack of effective drone counter solutions by providing a market growth from \$32.9 mn in 2015 to \$117.4 mn by 2024.

As the second market categorization, defense segment has been split into Detection and Detection&Disruption systems. Amongst the defense systems market, Radar based and Active Optics systems are the leading sub-segments of the detection system. The low price factor of these technologies over RF emission or acoustics type detection system accounts for their lead positions. In parallel to electronic systems, the trend in the global counter-drone market by defense category is in favor of Detection segment with a market growth from \$92.9 mn in 2015 to \$616.1 mn by 2024, following a CAGR of 25.0% over the forecast. These data naturally makes the detection systems as the fastest growing defense category segment. Comparatively,

³⁶ PR News Wire Website "Counter-Drone Market & Technologies – 2018-2023", published by Homeland Security Research Corp., <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-global-counter-drone-market-is-forecast-to-grow-at-a-2018-2023-cagr-of-37-2-300710320.html> (Access Date:17.01.2019).

Detection & Disruption market segment has a tendency of market growth from \$206.1 mn in 2015 to \$1.23 bn by 2024 with an estimated growth CAGR of 23.6% from 2016 to 2024.

As the third market categorization, End-Use Segment has been split into Military&Defense, Commercial, and Government sub-categories.

In terms of end-use market, the segments of both military and government are the key general end-users of counter-drone systems holding the leading share of the market in 2015.

The results of detailed analysis, regarding end-use market industry snapshot can be summarized as follows:

Military&Defense market by far anticipated to emerge as the leading predominant end-use segment due to increase in R&D activities by defense prime contractors; the market for counter-drone systems in military and defense applications is expected to cross USD 900 mn by 2024 with a market size estimated at \$179.4 mn in 2015. Military&Defense segment is followed by government segment. Government Market size was \$35.9 mn in 2015 and is expected to reach \$284.5 mn by 2024 with a proportional increase in the near future.

Apart from military and government sectors, the commercial sector is also expected to contribute significantly to the counter-drone market having a tendency of market growth from \$56.2 mn in 2015 to \$388.9 mn by 2024 over the forecast period with growing at an estimated CAGR of 25.6% from 2016 to 2024. This involves use of counter-drone for protection of airports, government buildings, commercial buildings, places of public gatherings, etc.

As the fourth categorization of Region market segment, Market Breakdown Description of the global anti-drone market share by geographic regions is roughly as follows; Americas with the lead of USA has the %60, Europe %25, Asia Pacific (APAC) %10 and rest of the World (RoW) %5.

In Asia Pacific region it is anticipated to witness a CAGR of close to 30.0% over the forecast period owing to increasing government expenditure in development of aerospace infrastructure across emerging economies.

3.1. Overview of Primary Company Revenues in the Market

Based on key player company types on the market these proportions are as follows: Companies having more than USD 1 billion total revenue of 2015 as %55, having total revenue of 2015 between USD 500 million – 1 billion %25, and having less than USD 1 billion total revenue of 2015 as %10. In parallel to global market share the USA is forcing counter-drone market with 62 companies, and the UK (20 companies), Israel (13 companies), Australia, Germany, France, and Switzerland (10-13 companies) are the other leading stakeholder manufacturer countries shaping the industry. Turkey is also contributing with two companies having ground-based RF/GNSS Jamming detection and interdiction capabilities.

Conclusion

Drone technology is undergoing progressive evolution. The current technology has already been transforming from capabilities of improved safety modes, autopilot modes into multi-type platform and payload adaptability, and full autonomy facilitating airspace awareness. The next generation suggests promising benefits particularly in full airspace awareness and automatic execution of every type of package missions in swarm.

In parallel with advancement of drone technologies, all the benefits have already come with their share of risks and challenges that is leveling them up to national security concern. It would unhesitatingly come that individuals and small groups will exploit them for their own advantages. Accordingly, this paper aimed to outline how growing number of increasingly capable commercial drones in our skies poses obvious risks and challenges along with the current overview of platform-based defense solutions.

Part of the challenges is evident that new national and international regulations must be designed for this emerging threat getting more and more autonomous. It seems impossible to find complete solution from today to tomorrow. However, sectors with support of governments have to develop corporate programs regarding net of multiple sensors to offer wide area architecture of surveillance

of all drones mostly operating in urban areas where many strategists increasingly acknowledge that the future of war is in cities. From platform standpoint, defending against multiple drones requires launching multiple sensors and platforms. And practically considering the worst case, even downing drone with an explosive could be risky for safety. Thus, capturing and taking them away seems to be the best option. Anti-drone market for “*detection and disruption*” clearly shows that it is going to grow at the highest CAGR in five year-period of time. But it is likely that counter interdiction methods (jamming, laser, net, machine gun, electromagnetic pulse etc.) employing combination of multiple sensor types generated by drone-catcher drones, rather than ground based or hand held platforms will be in focus among companies.

Özet

2006 yılında Amerikan Federal Havacılık Dairesi'nin verdiği izinle birlikte hızla yaygınlaşan dronların 1917 yılında tarihteki ilk pilotsuz uçakla başlayan gelişimi ve günümüzde teknolojik yeniliklerle birlikte devam etmektedir. Bununla birlikte modern dronların hızla çoğalan kullanımı dünyayı hem sivil hem de askeri alanlarda daha çatışmalı bir yer haline gelmesi riskini de barındırmaktadır.. Bu husus, nükleer çatışmada MAD doktrininin aksine herhangi bir etkili çözüm bulunamayan ve evrensel düzeyde tanımlanamayan bir sorun alanı ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Makalede bu sorun kapsamında sırasıyla dronların neden oldukları güvenlik riskleri, mevcut anti-dron sistemleri ve anti-dron sistemleri pazarının durumu incelenmektedir.

Günümüzde geniş bir kullanıcı kitlesi, çeşitli boyut ve işlevlere sahip olan dronları hayatın birçok alanında kullanmaktadır. Dron kullanımının bu şekilde yaygınlaşması çeşitli riskleri de beraberinde getirmiştir. Günlük hayatta bu riskler kamu düzenine güvenliğe ve özel hayata yönelik olarak üç kategoride toplanmaktadır. 2018 yılı itibariyle yapılan ve bazıları gerçekleşen risk analizlerinde bu sistemlerin uçuş güvenliğinin riske atılmasında, kritik altyapılar ve hassas bölgelere saldırılarda, taşıdığı kameralar ve hassas mikrofonlar ve topladığı veriler aracılığıyla istihbarat elde edilmesi, özel hayatın

gizliliği ve kişisel verilerin korunması ihlallerinde kullanılabileceği değerlendirilmektedir.

Dronların askeri açıdan yarattığı risklere yönelik teorik tartışmaları 1990'lı yıllara gitse de esas olarak Suriye ve Irak'taki terör gruplarının saldırı amacıyla bu sistemleri kullanmasıyla gündeme gelmiştir. Suriye'deki terörist unsurlar ucuza mal ettikleri, uzun bir uçuş menziline sahip dronları kullanarak çeşitli saldırılar düzenlemişlerdir. Ülkemize de yönelik saldırı girişimleri mevcut olsa da 13 tane patlayıcı yüklü ve 100 km menzile sahip el yapımı dron ile Rusya'ya ait bir üsse yapılan saldırı dronların kullanıldığı en çarpıcı örneklerden biridir.

Dronlara karşı alınabilecek önlemleri değerlendirdiğimizde mevcut hava savunma sistemleri belirli bir büyüklükteki hava araçlarına yönelik olması sebebiyle yetersiz kalmaktadırlar. Alçak irtifada uçan hava araçlarına yönelik sistemler bulunsada bunların çeşitli modifikasyonlara tabi tutulmadan dronlar için kullanılması mümkün değildir. Bu yeni tehdidin ortaya çıkardığı ihtiyaca yönelik geliştirilen hali hazırda 230'dan fazla anti-dron sistemi bulunmaktadır. Ancak bu sistemlerin hiç biri %100 koruma sağlamamaktadır. Bu sistemler kullandığı yöntemlere göre optik-kızıl ötesi sistemler, akustik sensörlü sistemler ve elektronik sistemler olarak üçe ayrılmaktadır. Ancak bu sistemlerin her birinin ciddi eksiklikleri bulunmakta ve sahada bazı durumlarda işlevsiz kalabilmektedirler.

Anti-dron sistemleri pazarına ilişkin elimizde son derece kısıtlı bilgiler bulunmaktadır. Bu pazara ilişki sunulan veriler sistemlerin etkilerine, kullanıldığı sektöre savunma açısından kullanımına, pazarın bölgesel olarak dağılımına ve pazardaki şirketlerin durumuna göre analiz edilmiştir.

Bu kapsamda etkinliğine göre yok edici sistemler en çok kullanılan ve pazarı en hızlı genişleyen sistemlerdir. Bu sistemlerin alıcıları incelendiğinde ise, en büyük payın devlet kurumlarına ve askeri kurumlara ait olduğu görülmektedir. Dron pazarına bölgesel olarak bakıldığında ise pazarın yarısından fazlasının ABD'ye ait olduğu görülmektedir. ABD'yi %25 ile Avrupa takip etmektedir.

Bu alanda faaliyet gösteren şirketlere baktığımızda ise yine ABD 62 şirketle ilk sırada bulunmaktadır.

Sonuç olarak hükümetler dronların takibine yönelik gerekli altyapıların kurulması için önlemler almalı ve gerekli düzenlemeleri yapmalıdırlar. Anti-dron sistemleri açısından ise tespit edip uzaklaştıran sistemler riski en aza indirmesi sebebiyle 5 yıllık süreçte pazar payında en fazla büyüme olacaktır. Ancak yerde kurulu sistemler veya elde taşınan sistemler yerine şirketler bu sistemlerin kullandığı müdahale yöntemlerine sahip avcı dronlar geliştirme yoluna gidecektir.

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Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in the Maritime Domain*

Deniz Alanında Sivil-Asker İş Birliği (SAİ)

Mehmet PALAZ**

Abstract

In its current sense, one of the military functions, which is named as Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), has emerged as a result of operational requirements during the peace operations in the Balkans in the 1990s. In this period, CIMIC was needed to establish liaisons with civilian actors, especially to coordinate humanitarian affairs with military operations and to facilitate cooperation if possible. Current changes in the execution of military operations have obliged changes in CIMIC support as well. These changes brought the assumption that CIMIC is not only applicable during an operation but also prior to the operation during the planning process. However, CIMIC has largely been applied for land-focused operations. The maritime domain, which includes a wide variety of actors and topics, has been ignored by the CIMIC perspective. This article explains how CIMIC can contribute in the maritime domain for maritime security efforts.

Keywords: *Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), Comprehensive approach, Maritime security.*

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Öz

Askeri bir fonksiyon olarak Sivil-Asker İş Birliği (SAİ), günümüzdeki anlamıyla, 1990'larda Balkanlarda icra edilen barış harekâtları esnasında bir ihtiyaç olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Anılan dönemde, SAİ'ne, harekât alanındaki sivil aktörler ile irtibat tesis etmek, bu irtibat vasıtasıyla özellikle insani yardım faaliyetleri ile askeri harekâtın eşgüdümünü sağlamak ve mümkün olan durumlarda ve belirli alanlarda sivillerle iş birliği ortamının oluşturulmasını sağlamak için başvurulmuştur. Değişen harekât ortamına uygun şekilde, SAİ'nin katkı sağladığı alanlar da günümüzde çeşitlenerek artmıştır. Konuların çeşitlenmesiyle birlikte yapılan değerlendirmelerde, SAİ'nin sadece harekât esnasında değil harekâtların öncesinde planlama aşamasında da önemli katkısının olacağı anlaşılmıştır. Buna karşın SAİ, kara harekâtlarında uygulanagelmştir. İhtiva ettiği aktör ve konu çeşitliliği bakımından, deniz alanının oldukça kapsamlı bir ortam sunması SAİ açısından göz ardı edilmiştir. Bu makalede, deniz alanının sağladığı kapsamlı ortamda SAİ'nin deniz güvenliği çabalarına nasıl katkı sunabileceği açıklanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Sivil-Asker İş Birliği (SAİ), Kapsamlı Yaklaşım, Deniz Güvenliği.*

Introduction

Maritime Security is one of the topics currently being studied intensively within the military, private sector, and related academic environments. This is not surprising because 80% of the world's population lives within 100 km of the coast, and 90% of world trade is carried by ships along the highways of the sea or the sea lanes of communication. While these studies have examined maritime security through its importance, in the end they emphasize more or less two similar points:

- A lack of coordination and cooperation between related actors who share the same maritime environment.
- The requirement for an inclusive and comprehensive approach to maritime security.

The maritime domain includes a wide variety of sectors and actors. This variety indicates the need for an inclusive and comprehensive approach to maritime security. Naturally, such an inclusive and comprehensive approach requires establishing liaisons with different stakeholders, being aware of each other's activities and structures, and seeking for opportunities to coordinate, cooperate, and collaborate. This kind of approach has effectively been applied through Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), presently in the land-focused domain. Meanwhile, the fact remains that maritime security offers opportunities for just such a comprehensive approach, and CIMIC might be the tool for it.

With this study, firstly it is going to be revealed why the maritime domain requires a comprehensive approach for maritime security. Following this, CIMIC is going to be introduced as it has been conceptualized and applied within NATO. At this step, it is going to be claimed that CIMIC is not the same as when it emerged in the 1990s. While doing this it will be revealed how CIMIC has evolved over the years, from its emergence until today, as a response to developments in the security environment. In the last step, NATO's efforts will be argued for maritime security in relation to merchant shipping as an example of civil-military cooperation. In the conclusion section, proposals for better civil-military cooperation in the maritime domain will be provided.

1. Comprehensiveness of Maritime Security

Here in this section, maritime security is going to be examined by approaching from two directions, mainly through Bueger's studies.¹ First one accepts that the threats and risks in the maritime domain are directly related to human beings. Thus while we are talking about maritime security, we are in fact mentioning human security as well.

¹ Christian Bueger, "What is Maritime Security?", *Marine Policy*, 2015, Vol.53, 159-164; Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, "Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies", *International Affairs*, 2017, 93:6, 1293-1311.

This means that maritime security is not equal to just defending territorial waters or exclusive economic zones of the state, as Bueger indicated.² The second one is that the threats and risks are complicated, multifaceted, and unpredictable. This is because they are not purely military and thus cannot be countered by military means alone.³

When we consider these two above-mentioned phenomena, we can see that the maritime domain has changed in terms of security. As quoted by Bueger and Edmunds⁴, this assumption has also been emphasized by Admiral Michael Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations for the US Navy who stated that the “sea-power discussion has been about big-ship battles and high-tech weapons, but now we face new challenges.” Before, the sea was a chaotic arena in which sea power was determinant, but now it includes opportunities for humanity and brings new risks and threats.⁵

These new risks and threats are widely known as hybrid threats and hybrid warfare. Admiral (Ret.) James Stavridis talked about hybrid warfare at sea. According to Stavridis, the fundamental idea of hybrid warfare is to create conditions for a limited and quick military operation at the tactical level. With this kind of operation, the aim is to gain operational and strategic impact⁶. Hybrid warfare is an asymmetric action applied to exploit differences and attack the target’s vulnerabilities and weaknesses.⁷ In this kind of action/operation, a

² Bueger, “What is Maritime Security?”, p. 160-162.

³ Bueger and Edmunds, “Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies”, p. 1300.

⁴ Ibid., 1298.

⁵ Lutz Feldt, “The Importance of the Global Maritime Domain for World Politics and Security”, *ISPSW Strategy Series*, October 2015, Issue No.382, 1-10, p. 3.

James Stavridis; “Maritime Hybrid Warfare Is Coming”, Proceedings, <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2016/december/maritime-hybrid-warfare-coming>, December 2016, (Access Date: 30 May 2019).

⁷ Lutz Feldt, “Maritime Hybrid Risks and Threats: Consequences for Harbours, Navies and Maritime Services – A European View”, *ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security*, January 2019, Issue No.596, 1-10, p. 1-3.

combination of threats, risks, and challenges are used known as hybrid threats. From this perspective hybrid threats in the maritime domain may include: commercial vulnerabilities in attacking vessels and ports, cyber-attacks, territorial vulnerabilities, disrupting communication between ships and operation centers, threats to maritime security forces, and disinformation.⁸ Within this context, to be able to counter these new risks, threats, and challenges that are in the form of hybrid threats and hybrid warfare, actors need to create an environment to enable working comprehensively together.⁹

In fact, these developments at sea had been predicted, and maritime security was put on the agenda of states such as the USA, UK, France, and India and by organizations and initiatives such as NATO, the European Union, the African Union, the G7 declaration, Our Ocean conferences, and the Independent World Commission on the Oceans (IWCO).¹⁰

As can be seen, a number of actors are aware about threats in the maritime domain and maritime security, but what indeed is maritime security? Bueger developed a matrix to be able to understand the maritime security environment. According to this matrix, maritime security has four pillars: sea power, marine safety, blue economy, and resilience¹¹. According to Bueger and as shown in the matrix below, sea power directly relates to national security, blue economy is in the area of economic development, marine safety is about the marine environment, and resilience indicates human security. Yet when one

⁸ Chris Kremidas-Courtney; “Countering Hybrid Threats In The Maritime Environment”, *Center for International Maritime Security*, <http://cimsec.org/countering-hybrid-threats-in-the-maritime-environment/36553>, (Access Date: 20 May 2019).

⁹ Lutz Feldt, Peter Roell and Ralph D. Thiele; “Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach”, *ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security*, April 2013, Issue No.222; James Stavridis, “Maritime Hybrid Warfare Is Coming”; “Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies”; Kremidas-Courtney, “Countering Hybrid Threats In The Maritime Environment”.

¹⁰ Bueger and Edmunds; “Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies”, p. 1293-1297.

¹¹ Bueger; “What is Maritime Security?”, p. 160.

considers these pillars with their sub topics, all other topics apart from sea power relate to human security.




Figure 1. Bueger's Maritime Security Matrix.

With a view through the perspective of national security, sea power has the utmost importance during both peace and crisis times in naval warfare, in securing the sea lanes and communication, and for deterrence in the maritime domain.¹² Marine safety, the blue economy, and resilience belong to human security. They include ship safety, marine installations, maritime professionals and marine environment, sustainable fishery, resources for fossil fuels and sea-bed mining, coastal tourism, food security, and safe employment.¹³ Additionally, protection of cultural assets, status of women in the maritime domain, and the fight against maritime corruption may also be considered part of the maritime security agenda from the perspective of human security.

Another study on understanding maritime security indicated maritime security to be related to "international and national peace and

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., p. 161.

security” and “sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence” and maritime security to include security of the sea lines of communications, protection from crimes at sea, security of resources, environmental protection, and the security of seafarers and fishermen.¹⁴

Different views are found on maritime security. On this point it can be easily claimed that security assumptions have changed in the maritime domain. New threats cannot be seen just from the perspective of national security or only be countered by military means. Within this context, providing maritime security requires a comprehensive approach in which co-existing actors seek to coordinate, cooperate, and collaborate. Some examples from current developments can be examined at that point.

It is known that the prosperity and welfare of society depends on the functioning of sea-borne trade, free access to marine resources, and freedom of navigation.¹⁵ Let one assume that global trade is threatened by piracy in certain parts of the world. The naval defense of shipping lanes becomes a matter of national security. Meanwhile, looking from the perspective of human security, this effort can also provide a safe and secure environment for fisheries, which is directly related to the resilience and development of local populations. For this reason, the African Union’s 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy) placed *blue growth* at the heart of its narrative.¹⁶ In this scenario states, navies, fishermen, companies, organizations, and populations have something to say, contribute, and expect.

This example has two major issues: defeating piracy and contributing to the safety of the marine environment. Defeating pirates is an issue of national security that requires simultaneous cooperation

¹⁴ Feldt, Roell and Thiele; “Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach”, p. 2-3.

¹⁵ Feldt, “The Importance of the Global Maritime Domain for World Politics and Security”, p. 1.

¹⁶ Bueger and Edmunds, “Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies”, p.1299-1300.

between multiple actors. For example, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia combated piracy in their region by conducting joint operations, patrols, and sea/air surveillance.¹⁷ In this example we come to the safety of the maritime environment and can say that the protection and sustainability of fisheries, for example, underpin the livelihoods of millions of people living in coastal regions. This is not only about providing food and sustaining local/regional trade but also about employment so as to avoid having people join in piracy and criminality.¹⁸

Another example can be given from search-and-rescue (SAR) activities, especially from the Mediterranean. During SAR efforts off the coast of Italy, a number of different organizations were active, such as the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Sea-Watch, SOS-Méditerranée, Sea-Eye, Pro-Activa Open Arms, Jugend Rettet, the Lifeboat Project, the Boat Refugee Foundation, Save the Children, and Mission Lifeline.¹⁹ Some of these organizations coordinated their efforts with the Italian authorities (i.e., Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) of Rome [run by the Italian Coast Guard] and Ministry of Interior).²⁰

As stated in these studies and depicted in the examples, actors need to be aware of their efforts and understand their roles, mandates, and aims. Yet the obvious fact is that military and civilian assessments considerably differ from each other, as well as their way of planning and acting.²¹ From the military aspect, an interface between military

¹⁷ Feldt, Roell and Thiele, “Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach”, p. 2-3.

¹⁸ Bueger and Edmunds, op. cit., p. 1300.

¹⁹ Paolo Cuttitta, “Repolicization Through Search and Rescue? Humanitarian NGOs and Migration Management in the Central Mediterranean”, *Geopolitics*, 2018, Vol. 23, No. 3, 632–633; Eugeion Cusumano and James Pattison; “The non-governmental Provision of Search and Rescue in the Mediterranean and the Abdication of State Responsibility”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 2018, Vol. 31, No. 1, 53.

²⁰ Paolo Cuttitta, op. cit, p. 642.

²¹ Feldt, “The Importance of the Global Maritime Domain for World Politics and

and non-military actors is needed to be able to facilitate this issue. Within this context, CIMIC is the best candidate to set this interface.

2. Definition of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

Although CIMIC is a military function, understanding of it is unfortunately really quite limited, even within military staff. CIMIC was a very attractive topic during the 1990s and early 2000s within NATO. Later on, it appeared to start losing importance, but with the rise of new threats (i.e., hybrid threats), CIMIC regained importance.

CIMIC as defined in the Allied Joint Publication (AJP-3.19), which is the NATO military doctrine on CIMIC from November 2018, is “a joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil-military interaction with diverse non-military actors.”

This definition clearly indicates three points:

1. *Diverse non-military actors* means that actors other than military and different from one another are present.
2. *A broad spectrum of civil-military interaction* means that the military engages with these actors for different purposes.
3. *Supporting the achievement of mission objectives* means that engaging with these different actors may support achieving mission objectives.

At this stage and moving from the first point, it must be defined who these actors in the area are. As generally accepted, these actors include:

- International organizations (IOs),
- Non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
- Government organizations (GOs),

- Local authorities,
- Indigenous populations,
- Refugees/internally displaced persons (IDP), and
- Private sector.

This clearly indicates that the civilian environment is not composed only of the population and NGOs. This also helps one understand that this wide variety of actors can affect military missions from both positive and negative aspects.

These actors are natural members of the crisis or conflict area. In all cases, local authorities, indigenous populations, and refugees/IDPs already exist; the rest arrive and become involved long before the military. For example, on the first day of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) deployment on June 11, 1999, hundreds of thousands of people had already fled their homes; more than 500 international and non-governmental organizations had already deployed to and were operating in Kosovo.²² The organizations had successfully accomplished their mission in bringing the conflict to an end, providing humanitarian assistance to affected people, and identifying and applying measures for quick development. The military contributed directly and indirectly to their efforts through CIMIC in many cases. To be able to contribute so, the military needs to know who is who in the battlefield and needs to establish liaisons with non-military actors. Liaison is the primary function and mission of CIMIC.²³

Here CIMIC should be broadly stated as being just the enabler for the military to enter the civilian environment by defining non-military actors. In this environment, non-CIMIC military units and functions need to engage with non-military actors for various purposes. For example, transportation and logistics branches need to know the

²² Larry Wentz (ed.), *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience*, Washington, National Defense University Press, 1998, p. 135.

²³ NATO, *Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.19 Civil-Military Cooperation*, November, 2018.

conditions of the roads, seaports, and airports; thus they need support from the Ministry of Transportation and related IOs and NGOs in the country. Another issue is the coordination of movement and transportation. Main and alternative routes should be defined, and using routes must be coordinated with the related actors. These actors are mainly the military, humanitarian organizations, government, and locals. This is the second core function of CIMIC: Support to the Force. This helps the military de-conflict actions, avoid duplication of efforts, and provide economy of resources.

A number of functions should be covered by non-military actors in a conflict/crisis area, but sometimes these functions need to be covered by the military, especially when no civilian authority is present. Though not limited to, some of these areas include: humanitarian assistance issues, gender issues, status of children in an armed conflict, protection of cultural assets, protection of civilians, environmental protection, and civil preparedness. These areas can be covered by CIMIC by conducting CIMIC projects, providing awareness, reporting developments, and liaising with related stakeholders. The military can contribute to civil situations only when really necessary with its limited resources. As such, the third and final function of CIMIC is support to civil actors and their environment.

During the crisis in the Balkans at the beginning of the 1990s, the first example of CIMIC was observed. These examples were the first applications of CIMIC as a NATO concept. In the post-conflict reconstruction efforts, support to civil actors and their environment held priority. That is why this generally became known as CIMIC. This early concept was developed after the case of Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the military experienced CIMIC within provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). CIMIC was again in the foreground in the post-conflict situations but in a different way. In this case, civilian and military stakeholders worked together closely. Now, however, we are experiencing another CIMIC concept, which is the main facilitator of the comprehensive approach (CA).

CIMIC efforts during the Balkan crisis were applied in the post-conflict reconstruction process. Afterwards, CIMIC efforts in

Afghanistan were again related to reconstruction but were applied while the kinetic operation was still ongoing, and this provided some opportunities to the military. Currently, militaries need to know about the civil environment to be able to understand the root causes of a crisis or conflict, to be able to conduct better planning, and to be able to contribute to the efforts of the international community. This requires militaries to comprehensively engage with the civilian environment prior to a mission, and here the main facilitator is CIMIC.

CA emerged as an idea that aimed to bring the military and other stakeholders from a wide spectrum of the civilian environment, such as IOs, GOs, NGOs, and actors from the private sector. The object was to contribute to providing stability and sustaining a safe and secure environment by coordinating the efforts of different stakeholders.

The concept of CA was raised for the first time in 2004 within NATO, but so far no definition has been provided, deliberately. This frees NATO from owning the concept and allows it to present CA as an effort of the international community, which means NATO is just one of the actors that can contribute to providing security and stability as a member of the international community (IC).

NATO began preparations against hybrid threats and hybrid warfare in 2006 by accepting CA during the Riga Summit; so far, however, this approach is still underdeveloped. In the 2006 Riga Summit, heads of states and governments agreed that cooperation with non-military actors is a requirement in applying NATO's crisis management system. They also agreed that the related non-military actors' contributions must be provided at all levels in planning and in executing ongoing and future operations. This initiative was when CA emerged. NATO deliberately accepts no single definition of CA. NATO wants it to remain as an understanding instead of a set of rules to be followed.

NATO's New Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, underlined that lessons learned from that crisis, and NATO operations show that effective crisis management calls for a comprehensive approach involving political, civilian, and military

instruments. Military means were stated to be insufficient on their own for meeting the many complex challenges Euro-Atlantic and international security face.²⁴ A recent study of member perspectives regarding CA found three consistent themes:

- Coherent application of national instruments of power,
- Comprehensive interactions with other actors, and
- Comprehensive actions in all domains and elements of a crisis.²⁵

NATO is working on a comprehensive conceptual framework for identifying and discussing such threats, as well as the possible multi-stakeholder responses. In essence, the hybrid threats faced by NATO and its non-military partners require a comprehensive approach that allows for a wide range of responses, kinetic and non-kinetic, by military and non-military actors.²⁶ Such a response will have to be in partnership with other stakeholders, such as international and regional organizations, as well as with representatives of business and commerce.²⁷

3. Maritime Security and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

Areas of shared interest exist for the military. These related areas can be divided into two groups: directly-related and indirectly-related. Directly-related areas may include port security, anti-piracy, anti-terrorism, and anti-proliferation. Indirectly-related areas may include military assistance in humanitarian emergencies (MAHE), disaster relief, civil emergency planning, host-nation support, search and rescue, protection of critical infrastructure, and capacity building and training.

²⁴ NATO, *NATO's New Strategic Concept*, 2010.

²⁵ M. Aaronson et.al. "NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat", *Prism*, 2011, Vol.2, No.4, 111-124, p. 115.

²⁶ NATO, "Updated List of Tasks for the Implementation of 'Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the Lisbon Summit Decisions on the Comprehensive Approach'", dated to 4 March 2011.

²⁷ S.D. Bachmann, "Hybrid Threats, Cyber Warfare and NATO's Comprehensive Approach for Countering 21st Century Threats-Maping the New Frontier of Global Risk and Security Management", *Amicus Curiae*, 2011, Issue 88, 24-27, p. 25.

These are some of the main areas in which the military operates actively with other international and non-governmental organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization, International Chamber of Shipping, European Union, and African Union. Liaising, coordinating, and cooperating with these actors provide opportunities to all sides for better planning, avoiding duplicate efforts, conserving resources, and reaching an end state that is likely to be the same for all actors.

CIMIC as an interface can be the main facilitator in liaising, coordinating, and cooperating with these actors by monitoring the current maritime security environment, defining related actors, establishing liaisons with them, and creating conditions for information exchange. This can help military decision-makers better understand the security environment and root causes of the tensions and conflicts. At the onset, however, this requires being aware of the situation and the maritime domain. These awareness efforts should start by coordinating with commercial shipping agencies.²⁸

Very important within this framework are NATO's long-term efforts, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS), Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System (AWNIS), and NATO Shipping Center (NSC). The first two initiatives are composed not just of NATO nations but also of partner nations, non-NATO nations, and other regional shipping organizations. NCAGS and AWNIS contribute to the comprehensive approach through their close cooperation with CIMIC. NCAGS and AWNIS's inherent relationships with the merchant shipping industry facilitate the de-confliction of military and commercial shipping operations by coordinating with military and non-military stakeholders, which includes military maritime security agencies, government departments and agencies, law enforcement agencies, and international and non-governmental organizations.²⁹

²⁸ Feldt, Roell and Thiele, "Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach", p. 19.

²⁹ NATO, *Allied Joint Publication (AJP)*.

NATO joint efforts in this regard are supported by NCAGS and AWNIS through their:

- support in commercial shipping which contributes to free flow of trade, improved safety and security, and advice and guidance on maritime security risks, as well as
- contributions to the commander's freedom of maneuvers and efficient use of military resources by de-conflicting military and commercial maritime operations.³⁰

The NATO Shipping Centre (NSC) is an integral and permanent element of the NATO maritime command headquarters and provides the primary point of contact between NATO and the merchant shipping industry. The NSC provides fused information and operational support for all national and multinational operations worldwide as directed. The NSC implements NCAGS and AWNIS on a daily basis through interfaces with the maritime industry and provides and maintains global situational awareness to them in support of NATO operations.³¹

Conclusion

As a military function with dedicated capabilities, CIMIC is the manager of the civil-military interface. This interface was created by the military during land-heavy operations as a requirement. However, civil-military interface is somewhat natural, and being in relations with non-military actors is a part of the daily duty of military actors in the maritime domain. Nevertheless, this responsibility needs to be pulled away from a daily-duty form; the civil-military interface in the maritime domain must be organized and managed by dedicated staff. Here are some points for a better maritime CIMIC:

- Establish a maritime CIMIC with dedicated staff who will help militaries prepare and plan even in peace time.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

- This should cover creating conditions and facilitating information and experience-sharing with related non-military actors, including academia and the private sector.

- These conditions can be easily created by inviting these actors to trainings and exercises and conducting capacity-building projects.

- While conducting academic studies on maritime security, militaries can contribute by indicating how maritime threats and risks are interconnected.

- Militaries may provide information for security-sector reform in the maritime domain.³²

- Militaries can establish a “*lessons identified and lessons learned*” and “*operation assessment and evaluation*” mechanism open to respective non-military actors.

- While doing these things, militaries should respect the primacy of non-military actors.

This will help militaries understand the civilian environment and become aware about other actors’ capacities and capabilities, decision-making processes, structures, and mandates. This awareness will help in planning activities better by avoiding duplicate efforts and conserving resources, as well as delivering the situation to the relevant civilian authorities in a short time.

Özet

Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Yugoslavya’nın dağılma süreciyle tetiklenen silahlı çatışmalar yeni düzenin ilk krizlerine örnek teşkil etmiştir. Uluslararası askerî müdahale kararının alınmasıyla birlikte NATO üyesi olan ve olmayan ülkeler askerî destek sağlamış ve krizlerin çatışma safhası kısa sürede sona ermiştir. Bu harekâtlar NATO terminolojisinde “5. Madde Dışı Harekâtlar” ya da bilinen

³² Bueger and Edmunds, “Beyond Seabindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies” p. 1294.

adıyla “*Barış Harekâtları*” olarak anılmaktadır. Barış Harekâtları’nın en temel özelliği, silahlı çatışmaların kısa sürede sonlandırılmasına rağmen insani sorunun bir türlü çözülememesi, askerlerin daha çok siviller tarafından yerine getirilen görevleri üstlenmeleri ve bunun sonucunda bir sivil-asker arayüzünün oluşmasıdır. Bu arayüz, daha çok uluslararası sivil toplumun üyeleri olan aktörler, yerel halk ve askerlerin içinde olduğu bir ilişkiler ağıdır. Sivil-Asker İş Birliği (SAİ) ile belirli bir çerçevede ve bir amaç doğrultusunda bu ilişkiler ağının yönetilmesi hedeflenmektedir.

SAİ’ne, 1990’larda daha çok insani yardım faaliyetlerini koordine etmek için başvurulmuştur. Günümüzde değişen harekât ortamı ve tehdit ve riskler ile SAİ’ne atfedilen konular da değişmiştir. Bunların başında toplumun bir şok karşısında yeniden toparlanma kabiliyeti yani dirençlilik (resilience) ve sivil hazırlık gelmektedir. Diğer konular ise kültürel varlıkların korunması, silahlı çatışmalarda kadınların ve çocukların durumları gibi konulardır.

Hem ilgilenilen konular hem de ortaya çıkan aktörler açısından bakıldığında ve sorunlara kapsamlı bir yaklaşımla eğilmek gerektiği kabul edildiğinde barıştan itibaren sivil durum değerlendirmesi yapmak, ilgili aktörlerle irtibat tesis ederek bilgi alışverişinde bulunmak ve mümkün olduğunda planlamaları birlikte gerçekleştirmek problemlere daha uygun çözümler getirilmesine katkı sağlayabilir.

Bütün bunlar çerçevesinde, deniz alanında deniz güvenliğinin sağlanmasında da aynı yaklaşım gerekli ve geçerlidir. Deniz alanı çok çeşitli aktörler ve faktörler ihtiva etmektedir. Bu durum günümüz tehdit ve riskleri göz önüne alındığında deniz güvenliğinin sadece savaş gemileri ve askerler tarafından sağlanamayacağını göstermektedir. Deniz güvenliğinin sağlanmasında katkısı olacak aktörlerin belirlenmesi, irtibata geçilmesi, aktörlerin birbirini anlaması ve ortak bir paydada buluşarak tam bir iş birliğine gidilmesi uzun bir süreçtir. Bu süreci başından beri yönetebilecek olan ise SAİ’dir.

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YAYIN İLKELERİ

GSD'ye gönderilen makalelerin daha önce yayımlanmamış ve ilgili alan literatürüne katkı sağlayacak derecede özgün olması gereklidir. Bilimsel toplantılarda sunulmuş bir bildiriye dayanan aday makale, ilgili bildiri kitapçığında yayımlanmamış olması ve bu durumun belirtilmesi koşuluyla kabul edilebilir.

Yayımlanmak üzere GSD editörlüğü eposta hesabına iletilen makale metinleri, aşağıda belirtilen şekil şartlarını taşımaları ve konu/ alan açısından uygun bulunmaları halinde alan uzmanı (en az) iki hakeme gönderilir. Hakem değerlendirmelerinin tamamı sunulan çalışmanın değişiklik yapılmaksızın yayımlanması yönünde ise aday makale yayım sırasına alınır.

Dergi editörlerinin ve hakemlerin aday makale metninde biçim, yöntem ya da içerik açılarından değişiklik/ düzeltme talep etmeleri halinde, yazar durumdan haberdar edilir ve en geç 20 gün içinde metni yeniden düzenleyerek iletmesi istenir. Katılmadığı hususlar olması durumunda, yazar bunları gerekçeleri ile cevabi bir yazıyla bildirme hakkına sahiptir. Yazar tarafından hakem raporlarına verilen cevap ve/veya hakem görüşleri doğrultusunda yeniden düzenlenmiş makale metni editörlük ve gerekiyorsa hakemlerce tekrar incelenir. Aday makale, alan uzmanı en az iki hakemin "yayımlanabilir" onayı vermesinden sonra, ilk Yayın Kurulu toplantısına gündemine alınır ve burada alınacak nihai karar sonrası yayımlanır.

Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi'nde yayımlanan makale ve kitap incelemelerinde ifade edilen görüşler yazarlarının şahsi bilimsel değerlendirmeleri olup, mensup oldukları kurum ve kuruluşlar ile derginin yayımcısı olan Atatürk Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü ve Millî Savunma Üniversitesi'nin kurumsal görüşü niteliğini taşımaz.

Makale ve Kitap İncelemesi Metin Şekil Esasları

1. GSD'nin yayın dili Türkçe'dir. Ancak İngilizce, Fransızca ve Almanca makale ve değerlendirme yazıları da yayımlanabilir. Türkçe makalelerin imla ve noktalamasında Türk Dil Kurumu kurumsal web sayfasında erişilebilen güncel sözlük ve yazım kuralları esas alınır. Gönderilen yazılar dil ve anlatım açısından bilimsel ölçülere uygun, açık ve anlaşılır olmalıdır.
2. Gönderilen makale metninin azami hacmi 12.500 kelime (öz, *abstract*, kaynakça, özet ve dipnotlar dâhil) olmalıdır.
3. Kitap incelemelerinin azami hacmi 4000 kelime olmalıdır. Başlık bilgilerinde tanıtım veya inceleme yapılan eserin adı, yazarı, yayımlandığı şehir ve yayınevi, yayım yılı ve ISBN numarası yazılmalıdır. Çalışmanın sonuna incelemeyi veya tanıtımı yapan yazarın unvanı, görev yeri ve elektronik posta adresi yazılmalıdır. İnceleme, kitapta ortaya konulan en önemli noktaları öne çıkararak, çalışmanın dil, üslup, yöntem, teorik yaklaşım ve kavramsallaştırma, bulguları destekleyen kanıtlar ve ulaşılan sonuçların ilgili alana katkısı açılarından eleştirel olarak tartışılması şeklinde kaleme alınmış olmalıdır.

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4. Türkçe makalelerin başlık ve metinleri arasında, Türkçe ve İngilizce olarak hazırlanmış azami 150 kelimelik öz ile beş anahtar kelime yer almalıdır. Öz, makalenin kaleme alınma amacını, yöntemini, hipotezini/araştırma sorusu, bulguları ve sonucunu kısaca belirtmelidir. Ayrıca makalenin sonunda 750 kelimeyi geçmeyecek şekilde Türkçe ve İngilizce geniş özete yer verilmelidir. Geniş özet, özde yer verilen hususlara ilâve olarak vurgulanması gerekli görülen noktaları, tartışmaları ve makalenin genel akışını içermelidir.

5. Yazar adı, makale başlığının altına yazılmalı; yazarın unvanı, görev yeri ve elektronik posta adresi dipnotta (*) işareti ile 9 punto yazılarak belirtilmelidir. Diğer açıklamalar için yapılan dipnotlar metin içinde ve sayfa altında numaralandırılarak verilmelidir.

6. Metinler Times New Roman karakteri kullanılarak, 11 puntoda ve 1,5 satır aralığına sahip olacak şekilde yazılmalıdır. Dipnotlar ise 9 punto ve 1 aralıklı yazılmalıdır.

7. Paragraf özellikleri hizalama iki yana ve satır aralığı 1,5 şeklinde olmalıdır. Sayfa numaraları ise altta verilmelidir.

8. Makalelerde kullanılacak altbaşlıklar koyu yazılmalı ve rakam ile numaralandırılmalıdır.

9. Dipnotlarda atıflar aşağıdaki şekillerde verilmelidir.

9.1. Kitaplar: Kitaplara yapılan atıflarda yazar adı ve soyadı, *eser adı*, (varsa cilt numarası), (varsa çeviren), yayınevi, yayımlandığı yer, yayımlandığı tarih ve sayfa numarası aşağıdaki örneklerle uygun olarak sırayla verilecektir.

Tek yazarlı kitap: Henry Kissinger, *Dünya Düzeni*, (çev. Sinem Sultan Gül), Boyner Yayınları, İstanbul, 2016, ss. 14-16.

İki yazarlı kitap: George Friedman ve Meredith Friedman, *Savaşın Geleceği-21. Yüzyılda Güç, Teknoloji ve Amerikan Dünya Egemenliği*, (çev. Enver Günsel), Pegasus Yayınları, İstanbul, 2015, s. 114.

Çok yazarlı kitap: Pınar Bilgin vd., *Türkiye Dünyanın Neresinde?-Hayali Coğrafyalar, Çarpışan Anılar*, Koç Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2015, s. 19.

Çeviri: Walter Isaacson, *Steve Jobs*, çev. Dost Körpe, Domingo Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2011, s. 540.

Yazar bilgisi verilmemiş kitap: “Türkiye ve Dünyada Yükseköğretim”, *Bilim ve Teknoloji*, TÜSİAD Yayınları, İstanbul, 1994, s. 81.

Çok ciltli kitap: Halil İnalçık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarihi* (çev. Halil Berktaş), Cilt: 1, Eren Yayınları, İstanbul 2000, s. 100.

9.2. Makaleler: Makalelere yapılan atıflarda yazar adı ve soyadı, “makale adı” (varsa çeviren), *yayımlandığı süreli yayının adı*, yayımlandığı yıl, cilt no (Romen)/sayı, dergide yer aldığı sayfa aralığı, alıntının yapıldığı sayfa numarası aşağıdaki örneklerle uygun olarak sırayla verilecektir. Ansiklopedi maddelerine yapılan atıflarda da makalelere atıf şekli kullanılacaktır.

Tek yazarlı makale: R. Kutay Karaca, “Türkiye-Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti İlişkilerinde Doğu Türkistan Sorunu”, *Gazi Akademik Bakış*, 2008, Cilt: 1, 219-245, s. 220.

Derleme kitaplar ve bildiri kitaplarında bölüm/makale: Engin Avcı, “Türkiye’de Terörizm ve Terörizmle Mücadele”, Gökhan Sarı ve Cenker Korhan Demir, (ed.), *Güvenlik Bilimlerine Giriş*, Jandarma Basımevi, Ankara, 2015, 281-310, s. 305.

9.3. Konferanslarda Sunulan Tebliğler: Dritan Egro, “Arnavutluk’ta Osmanlı Çalışmaları”, *XIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Bildiriler, 4-8 Ekim 1999*, Cilt: I, TTK Yayını, Ankara, 2002, s. 14.

9.4. İnternet Dergisinde Makale: Hasan Kopkallı, “Does frequency of online support use have an effect on overall grades?”, *The Turkish Online Journal of Distance Education*, <http://tojde.anadolu.edu.tr/> (Erişim Tarihi: 18.11.2009).

9.5. Tezlere yapılan atıflarda yayımlanmamış tezlerin başlıkları için italik kullanılmayacaktır. Yazar adı ve soyadı, tezin adı, tezin derecesi, tezin yapıldığı kurum ve enstitü, yapıldığı yer ve tarih, sayfa numarası aşağıdaki şekilde verilecektir.

Atasay Özdemir, Uluslararası Sistemdeki Etkin Aktörlerin İran’ın Nükleer Programına Yaklaşımları, Doktora Tezi, Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü, İstanbul, 2013, s. 53.

9.6. İnternet üzerinden erişilebilen açık kaynaklara yapılan atıflar, aşağıdaki örneğe göre yapılacaktır.

T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Resmî İnternet Sayfası, “Türkiye Ukrayna Anlaşması”, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkce/grouph/ikili/11.htm> (Erişim Tarihi: 14.07.2010).

10. Aynı kaynağa yapılan atıflarda yazar adı ve soyadı, age (adı geçen eser), agm (adı geçen makale) ve agy (adı geçen yayın) ifadesi ve sayfa numarası kullanılmalıdır. Aynı yazarın birden fazla eseri kullanılıyorsa yapılan atıflarda yazar adı ve soyadı, eserin yayım tarihi, age ifadesi ve sayfa numarası yazılmalı; yazarın aynı tarihli birden fazla eseri kullanılıyorsa, eser tarihinin yayına a, b, c harfleri konularak atıf yapılmalı ve bu durum kaynakçada da belirtilmelidir.

11. Ekler yazının sonunda verilecek ve altında belgenin içeriği ve kaynağına dair kısa bilgi yer alacaktır. Tablo ve şekiller (grafik dâhil), Ekler kısmında verilebileceği gibi metin içerisine de yerleştirilebilir. Metin içerisinde verilmeleri durumunda tablo ve şekiller kendi içinde sıralanarak numaralandırılmalı (Tablo: 1, Şekil: 2 gibi) ve gerek bu numara gerekse tablonun/ şeklinin içeriğine dair tanıtıcı başlık tablonun/ şeklinin üst orta kısmında verilmelidir. Tablo, şekil, grafik ve resim için alıntı yapılmışsa, mutlaka kaynak belirtilmelidir.

12. Aday makale metinlerinin sonlarında, alfabetik sıra ve alıntı türüne (kitaplar, makaleler, internet kaynakları vs.) göre tasniflenmiş kaynakça verilmesi gerekmektedir. Bu kaynakça makalenin yayımlanması durumunda metinde yer almayabilir, makale değerlendirme sürecinin hızla yürütülebilmesi için kullanılır.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

Articles submitted to the Journal of Security Strategies (JSS) shall not be previously published and shall be authentic in a way that it will contribute to literature of the relevant field. Articles based on presentations submitted in scientific meetings may be accepted for evaluation, provided that they have not been published in the proceedings of the meetings and that the authors indicate it so.

If the article submitted to the e-mail address of the editorial board comply with the formatting principles presented below and is found to eligible in terms of subject/field, it is sent to (at least two) referees who are experts in the field. If all the referee reviews approve the article to be published without any change, the candidate article in question is taken to the list of articles to be published.

If the editors or the referees request changes/corrections in the article in terms of format, method or content, the author is notified of these requests and is asked to edit the article within 20 days at the latest. In the event that he/she does not agree with these requests or some parts of them, the author has the right to report them by presenting his/her reasons in a written reply to the editorial board. The author's response to the requests of changes/corrections and/or the article which has been edited by the author in accordance with the requests of changes/corrections are revised by the editors and, if necessary, by the referees again. After the article gets "publishable" approval from at least two referees who are experts in their fields, it is taken to the agenda of the next meeting of the Editorial Board and gets published after the final decision to be taken in this meeting.

Opinions expressed in the articles and book reviews published in the JSS are the personal scientific evaluations of the authors and are not, in any way, the institutional views or opinions of their own organizations/institutes or of the Atatürk Institute of Strategic Studies or Turkish National Defense University.

Formatting Principles for Articles and Book Reviews

1. The publication language of JSS is Turkish. However, articles written in English, German, and French may also be published. The texts submitted shall be clear and understandable, and be in line with scientific criteria in terms of language and expression.
2. The article submitted shall have maximum of 12,500 words including abstract, summary, bibliography, and footnotes.
3. The book reviews shall have maximum of 4000 words. Title information of the book reviews shall include the name of the book reviewed, the author, the city of publication, the publication house, the publication year and the ISBN number. Name of the reviewer, his/her title, institution, and e-mail address shall be written at the end of the review.

The reviews shall be written by pointing out the most important points outlined in the book and also in the form of critical discussion on the book's language, style,

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methodology, theoretical approach and conceptualization, evidences supporting the findings and results obtained.

4. The articles shall be submitted with the abstract no longer than 150 words and five keywords. The abstract shall include purpose, method, hypothesis/question and findings of the article and present the conclusion reached in the article shortly. The article shall also have a summary no longer than 750 words at the end of the text. The summary shall include the points and arguments which are considered to emphasize and the general outline of the article, in addition to the points pointed out in the abstract.

5. Name of the author shall be placed under the title of the article; his/her title, place of duty and e-mail address shall be indicated in the footnote with (*) in 9 type size. Footnotes for other explanations shall be provided both in the text and at the bottom of the page in numbers.

6. The type character shall be Times New Roman, 11 type size, line spacing 1,5, footnotes in 9 type size and with single line spacing.

7. Paragraphs shall be justified and line spacing shall be 1.5. Page numbers shall be placed at the bottom of the page.

8. Subheadings shall be written in bold and given numbers.

9. References in the footnotes shall be given as specified below.

9.1. Books: For references to the books, name and surname of the author, *name of the book*, (volume number, if available), (translator, if any), publisher, place of publication, date of publication, and page number shall be given in accordance with the following examples.

Books with single author: Henry Kissinger, *World Order*, Penguin Press, New York, 2014, pp. 23-30.

Books with two authors: George Friedman and Meredith Friedman, *The Future of War-Power, Technology and American World Dominance in Twenty-First Century*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996, p. 113.

Books with more than two authors: Pınar Bilgin et al, *Türkiye Dünyanın Neresinde?-Hayali Coğrafyalar, Çarpışan Anılar*, Koç University Press, İstanbul, 2015, p. 19.

Translated books: Walter Isaacson, *Steve Jobs*, trans. Dost Körpe, Domingo Publication, İstanbul, 2011, p. 540.

Books with name or editor non-specified: "Türkiye ve Dünyada Yükseköğretim", *Bilim ve Teknoloji*, TÜSİAD Publication, İstanbul, 1994, p. 81.

Publication with more than one volume: Halil İnalçık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarihi* (trans. Halil Berktaş), Vol: 1, Eren Publication, İstanbul 2000, s. 100.

9.2. For references to the articles, name and surname of the author, "name of the article" (translator, if any), *name of the periodical in which it is published*, year of publication, volume no./issue no., page range in the periodical, and page number of the reference given shall be given in accordance with the following examples. Entries from encyclopedias shall be given reference as if they are articles.

Article with one author: John C. Grene, “Reflections on the Progress of Darwin Studies”, *Journal of the History of Biology*, 1975, Vol: 8, 243-273, p. 270.

Chapter/Article in compilation books: Engin Avcı, “Türkiye’de Terörizm ve Terörizmle Mücadele”, Gökhan Sarı and Cenker Korhan Demir, (ed.), *Güvenlik Bilimlerine Giriş*, Gendarmerie Publishing House, Ankara, 2015, 281-310, p. 305.

9.3. Presentation in Conference: Dritan Egro, “Arnavutluk’ta Osmanlı Çalışmaları”, *XIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi Bildirileri, 4-8 October 1999*, Vol: I, TTK Publishing, Ankara, 2002, p. 14.

9.4. Article from Internet Journal: Hasan Kopkallı, “Does frequency of online support use have an effect on overall grades?”, *The Turkish Online Journal of Distance Education*, <http://tojde.anadolu.edu.tr/> (Access date: 18.11.2009).

9.5. For reference to the theses, no *italics* shall be used for titles of non-published theses. Name and surname of the author, name of thesis, degree of the thesis, institution or institute to which the thesis is presented, place and date of the thesis, page number shall be given in accordance with the following example.

Atasay Özdemir, The Approaches of the Major Actors in the International System to Iran's Nuclear Programme, Ph.D. Thesis, Turkish War Colleges, Strategic Research Institute, İstanbul, 2013, p. 53.

9.6. References to the open sources accessible via Internet shall be given in accordance with the following example.

The Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Official Web Site, “Agreement between Turkey and Ukraina”, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkce/grouph/ikili/11.htm> (Access date: 14.07.2010).

10. References for the same publication shall be made by writing down the name and surname of the author, *ibid*, and page number. If more than one publication from the same author is to be referenced, name and surname of author, year of publication, *ibid*, and page number shall be used. If more than one publication with same year of publication from the same author is to be referenced, letters a, b, c, and so forth shall be used after year of publication, and it shall also be stated in bibliography.

11. Attachments (documents) shall be presented at the end of the text and brief information as to the content and source of the document shall be presented at the bottom of it. Tables and figures (including graphics) may be presented within the text of the article as well as in the attachments. If they are to be presented within the text of article, tables and figures shall be organized and numbered according to their own types (e.g. Table:1, Figure:1, etc). Along with the number of the table or figure, an informative title for the table or the figure shall be written on the top center of it. If tables, figures, graphics or pictures are quoted from somewhere else, the source shall be referenced.

12. Resources shall be sorted alphabetically and according to their types (books, articles, internet resources, etc.) in a bibliography at the end of the article. This bibliography may not to be included in the article, if the article is accepted as “publishable”, but it is used to speed up the evaluation process.

